L  I  B  R.ARY 

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OF    ILLINOIS 

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34 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  OF 

AMERICA  AND  THE 

NON-UNION   COAL   FIELDS 


BY 

A.  F.  HINRICHS 

Instructor  in  Columbia  College 


SUBMITTED    IN    PARTIAL    FULFILMENT    OF    THE    RFQUIREMENTS 
FOR    THE   DEGREE   OF    DOCTOR    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

IN  THE 

Faculty  of  Political  Science 
Columbia  University 


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NEW  YORK 
1923 


PREFACE 

This  study  is  the  result  of  some  eight  weeks  which  I 
spent  in  the  coal  fields  of  West  Virginia  in  the  summer  of 
192 1  and  of  a  careful  examination  of  all  of  the  available 
material,  and  particularly  of  the  reports  of  the  U.  S.  Geo- 
logical Survey,  of  the  various  state  and  federal  investiga- 
tions bearing  on  the  coal  industry,  and  of  the  publications  of 
the  parties  to  the  controversy. 

In  some  respects  the  material  available  is  quite  complete, 
but  as  regards  labor  conditions  in  the  coal  industry  there  is 
little  continuity  and  the  evidence  is  conflicting.  This  occurs 
because  public  interest  in  the  industry  has  been  sporadic. 
Dramatic  events  h?  ;e  drawn  non-partisan  attention.  Hear- 
ings before  some  committee  have  resulted.  These  com- 
mittees have  received  evidence  from  both  sides,  assuming 
them  competent  and  willing  to  present  all  the  necessary  in- 
formation. On  this  'basis  the  committee  members  have 
formulated  their  conclusions.  The  result  has  never  been 
the  truth,  but  rather  a  judgment  of  relative  truthfulness. 
These  committees  have  not  set  up  their  own  investigating 
staffs,  and  yet  it  is  only  by  such  means  that  we  can  hope 
for  valuable  results.  This  is  now  being  done  by  the  U.  S. 
Coal  Commission.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  we  may  soon 
have  all  the  facts. 

Pending  the  results  of  such  an  investigation,  my  analysis 
had  to  be  made  on  the  old  lines.  From  such  facts  as  are 
available,  I  have  sought  to  draw  conclusions.  It  is  hoped 
that  the  analysis  is  an  advance  over  our  present  knowledge 
in  that  it  discards  certain  occurrences  that  are  beside  the 
5]  5 

539672 


6  PREFACE  [6 

point  but  have  hitherto  clouded  the  issue,  that  the  issues 
themselves  are  set  forth  squarely  and  that  the  limitation  of 
our  information  is  made  so  clear  as  to  be  of  some  aid  in 
further  investigation.  This  monograph  is  intended  then  to 
be  a  summary  and  analysis  of  our  present  knowledge  but 
also — and  far  more  important — a  starting  point  for  other 
investigations  with  the  resources  and  power  to  secure  and 
analyze  all  the  facts. 

Although  not  agreeing  with  much  in  Winthrop  Lane's 
Civil  War  in  West  Virginia,  I  have  made  extensive  use  of 
it  in  directing  my  critical  thought.  To  Louis  Bloch's  The 
Coal  Miners'  Insecurity,  I  am  indebted  for  statistics  used 
in  my  discussion  of  the  development  of  the  coal  industry. 

So  many  people  have  given  to  me  of  their  time  and  advice 
that  I  am  unable  to  express  my  appreciation  to  them  ail- 
Particularly  is  this  true  of  miners'  officials  and  operators  in 
West  Virginia.  However,  I  must  take  occasion  to  express 
my  obligation  to  W.  E.  Ambrose  of  Cumberland,  and  Frank 
Keeney  and  D.  C.  Kennedy  of  Charleston,  W.  Va. ;  and  to 
Professor  Henry  R.  Seager  for  much  valuable  criticism.  My 
especial  thanks  are  due  to  my  family  for  their  encourage- 
ment, careful  criticism  and  labor. 

Needless  to  say,  although  others  have  made  these  results 
possible,  I  am  alone  responsible  for  any  statements  which 
are  made  in  the  following  pages. 


CONTENTS 


PACK 


Introduction 9 

CHAPTER  I 
Do  the  Men  Want  the  Union  ? 13 

CHAPTER  II 
Wages 17 

CHAPTER  III 
The  Checkweighman 30 

CHAPTER  IV 
The  Company  Store.    . 36 

CHAPTER  V 
The  Company  and  Private  Life 53 

CHAPTER  VI 
Improvement  in  Miners'  Conditions 81 

CHAPTER  VII 
The  Development  of  the  Coal  Industry  and  the  Miner 92 

CHAPTER  VIII 
Early  History  of  Unions  of  Coal  Miners.    .   .   J 104 

CHAPTER  IX 
Conspiracy 112 

CHAPTER  X 
The  Closed  Shop  in  the  Coal  Industry      '. 126 

7]  7 


8                                              CONTENTS  [8 

PACK 

CHAPTER  XI 

The  Case  of  Management  Against  the  Union 143 

CHAPTER  XII 

Public  Interest  in  Coal 172 

CHAPTER  XIII 

Conclusion 186 

Bibliography 189 

Index 195 


INTRODUCTION 

i 
It  is  the  purpose  of  this  book  to  examine  the  case  for 

and  against  the  extension  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of 
America  to  non-union  coal  fields.  The  author  is  aware  that 
his  analysis  runs  counter  to  many  current  notions.  He  also 
feels  that  the  general  trend  of  the  argument  may  be  con- 
fusing unless  the  reader  has  in  mind  the  skeleton  form  of 
the  development. 

The  reason  usually  advanced  for  the  introduction  of  a 
union  is  the  anticipation  of  an  immediate  economic  gain  for 
the  hitherto  unorganized  workers.  Conditions  in  a  non- 
union shop  or  mine  are  presumed  to  be  much  worse  than  in 
a  union.  That  is,  hours  are  longer,  wages  are  lower,  sani- 
tation and  safety  are  more  meagerly  provided  for.  True  to 
form,  this  is  the  line  of  attack  taken  by  the  coal  miners. 
The  author  in  his  first  prejudice  assumed  this  to  be  correct 
and  proceeded  to  make  his  study  from  this  angle.  To  his 
great  surprise  he  found  little  justification  for  such  an  argu- 
ment. The  facts  seem  to  be  that  at  any  given  time  wages, 
hours  and  general  living  conditions  are  likely  to  be  about 
the  same.  The  facts  which  lead  to  this  assertion  are  set 
forth  in  the  first  chapters  of  this  book. 

When  it  is  not  the  immediate  economic  reason  that  is 
advanced,  the  argument  becomes  more  general.  It  takes  on 
a  philosophico-psyohological  aspect,  dealing  in  a  confusing- 
manner  with  both  sentimental  and  scientific  appeals  for 
freedom.  There  is  undoubtedly  much  to  be  said  for  the  ad- 
vantages of  industrial  democracy;  but  that  mystic  wave 
of  the  flag  and  the  cry  of  "  Bunker  Hill,"  "  the  Boston  Tea 
9]  9 


10  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [10 

Party,"  or  "  the  Declaration  of  Independence  "  only  clouds 
the  argument. 

In  the  case  of  West  Virginia,  particularly  since  the  appeal 
to  the  emotions  is  so  strong,  it  is  necessary  to  remain  as  far 
as  possible  quite  coldly  analytical.  It  will  be  particularly 
noticed  in  the  pages  that  follow  that  the  author  has  neglected 
much  that  commonly  figures  in  accounts  of  the  struggle 
and  the  miners'  wrongs.  There  is  almost  no  mention  of  the 
acts  of  violence  committed  by  both  sides,  the  infringement* 
of  personal  liberty,  the  suffering,  the  brutality.  Such  facts 
play  an  important  part  in  the  story  of  the  struggle  but  have 
almost  nothing  to  do  with  the  fundamental  question,  Shall 
the  field  be  unionized? 

This  point  is  so  important  that  we  may  be  pardoned  if 
we  develop  it  at  somewhat  greater  length,  although  exclud- 
ing it  from  the  subsequent  argument.  Let  us  assume  that 
from  the  union  point  of  view  the  field  is  virgin  territory. 
There  has  been  no  attempt  to  organize  it.  Now  contrast 
the  conditions  of  personal  liberty  in  this  non-union  field 
and  some  union  region.  In  the  former  the  man  deals  as  an 
individual  with  the  operator.  They  are  both  technically 
"  free  "  individuals,  but  economic  power  allows  the  oper- 
ator to  dominate.  He  may  discharge  the  worker  at  will. 
The  employee  has  virtually  no  control  over  conditions  of 
employment.  In  the  union  field  the  worker  delegates  cer- 
tain rights  to  the  collective  body.  He  sacrifices  part  of  his 
freedom  to  the  common  interest,  as  does  the  citizen  of  the 
state.  But  he  may  gain  collectively  more  than  enough  to 
compensate.  He  can  prevent  gross  frauds.  He  may  gain 
in  wage  disputes.  He  may  even  fix  so  petty  a  condition  as 
the  location  at  which  the  work-bus  stops  in  the  morning. 
This  phase  of  personal  liberty  must  be  considered.  It  goes 
now  under  the  generic  head  of  "  industrial  democracy  ". 

But  this  is  not  the  sense  in  which  it  is  most  commonly 


H]  INTRODUCTION  II 

alleged  that  personal  liberty  is  infringed  in  West  Virginia. 
The  usual  complaint  is  with  reference  to  the  violations  of 
constitutional  guarantees.  In  ordinary  times  the  worker  is 
not  jailed  and  railroaded  out  of  town.  He  is  not  black- 
jacked and  threatened.1  Such  violence  occurs  against  the 
collectivity  of  workers  after  the  strike  is  called  or  when  the 
union  seriously  threatens  to  enter  the  field. 

This,  then,  cannot  be  a  cause  of,  or  a  reason  for  the  en- 
trance of  the  union.  The  reasons  for  the  entrance  of  the 
union  must  have  existed  before.2  Such  reasons,  lumped 
generically,  may  be  two  in  number:  Conditions  within  the 
field  may  be  comparatively  poor,  which  would  include  per- 
sonal liberty  in  the  sense  of  industrial  democracy;  the  en- 
trance of  the  union  may  be  warranted  by  conditions  in  the 
industry  as  a  whole  rather  than  by  conditions  in  one  locality. 

It  is  to  this  second  point  that  the  second  part  of  this  book 
is  addressed.  In  the  industry  as  a  whole,  conditions  are 
limited  by  the  most  recalcitrant  part.     The  union  field  is  a 

1  There  may  be  some  dispute  as  to  the  validity  of  this  statement. 
Unorganized  workers  have  often  feared  to  ask  for  improved  condi- 
tions, but  the  consequence  in  the  case  of  individuals  has  been  dis- 
charge. This  would  be  treated  under  industrial  democracy.  In 
Colorado  the  worker  often  suffered  an  impairment  of  his  franchise. 
(For  this  alleged  condition  in  West  Virginia  see  testimony  before  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Labor  and  Education,  vol.  ii,  p.  719  et  seq.). 
But  by  and  large  the  statement  holds,  particularly  as  the  union  in 
presenting  its  case  dealt  not  so  largely  with  these  instances  as  with, 
the  gross  violations  of  personal  liberty  that  occurred  when  the  strike 
was  called. 

2  Philip  Murray,  a  vice-president  of  the  union,  told  me  when  I  de- 
veloped this  point  to  him  that  he  agreed.  But  the  difficulty  is,  says 
Murray,  that  this  is  a  condition  that  can  be  changed  only  when  the 
union  gets  in.  In  the  meantime  the  operators  control  the  situation 
through  the  government.  Nothing  can  be  done  by  the  workers  until  the 
condition  is  remedied. 

It  is  a  puzzling  situation.  One  does  not  blame  the  union  at  all  for 
confusing  the  situation.  But  I  feel  that  the  distinction  made  above  is 
not  only  valid  but  valuable. 


12  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [12 

positive  force.  The  non-union  is  negative,  reflecting  the 
"  natural  "  condition  of  the  entire  industry  in  its  present 
state  of  over-development. 

Then  the  argument  swings  back  to  the  local  field  in  an 
attempt  to  justify  the  surrender  of  some  rights  by  the  worker 
to  his  collective  self,  and  to  present  the  case  of  both  oper- 
ator and  the  public. 

Thus  in  brief  the  argument  runs  as  follows:  Viewed 
statically,  that  is  as  a  point  in  time,  conditions  tend  to  be 
the  same  in  union  and  non-union  fields.  But  dynamically 
the  coal  industry,  because  of  the  extreme  competition  en- 
gendered by  over-development,  is  a  negative  force  that  re- 
quires control.  The  workers  secure  this  control  through 
the  union  and  through  this  alone,  but  they  are  balked  in 
their  efforts  by  the  fields  over  which  they  have  no  control: 
i.  e.,  the  non-union  fields.  Therefore  they  must  bring  in  all 
fields.  When  they  have  succeeded,  however,  the  operator  is 
entitled  to  some  protection  and,  above  all,  the  miners  must 
be  forced  to  surrender  certain  rights  to  the  superior  rights 
of  the  public  as  consumers. 


CHAPTER  I 
Do  the  Men  Want  the  Union? 

It  has  been  the  operators'  contention  that  their  men  do 
not  desire  the  introduction  of  the  union.  They  feel  that 
they  are  in  closer  contact  with  the  men  about  the  mines  than 
are  the  union  organizers  who  come  to  the  field  as  strangers. 
The  operator  therefore  claims,  in  opposing  the  union,  to  act 
in  the  interest  of  the  men. 

Under  what  they  deemed  fair  conditions  the  operators  of 
the  Williamson  field  in  West  Virginia  drew  up  a  petition  to 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Education  and  Labor  to  be  signed 
by  their  men.  This  petition  states  that  the  undersigned 
employees 

desire  to  continue  to  work,  as  we  have  heretofore,  under  our 
own  individual  contracts,  believing  that  we  are  capable  of 
knowing  what  we  want  and  that  we  will  be  accorded,  as  we 
have  been  accorded  in  the  past,  the  most  reasonable  terms  and 
conditions  that  the  market  for  coal  and  business  conditions 
warrant,  and  desiring  protection  for  ourselves,  our  wives  and 
children  in  the  right  to  work  without  fear  of  loss  of  life  and 
free  of  intimidation  and  insult,  humbly  petition  your  Honor- 
able Committee  to  make  no  finding  that  will  question  or  deny 
us  .  .  .  the  choice,  privilege  and  right  to  work  as  American 
citizens  free  from  the  domination  and  control  of  those  who 
would  deny  us  the  choice,  privilege  and  right  to  work  as  such 
American  citizens,  and  would  seek  to  compel  us  to  join  the 
United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  or  relinquish  our  employ- 
ment and  means  of  livelihood  in  this  community.1 

1  Senate  Committee  on  Education  and  Ijobor:  Testimony  taken  under 
Senate  Resolution  No.  80,  1921,  investigating  conditions  in  West  Virginia 
coal  mines,  vol.  i,  p.  248. 

13]  13 


I4  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [i4 

The  paper  was  presented  to  the  men  for  voluntary  signa- 
ture. No  threat  was  made.  In  fact,  eleven  men  employed 
by  the  Pond  Creek  Coal  Company  refused  to  sign  because 
they  might  at  some  time  desire  to  return  to  union  fields  and 
they  feared  that  such  a  signature  would  injure  them.  Those 
men  were  not  discharged  or  discriminated  against.  In  the 
entire  field  the  petition  was  signed  by  4931  men  of  a  total 
of  about  5200  on  the  payrolls. 

It  seems  also  necessary  to  concede  that  the  men  were  fully 
aware  of  the  nature  of  the  petition.  Senator  Kenyon 
brought  out  by  questioning  that  probably  seventeen  per  cent 
of  the  men  who  signed  did  not  read  English,  and  hence  in- 
ferred that  they  did  not  know  what  they  signed.1  Mr. 
Olmsted,  the  chairman  of  the  Labor  Committee  of  the 
Williamson  Operators  Association,  believes  that  the  men 
understood,  for  at  one  colliery  the  men  refused  to  sign, 
thinking  it  favored  the  United  Mine  Workers.  When  the 
true  nature  of  the  petition  was  explained,  they  signed 
en  masse?  Mr.  Olmsted  is  probably  correct.  Even  the 
non-English  speaking  groups  probably  discovered  by  con- 
versation what  it  was  all  about. 

Far  more  important  than  Senator  Kenyon's  doubt  is  that 
raised  by  the  question  of  the  true  significance  of  such  a 
signature.  The  operator  cannot  be  sure  that  his  men  know 
anything  about  the  United  Mine  Workers,  but  we  may  be 
positive  that  every  man  in  the  Williamson  field  realized  that 
his  adherence  to  the  Mine  Workers  meant  discharge.  There 
is  a  subtle  distinction  between  signing  a  petition  favoring, 
and  refusing  to  sign  one  disapproving  of  the  United  Mine 
Workers.  The  distinction  is  too  fine  to  expect  the  average 
miner  to  draw. 

lIbid.,  p.  249. 

2  Statement  of  Harry  Olmsted,  Chairman  of  the  Labor  Committee  of 
the  Operators'  Association  of  the  Williamson  Field  to  the  Senate  Inves- 
tigating Committee  (Privately  Printed),  Washington,  1921,  p.  36. 


!c]        DO  THE  MEN  WANT  THE  UNION  1 5 

The  coal  operator  has  been  building  a  tradition  about 
himself  for  fifty  years  that  makes  him  absolutely  alien  to 
the  miners'  desires  and  convictions  with  reference  to  the 
union  or  anything  approaching  it.  It  is  too  late  to  expect 
the  men  to  give  the  operator  their  confidence  even  when  he 
is  as  honest  in  his  intent  as  some  of  these  operators  probably 
were.  As  one  miner,  William  C.  Gilbert,  testified  in  1914 
about  Colorado  conditions,1  although  the  company  had 
offered  the  men  a  checkweighman  "  the  men  was  afraid  to 
have  a  meeting  for  that  purpose;  they  have  been  discrimi- 
nated against  at  so  many  different  times  for  attending 
meetings  to  better  their  own  conditions."  Powers  Hap- 
good  tells  the  same  tale  for  Pennsylvania : 2 

When  I  saw  the  boss  again,  an  unusual  thing  happened  and 
one  which  will  make  me  keep  my  thoughts  to  myself  in  the 
future  if  I  want  a  job  very  badly.  While  the  foreman  was 
writing  down  a  few  answers  to  his  questions,  I  thought  it  would 
do  no  harm  to  ask  him  about  the  conditions  of  work. 

"  What  do  you  pay  here?" 

"  Seventy- two  cents  a  ton." 

"  Do  you  pay  anything  for  '  dead-work  '  ?" 

'As  soon  as  I  asked  this  question  the  foreman  threw  his 
pencil  on  the  table  and  said,  "  I  guess  you  don't  want  a  job 
bad  enough  to  get  one  here.     You  might  as  well  go  along." 

West  Virginia  was  a  living  commentary  on  the  fate  of  a 
man  who  joined  the  union.  The  railroad  tracks  were  dotted 
with  tent-colonies  of  discharged  miners,  discharged  for  but 
one  reason.  Although  this  referendum  seems  to  have  been 
perfectly  honest  on  the  part  of  the  operators,  we  cannot  infer 
that  the  miners  were  equally  sincere. 

1  Conditions  in  the  Coal  Mines  of  Colorado:  Testimony  taken  under 
House  Resolution  387  (1914),  vol.  ii,  p.  2366. 

a  Powers  Hapgood,  "  Two  Days  from  a  Diary,"  Survey  Graphic, 
April,  1922,  p.  1033. 


l6  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [16 

The  outsider  finds  himself  in  an  even  more  difficult  posi- 
tion than  the  operator.  Men  talk  freely,  but  not  of  union- 
ism, in  these  non-union  fields.  In  my  conversations  none 
of  the  men  admitted  any  desire  to  join  the  union  except 
strikers  who  had  joined  and  now  had  nothing  to  lose.  Mr. 
Hapgood  writes i1  "  None  of  the  group  I  talked  with 
seemed  much  interested  in  unionism  either  for  or  against. 
They  seemed,  like  most  non-union  men  I've  met,  too  in- 
active mentally  to  consider  the  question." 

There  are  undoubtedly  many  men  who  do  not  care,3  but 
there  were  in  the  mines  a  group  of  men  sufficiently  inter- 
ested completely  to  tie  up  >the  West  Virginia  half  of  the 
Williamson  field  for  over  a  month  and  several  hundreds 
who  were  willing  to  spend  a  winter  in  canvas  tents  rather 
than  surrender  their  unionism. 

Thus  it  seems  necessary  to  discount  very  heavily  the  peti- 
tions presented  by  the  operators.  We  may  assume  that  at 
least  a  very  considerable  fraction  of  the  men  employed 
wanted,  and  still  do  want,  the  union,  a  fraction  at  least 
large  enough  to  warrant  a  study  of  the  benefits  they  might 
derive  from  unionization. 

1Ibid.,  p.  1034.  I  cannot  agree  with  the  charge  of  mental  inertia.  I 
found  the  miners  of  West  Virginia  quite  alert,  although  many  of  them 
admitted  rather  complete  ignorance  of  the  functioning  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers. 

2  Cf.  infra,  p.  135.    Testimony  of  C.  E.  Lively. 


CHAPTER  II 
Wages 

There  is  no  single  factor  that  determines  whether  or 
not  one  job  is  better  than  another.  If  we  consider  all  the 
advantages  which  a  job  offers,  we  will  include  of  course 
real  wages  in  the  conventional  sense  of  purchasing  power, 
agreeableness  and  safety  of  working  conditions,  housing 
facilities,  and  educational  and  recreational  opportunities. 
But  this  carries  us  into  too  broad  a  field.  The  psychic 
gains  are  hardly  capable  of  more  than  the  roughest  meas- 
urement and,  as  will  be  seen  below,  the  incidental  advan- 
tages appear  in  all  respects,  excepting  perhaps  certain  mani- 
^  festations  of  personal  liberty,  to  be  at  least  as  great  in  non- 
union as  in  union  fields.  We  shall  start,  therefore,  with  a 
comparison  of  the  actual  money  wages  in  the  non-union 
Williamson  and  Logan  districts  and  the  union  sections  of 
West  Virginia.  This  is  justified  by  the  fact  that  the 
organization  of  the  Williamson  field  was  begun  by  men 
who  had  not  received  the  increase  awarded  by  the  Bitu- 
minous Coal  Commission  in  1920. 

Wages  may  be  compared  in  two  aspects :  first,  as  rates 
of  pay;  and  second,  as  earnings  over  a  given  period.  In 
general  industry  where  payment  is  by  the  piece,  we  may 
assume  that  the  higher  rate  is  better  than  the  lower  for 
similar  work.  We  are,  however,  prone  to  confuse  work 
and  product.  The  coal  industry  is  one  of  those  in  which 
this  distinction  is  important;  for  although  the  product  of 
two  mines  may  be  very  similar,  the  effort  in  mining  it  may 
17]  17 


1 8  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [Tg 

be  quite  different.  In  making  comparisons  of  wage  rates 
it  is  necessary  to  have  approximately  the  same  mining  con- 
ditions in  both  fields. 

The  earnings  of  men  vary  from  many  causes.     The  rate 

of  payment  affects  the  total  earnings.    The  number  of  hours 

^  worked  per  day  is,  of  course,  an  important  factor.     The 

\  regularity   of   employment   is   a   third.      The   influences   at 

work  are  so  various  that  the  wage  rate  in  two  similar  fields 

seems  to  me  a  better  test  than  earnings. 

For  example,  in  the  joint  conference  in  the  Kanawha  dis- 
trict of  West  Virginia  in  1906  Mr.  Rice,  a  union  represen- 
tative, talks  about  a  fair  day's  wage.  He  defines  it  as  "that 
which  will  enable  [the  miners]  to  live  with  reasonable  com- 
fort and  under  reasonable  circumstances,  without  having 
v  been  forced  to  exhaust  their  vitality  to  reach  it."  *  This 
"  exhaustion "  feature  makes  comparison  of  earnings  in 
two  fields  difficult.  He  goes  on  to  say:  "If  it  required 
twenty  tons  of  coal  for  me  to  support  my  wife  and  six 
children  properly,  I  would  have  to  do  it  until  my  body  gave 
out  from  exhaustion.  .  .  .  But  if  four  tons  a  day  will  do  it, 
that  is  enough." 

It  is  also  difficult  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  earnings 
vary  because  of  differences  in  the  number  of  days  worked. 
During  192*1  the  demand  for  coal  sank  to  about  sixty  per 
cent  of  war-time  and  post-war  peak  demands.  The  market 
required  about  400,000,000  tons  and  many  operators  ad- 
mitted that  "  giving  coal  away "  would  hardly  have  in- 
creased this  demand.  Since  the  total  capacity  amounted  to 
between  700,000,000  and  800,000,000  tons,  some  mines 
were  'bound  to  be  idle.  Trade  will  naturally  go  to  the 
mines  selling  at  the  lowest  rate.  The  union  maintains  its 
A  scale  rate  and  the  non-union  operators  cut  wages.     The  re- 

1  Proceedings  of  the  Joint  Scale  Committee  and  the  Joint  Convention 
of  Miners  and  Operators,  Charleston,  W.  Va.  (1906),  p.  128. 


19]  WAGES  I9 

suit  may  be  seen  by  examining  any  weekly  bulletin  of  the 
U.    S.    Geological    Survey : *   the  non-union  field   gets  the 
trade  at  the  expense  of  the  union.     But — and  this  is  the 
point  that  is  sometimes   forgotten — if  all  fields  cut  rates,/ 
all  would  be  only  partially  employed. 

In  considering  the  wages  of  union  and  non-union  labor 
we  find  a  difference  in  the  method  of  wage  payment  that 
enters  at  the  beginning  of  our  study.  In  the  union  field 
payment  is  almost  universally  by  weight.  In  the  non-union 
field  payment  seems  quite  generally  to  be  by  the  car.  Mr. 
George  M.  Jones,  a  Logan  operator,  defends  this  practice, 
saying  that  it  "is  a  matter  of  pay;  it  is  not  a  matter  of 
weight.  Any  unit  is  as  good  as  another  unit  provided  the 
man's  earning  capacity  is  as  great."  2 

This  is  only  a  partial  truth.  One  unit  is  not  so  good  as 
another  unit,  as  is  testified  by  the  change  in  the  marketing 
of  vegetable  products,  fruits  and  even  eggs.  In  general, 
wherever  there  is  any  attempt  at  accuracy  in  the  measure- 
ment of  solids  the  weight  unit  is  being  adopted. 

There  are  two  disadvantages  in  the  use  of  such  a  rough 
measure  as  the  car :  the  rate  translated  into  a  ton  rate  may 
be  low  but  the  fact  remains  hidden;  secondly,  a  "  full  car  " 
is  not  always  of  the  same  weight.  Even  assuming  the  rate 
per  ton  to  be  fair,  this  last  feature  seems  to  condemn  the  use 
of  the  car  as  a  measure.  The  men  are  required  to  send  out  a 
full  car,  one  loaded  level  with  the  edges  and  then  humped. 
But  that  practice  varies.  Frank  Ingham,  a  colored  loader 
who  has  worked  for  fourteen  years  in  Mingo  county,  says : 
"  Where  they  needed  men  and  miners,  then  in  those  cases 

1  United1  States  Geological  Survey:    Weekly  report  on   the  production 
of  bituminous  coal,  anthracite  and  beehive  coke,  Washington,  D.  C. 

uidence  Taken  by  Commission  appointed  by  the  Governor  of  West 
Virginia  in  connection  with  the  Logan  County  Situation,  1919.  Never 
printed.    Official  typewritten  copy,  p.  301. 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [20 

those  cars  were  level  full,  but  where  they  have  plenty  of 
men  at  the  operations  they  compelled  them  to  heap  the  cars 
up  what  is  known  as  the  0-2  hump,  and  the  drivers  are  in- 
structed to  set  their  elbows  on  the  edge  of  the  miners'  cars 
like  this  and  sight  over  their  fingers,  and  if  they  could  not 
see  any  coal  over  their  fingers,  they  would  let  it  stand  until 
the  men  loaded  them  up  until  they  would  see  coal  over  their 
finder*  "  '     If,  as  Mr.  Ernst  of  Pond  Creek  told  me,  the 
greatest  source  of  complaint  is  the  measurement  of  coal, 
such  an  irregular  system  must  breed  endless  ill-feeling  even 
though  the  men  know  that  the  general  rate  is  fair.    W.  K. 
Hutchinson  said  that  at  Burnwell  two  cars  were  used,  one 
holding  about  two  tons  supposedly  on  the  thin  vein    and 
one  holding  three  and  a  half  tons  on  the  thick  vein.    They 
were  at  times  both  used  on  the  same  vein  and  there  was  no 
differential  for  loading  the  larger.2 

The  criticism  by  the  miners  has  been  chiefly  that  if  the 
capacity  were  translated  into  tons  the  rate  would  be  much 
lower  than  that  paid  in  similar  union  fields.     In  Logan 
county  Mr.  Keeney,  President  of  District  17,  United  Mine 
Workers,  submitted  a  diagram  of  an  average  car  *  used  by 
the  Island  Creek  Coal  Company  at  Whitman  Mine  No. 
which  showed  a  capacity  of  2.53  tons.     Based  upon  these  •■ 
measurements  the  rate  paid  is  about  30  cents  a  ton.     The 
lowest  rate  in  the  union  Fairmont  field,  which  he  says  is 
comparable  with  Logan,  is  43-2  cents  a  ton.1    Samuel  Madi- 
son testified  that  he  had  measured  a  car  at  Cut  Fork  tor 
which  he  was  paid  66/2  cents.5     The  car  held  about  2^ 

1  Senate  Investigation  1921,  vol.  i,  p.  32- 

*Ibid„  p.  97- 

>  Ten  cars  were  measured. 

'Logan  Evidence,  p.  827;  also  Report  and  Digest  of  Evidence  token 
.  .  .  £  Connection  with  the  Logan  County  Sawhon,  1919.  Charleston. 
W.  Va.,  p.  33- 

» Digest  of  Logan  Evidence,  p.  3°- 


2i  ]  WAGES  21 

tons.  This  is  about  29^  cents  a  ton.  Similar  evidence  has 
been  submitted  for  Mingo  county. 

Leaving  this  matter  of  method  and  before  considering 
the  further  evidence  as  to  wages  at  a  given  time,  we  may 
say  that  in  general,  wage  increases  are  granted  more  slowly 
in  response  to  rising  costs  of  living  in  non-union  than  in 
union  fields.  In  the  Kanawha  field  rates  rose  about  seven 
per  cent  from  1902  to  191 2,  except  on  Cabin  Creek,  where 
under  non-union  operation  smaller  advances  had  been 
granted.1  Air.  Brown,  an  operator  at  Mt.  Carbon  on 
Morris  Creek,  complained  that  his  organized  mine  was  pay- 
ing 42T/2  cents  per  2000  pound  ton  while  half  a  mile  away 
coal  was  being  mined  at  40  cents  per  2240  pounds.2  In 
Mingo  County  the  Garfield  award  of  fourteen  per  cent  in 
December,  191 9,  was  applied,  but  the  Bituminous  Coal 
Commission  award  was  not  put  into  effect.  It  was  this,  so 
one  of  the  men  thinks,3  which  led  to  the  organization  of 
the  Williamson  field. 

But  this  is  a  tendency  rather  than  a  rule.  If  we  compare 
the  wages  paid  by  the  Logan  Mining  Company  of  Logan 
and  the  Hutchinson  Coal  Company  of  Fairmont,  we  see 
that  the  difference  in  wages  is  not  very  great.4  (Table  1.) 
In  191 5  both  fields  were  non-union.  In  19 19  the  Fairmont 
field  was  operating  under  union  agreement  and  the  Logan 
was  still  unorganized.  In  spite  of  this  situation  the  Logan 
mines  appear  to  have  been  paying  slightly  higher  day-wages 
in  1 91 9.  The  piece-rate  for  cutting  and  loading  coal  is  lower 
in  Logan  than  in  Fairmont  but  the  differential  of  the  two 
fields  has  decreased  since  191 5. 

1 "  The  West  Virginia  Coal  Strike,"  Lawrence  Lynch,  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  December,  1914,  vol.  xxix,  p.  631. 

2  Joint  Conference  1906,  pp.  63-64. 

3  Senate  Investigation   1921,  vol.   i,  testimony  of  W.   E.   Hutchinson, 
passim. 

4  Logan  Evidence,  pp.  409-1,  409-2. 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS 


[22 


TABLE  i 

Rates  of  Wages  in  Two  Mines  in  1915  and  1919,  to  Show  the 
Effect  of  Organization 


Rates  in    19 

15 

R 

ites  in    19 

19 

Type  of  Labor 

G 

.2 
"S 

c  c 

c 

c 
.2 

c  ■? 
c  c 

II 

^rcentage 
Differential 
in  favor  of 
Fairmont 

a 

.2 
B 

0 

-    — 
'rt  s — 

^rcentage 
Differential 
in  favor  ol 
Fairmont 

£ 

Ph 

J 

fe 

Cm 

Piece  Workers : 

Cutting  in  rooms  .    . 

$  .09 

$  .09 

.    . 

$  .09 

$    .1073 

19.2% 

Loading  in  rooms.   . 

.35 

•37 

5-7% 

.42 

.432 

2.9 

Pickmining  in  rooms 

•5° 

•52 

4.0 

Day  Workers : 

Drivers 

2.IO 

2.10 

4-25 

4-52 

6.4% 

Trappers    . 

1. 00 

1. 10 

10.0% 

3.25 

2-35 

-27.7 

Motormen 

2.35 

2.50 

6.4 

4.85 

4-79 

-1.2 

Brakemen. 

2.10 

2.25 

7-1 

Engineers. 

2.50 

2-375 

-5-01 

Firemen    . 

2.25 

2.175 

-3-3 

Blacksmiths 

3.00 

2.60 

-13-3 

Tipple  men 

1.80 

2  10 

16.6 

4.00 

4.00 

.     . 

Track  men 

2.50 

2.35-2.50 

4.75 

4-52 

-4.8 

Timbermen 

2.25 

2.10 

-6.6 

4-75 

4-52 

-4-8 

Pumpers    . 

2.IO 

2.10 

4-50 

4.20 

-6.6 

Bratticemen. 

2.25 

2.25 

•    • 

In  the  non-union  Williamson  field  the  union  has  at- 
tempted to  introduce  the  Kanawha  scale .  The  operators 
have  presented  a  chart  showing  the  average  earnings,  per 
day  of  actual  employment,  for  36  mines  in  the  Williamson 
field  and  6  reprenstative  mines  in  the  Kanawha  field  from 
April  1,  1920,  to  March  31,  1921.  The  piece-workers  aver- 
aged $9.84  in  the  Williamson  field  and  $7.85  in  the  Kana- 
wha.    The  day-workers  averaged  $6.00  in  the  Williamson 

1  The    negative    percentages    indicate    that    Logan    paid    higher    than 
Fairmont.     In  all  other  cases  Fairmont  is  the  same  or  greater  than  Logan. 

2  Harry  Olmsted,  p.  26. 


2$]  WAGES  23 

and  $6.10  in  the  Kanawha.1  On  the  basis  of  these  figures 
the  non-union  field  pays  25.4  per  cent  higher  for  piece-work 
and  1.7  per  cent  less  for  day-work. 

One  rather  significant  feature  of  this  chart  is  that  in 
August  the  day  average  in  Kanawha  increased  from  a  little 
over  $5.20  a  day  to  $6.60.  It  is  in  September  that  the  Wil- 
liamson field  follows  with  an  increase  from  slightly  less 
than  $5.20  to  about  $6.70.  In  other  words,  here  is  another 
indication  that  the  increases  granted  in  non-union  fields  tend 
to  follow  those  awarded  in  union  fields. 

In  stating  the  piece-workers'  average  earnings  it  is  neces- 
sary to  consider  the  number  of  hours  worked.  In  the 
Kanawha  field  the  flat  eight-hour  day  is  in  use.  This  is 
also  true  of  the  day-workers  in  non-union  fields.  In  neither 
case  is  punitive  over-time  paid,  but  the  union  contract  re- 
stricts over-time  to  "  emergency  work  "  or  work  necessary 
for  the  continuous  operation  of  the  mine.  If  the  men  feel 
that  the  operator  is  taking  advantage  of  this  clause  they 
may  take  it  up  as  a  grievance.  In  Logan  the  men  "  have  to 
work  over  eight  hours  in  a  great  many  instances,  but  the 
men  are  paid/'  ~  No  information  is  available  as  to  the 
actual  amount  of  over-time  worked  in  Mingo.  Those  men 
who  have  made  the  highest  earnings,  machine  men  and 
shooters,  work  on  a  night  shift  and  are  not  limited  to  an 
eight-hour  day.  They  "  can  work  as  long  as  they  please. 
If  a  man  is  ambitious  and  wants  to  make  money,  he  is 
privileged  to  do  so."  3 

The  earning  capacity  of  a  man  appears  to  be  greater  in 
the  Williamson  field  than  in  the   Kanawha.      Mr.   Olmsted 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  27-29.  Sec  footnote  on  company  store  prices,  p.  45 
for  a  discussion  of  the  greater  desirability  of  figures  for  the  year  pre- 
ceding the  strike  rather  than  for  the  year  of  the  strike. 

2  Logan  Evidence,  p.  321. 

*  Senate  Investigation  1921,  vol.  i,  p.  245. 


24  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [24 

has  taken  the  five  highest  loaders  in  each  of  six  mines, 
thirty  men,  in  the  Kanawha  and  Williamson  fields  for  April, 
1920.     For  the  Williamson  miners  this  averages  $198.16 

~"and  for  the  Kanawha  only  $i62.90.1  In  October  similar 
figures  for  thirty  mines,  one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  give 
respective  averages  of  $293.03  and  $207.10.  Some  of  the 
earnings  are  extremely  large.  In  April  the  highest  loader 
received  $294  in  the  Williamson  field.  In  October  one  man 
received  $509. 74.2    In  May,  1921,  Charles  Bandy,  a  shooter 

v  at  Pond  Creek,  earned  $733.86;  a  machine  man  earned 
$658.01;  another  shooter,  $561. 37. 3 

But  these  greater  possible  earnings  are  not  necessarily  an 
index  to  the  field  as  a  whole.  The  union  has  sought  to  raise 
the  average  for  the  whole.  In  so  doing  it  is  extremely 
likely  that  individuals  may  suffer.  One  clause  in  the  union 
contract  specifies  that  there  shall  be  a  "  fair  turn,"  that 
every  worker  shall  have  equal  opportunity  to  load  cars  and 
that  favoritism  shall  not  allow  one  man  to  load  three  cars 
while  another  is  idle  after  loading  one.  This  desire  for  a 
V  fair  distribution  of  work  between  individuals  is  part  of  the. 
fundamental  psychology  of  the  organized  miner.4 

The  problem  of  finding  an  earning  standard  has  always 
been  puzzling  in  the  mining  industry.  In  1906  Mr.  Evans, 
secretary  for  the  Kanawha  Coal  Operators  Association, 
said  5  it  is  neither  fair  to  take  the  best  man  in  a  place  nor 
the  poorest.  But,  he  says  of  men  who  average  five  dollars 
a  day,  "  I  do  not  say  that  everybody  can  do  this.  It  takes  a 
good  man  to  do  it,  and  I  realize  it,  but  it  shows  what  can 

1  Harry  Olmsted,  p.  30  and  table  opposite  p.  56. 

2  Ibid.,  table  opposite  p.  56. 

3  Senate  Investigation  192 1,  vol.  i,  pp.  242-3. 

KCj.  William  Hard,  Labor  in  a  Basic  Industry,  pp.   11-12,  Chicago 
Daily  News  Reprints,  no.  1,  1920. 
5  Joint  Conference  1906,  p.  46. 


25]  WAGES  25 

be  done  by  men  who  are  able  to  work  and  willing  to  work. 
The  great  trouble  is  with  the  fellow  who  does  not  want  to 
work,  and  only  cares  for  a  living  and  a  precarious  one  at 
that." 

The  irregular  working  habits  of  the  miner  must,  I  think, 
be  admitted.  I  talked  with  a  number  of  loaders,  good  men 
according  to  the  foreman,  who  said  that  they  worked  hard 
in  the  morning  and  loafed  along  in  the  afternoon.  The 
piece-worker  is  quite  independent  in  his  attitude,  often 
going  in  late  and  coming  out  early.  The  Geological  Survey 
was  unable  to  say  from  reports  received  of  November  1, 
19 1 9,  how  completely  the  mines  were  tied  up  by  the  strike 
called  on  that  day.  November  1st  opened  the  hunting 
season  and  many  miners  regularly  fail  to  report  for  work 
on  this  day.1  While  I  was  in  the  office  of  an  operator  in 
Cumberland  a  foreman  called  up.     I  judged  that  the  mine 

was  not  working.     Mr.  hung  up  and  said  "  They're 

not  working.     Moonshine  and  all  dead  drunk." 

There  are  two  points  to  be  made  in  connection  with  this 
irregularity.  The  first  is  that  the  men  cannot  work  regu- 
larly if  they  will.  From  1890-1917  inclusive  the  mines  of 
the  United  States  averaged  214.8  days;  of  Illinois,  201.4 
days;  of  Indiana,  190.2  days;  of  Ohio,  182.5;  of  Penn- 
sylvania, 227.5;  and  of  West  Virginia,  217.9.2  My  Cum- 
berland friend  went  on  to  add :  "  That's  great.  I  couldn't 
have  worked  them  anyhow.  But  this  gives  me  a  hold  on 
them."  Mr.  Newton,  speaking  for  the  miners,  answered 
Mr.  Evans :  3 

Mr.  Evans  knows  that  if  all  his  employees  were  offered  the 
same  opportunity  to  load  coal,  they  could  not  be  furnished  it 

*U.  S.  G.  S.,  Weekly  Bulletin  of  about  Nov.  15. 
2  Averages  figured   from  Annual  Reports  of  U.  S.  Geological  Su 
Mineral  Resources,  Dep't  of   Interior,   Washington,  D.   C. 
*  Joint  Conference  1906,  pp.  62-63. 


26  THE  UXITED  MINE  WORKERS  [26 

at  the  mine  if  they  had  the  same  capacity  and  ability  to  load — 
the  willingness  to  load.  .  .  .  We  all  know  that  in  certain  local- 
ities and  certain  sections  in  one  mine  there  are  conditions  that 
run  the  mine  or  a  portion  of  the  mine  even  to  the  detriment  of 
other  portions  of  the  mine.  .  .  .  There  are  exceptions  to  all 
rules,  and  you  cannot  take  a  dozen  men  out  of  a  hundred  and 
make  a  fair  average  as  to  the  earning  capacity  of  the  whole, 
even  if  it  was  possible  for  the  whole  to  do  it. 

The  other  consideration  is  that  the  irregular  working 
habits  of  the  miner  may  very  fairly  be  regarded  as  a  charge 
against  the  industry.  The  spasmodic  character  of  the  em- 
ployment under  normal  conditions  develops  1  a  type  of  labor 
that  would  never  be  tolerated  in  a  manufacturing  plant.  So 
long  as  this  condition  obtains  in  the  industry,  those  men 
who  lack  the  ambition  of  the  few — i.  e.,  those  men  who  take 
a  "  vacation "  when  they  want  it  rather  than  when  the 
coal  market  forces  it  on  them — must  be  regarded  as  one  of 
the  wastes  of  coal  production. 

Thus,  although  the  exceptional  earnings  are  of  interest 
and  give  a  faint  hope  to  a  fewr  miners,  they  cannot  be  taken 
as  indicative  of  the  actual  conditions.  As  Mr.  Tryon  says : 
"  Such  exceptional  performances  should  not  blind  us  to  the 
general  fact  that  the  industry  is  one  in  which  data  as  to  the 
annual  earnings  of  large  groups  of  men  are  the  only  ones 
of  real  significance."  2 

One  other  method  of  comparison  exists.  In  Mingo 
County  twenty-two  mines  signed  a  contract  with  the  union, 
taking  over  the  Coalburg  scale  of  Kanawha.  All  but  three 
of  these  were  wagon  mines,3  too  small  and  unimportant  to 

1  Cf.  F.  G.  Tryon,  "  The  Broken  Year  of  the  Bituminous  Coal  Miner," 
Survey  Graphic,  April  I,  1922,  p.  1010;  Report  of  the  Bituminous  Coal 
Commission,  1920,  p.  45 ;  William  Hard,  op.  cit.,  p.  12. 

3  F.  G.  Tryon,  op.  cit.,  p.  1009. 

8 "  Wagon  mines  "  are  small  mines  without  a  railroad  siding. 


2y]  WAGES  27 

afford  comparison.  One  of  the  tipple  mines  was  bought 
and  went  back  to  non-union  conditions.  In  the  two  re- 
maining mines  Mr.  Lane  of  the  New  York  Evening  Post 
found  some  data  to  afford  a  basis  for  comparison.1  Dur- 
ing the  non-union  period  of  April  1  to  June  30,  1920,  six 
men  with  the  P.  M.  and  C.  Coal  Mine  Company  averaged 
$9.26  for  days  actually  worked.  The  same  six  men  aver- 
aged $8.79  from  October  16  to  December  31,  a  union  period. 
But  under  the  non-union  system  the  men  had  received  yard- 
age.2 The  union  agreement  had  left  yardage  to  be  settled 
locally.  The  company  had  refused  to  pay  it  but  the  men 
were  preparing  to  protest.  Deducting  yardage  and  thus 
obtaining  a  figure  comparable  to  $8.79,  the  average  under 
non-union  operation  had  been  $8.25.  Similar  data  for  five 
men.3  at  the  Alma-Thacker  Fuel  Company  showed  an  aver- 
age for  days  worked  from  March  1  to  April  30  of  $9.03 
and  from  October  1  to  November  30  of  $10.98.  Here  the 
question  of  yardage  did  not  enter. 

No  one  realizes  more  acutely  than  the  author  the  insuffi- 
cient nature  of  the  wage  data  here  presented,  or  the  conflict 
of  testimony  offered  by  the  two  sides.  In  brief,  the  facts  1 
presented  are :  That  the  car  is  used  as  a  basis  of  measure- 
ment in  non-union  but  not  in  union  fields.  That  the  wage 
rate  in  some  instances  is  lower  and  in  some  instances  about 
the  same  in  non-union  as  in  union  mines.  That  the  daily 
earning  capacity  was  at  least  as  great  in  1920-21  in  the  non- 
union Williamson  as  in  the  union    Kanawha   district,   but 

1  Winthrop  D.   Lane,   Civil   War  in   West    Virginia,   p.    115,   B.   W. 

Huebsch,  New  York,  192 1. 

2  "  Yardage  "  is  extra  compensation  for  working-  in  a  narrow  opening 
where  it  is  more  difficult  to  load  than  in  wider  rooms. 

3  As  Lane  explains,  this  figure  is  smaller  than  is  desirable  in  Statistical 
comparisons;  but  he  thought  it  best  to  take  the  same  men  in  the  two 
periods.  There  were  only  live  such  at  the  latter  mine  and  six  at  the 
former. 


28  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [28 

that  the  indeterminate  element  of  hours  in  the  former  partly 
— we  cannot  say  how  much — invalidates  the  favorable  show- 
ing. That  when  two  mines  changed  in  the  Williamson  field 
to  the  Kanawha  rate,  the  earnings  of  the  men  increased; 
but  that  one  of  these  mines  had  before  offered  more  favor- 
able rates  of  its  own  volition  than  the  union  contract  had 
specified.  And  finally,  that  long-term  earnings  may  be 
higher  for  individuals  in  the  non-union  field,  but  that  ex- 
ceptional earnings  cannot  be  used  as  a  basis  of  comparison. 

We  are  forced,  therefore,  to  the  rather  ambiguous  con- 
clusion that  wages  in  the  non-union  field  may  be  as  high  as 
in  union  fields  during  periods  of  prosperity.  There  appears 
to  be  a  lag  in  the  granting  of  increases  in  the  non-union 
fields.  But  in  a  long-continued  period  of  prosperity  wages 
in  the  two  types  of  field  will  probably  be  about  the  same. 
The  union's  charge  of  gross  under-payment  has  certainly 
not  been  substantiated. 

But  we  may  say  with  absolute  confidence :  it  is  the  anion 
field  which  sets  the  upward  pace  of  wages  in  the  coal  in- 
industry.  It  is  the  non-union  which  sets  the  downward 
pace.  Scattered  through  the  pages  of  the  Coal  Age  in 
August  and  September,  1922,  is  the  "  law  "  of  wages  in  the 
coal  industry.  On  August  19  Governor  E.  F.  Morgan  of 
West  Virginia  telegraphed  to  the  Federal  Fuel  Distributor 
pleading  for  a  dollar  increase  in  the  selling  price  of  coal: 

Recent  wage  agreements  between  operators  and  United  Mine 
Workers  providing  for  resumpting  (sic)  of  work  on  the  scale 
effective  when  the  strike  was  declared,  make  imperative  a  new 
wage  scale  in  the  non-union  districts  —  Logan,  New  River, 
Pocahontas  and  Williamson — of  West  Virginia.1 

The  Pocahontas  operators  granted  an  increase  on  August  15, 
putting  the  workers  back  on  a  1920  level.  Two  reductions 
were  wiped  out. 

1  Coal  Age,  vol.  xxii,  p.  296,  8/24/22. 


29]  WAGES  29 

The  increase  made  by  the  Pocahontas  operators  came  without 
the  knowledge  of  miners  and  was  a  voluntary  act  upon  the  part 
of  the  operators,  employees  not  having  solicited  the  increase. 
It  was  deemed  necessary  by  the  Pocahontas  association,  how- 
ever, to  restore  the  1920  wage  scale  because  of  the  fact  that 
such  a  scale  was  being  paid  in  the  Winding  Gulf  and  New 
River  districts  and  there  was  a  possibility  that  inroads  might 
be  made  on  working  forces  by  virtue  of  the  higher  wages  paid 
elsewhere  unless  the  rate  was  increased. 1 

The  editor  asks  the  pertinent  question,  "  What  will  happen 
in  April?" 

Most  persons  are  disposed  to  believe  that  by  that  time  the 
market  will  be  glutted  with  bituminous  coal  and  that  wages  in 
the  non-union  regions  being  lowered,  it  will  be  impossible  for 
the  operator  in  union  districts  to  offer  the  1920  scale,  for  with- 
out contracts  and  with  lower  wages  in  competing  districts 
which  are  fully  able  to  supply  at  least  a  large  part  of  what  coal 
is  needed  there  will  be  no  possibility  of  running  the  mines  in 
union  regions  more  than  a  day  or  so  in  each  week.2 

God  may  intervene  if  He  presents  the  country  with  a  winter 
severe  enough  to  hamper  transportation;  but  if  in  His 
Providence  the  country  should  lead  a  normal  economic  life, 
we  shall  again  face  a  situation  of  stagnation  in  union  fields.3 
The  two  forces  continue  to  wrork  in  wage  settlements,  nega- 
tive and  positive,  non-union  and  union. 

1  Coal  Age,  vol.  xxii,  p.  370,  9/7/22. 

1 1bid.,  p.  350,  9/7/22. 

3  Since  this  was  written  there  has  of  course  been  a  settlement  of  the 
editor's  question.  The  wage  rate  will  continue.  But  it  is  not  thought 
necessary  to  change  the  sentences  which  fairly  reflect  opinion  in 
September,  1922,  and  the  general  attitude  with  reference  to  the  forces 
controlling  wages. 


CHAPTER  III 
The  Checkweighman 

The  matter  of  wages  is  of  course  not  a  mere  matter  of 
rates.  In  an  industry  in  which  the  workers  are  paid  by  the 
piece  it  is  essential  that  they  shall  have  some  method  of  de- 
termining the  honesty  and  accuracy  of  the  measure  accorded 
them.  No  single  condition  is  a  more  fruitful  source  of 
dispute  than  the  measure  of  coal. 

Under  the  laws  of  West  Virginia  the  miner  receives  pro- 
tection against  both  dishonesty  and  the  natural  errors  of 
weighing.  The  law  provides  for  scale  inspectors  whose 
duty  it  is  to  test  the  scales  at  all  mines  and,  if  called  upon 
by  either  miners  or  operators,  to  make  an  immediate  test.1 

The  men  are  accorded  further  protection  by  an  act  of 
1 89 1  providing  that  every  person  engaged  in  mining  coal 
"  shall  employ  a  weighman,  and  the  miners  working  in  any 
such  coal  mine  may  employ  another  such  weighman,  and 
the  two  so  employed  shall  supervise  the  weighing  of  each 
car  while  empty,  and  the  weighing  of  the  same  when  loaded 

1  Mr.  Samuel  B.  Montgomery,  Labor  Commissioner  and  Supervisor  of 
Weights  and  Measures,  says  the  law  is  weak  because  the  state  has  only 
one  sealer  who  has  the  work  of  four  or  five.  This  is  a  matter  of  legis- 
lative appropriation.  The  county  sealers  are  appointed  by  the  county 
court.  "  Therefore  the  sealer  feels  indebted  to  the  county  court.  .  .  . 
In  the  counties  that  are  controlled  by  the  coal  companies  or  other  large 
interests,  where  the  county  court  is  a  corporate  court,  you  men  need 
not  be  told  that  they  appoint  men  who  do  not  enforce  the  law  and 
who  will  not  go  in  emergency  cases  to  test  the  scales  or  measure  a  car." 
Proceedings  of  the  Annual  Convention  of  District  17,  U.  M.  W.,  Charles- 
ton, W.  Va.,  1918,  pp.  129-130. 

30  [30 


3 1  ]  THE  CHECKWE1GHMAN  ~  L 

with  coal  so  paid  for  by  weight,  and  the  measuring  of  the 
number  of  bushels  therein,  when  necessary,  so  paid  for  by 
measure."  If  the  workers  do  not  employ  such  a  man,  the 
company  weighman  shall  be  sufficient.1  This  act  was  main- 
tained as  within  the  police  power  of  the  legislature  as  its 
purpose  was  to  prevent  fraud.2  Slightly  amended  in  1901, 
it  is  now  provided  that  the  checkweighman  shall  be  em- 
ployed at  the  cost  of  the  miners  and  shall  be  appointed  by  a 
majority  ballot  of  the  workers.3  No  checkweighman  need 
be  employed  "  where  the  weighman  is  mutually  selected  by 
the  consent  of  a  majority  of  the  miners  working  in  any  mine 
and  the  operator."  But  "  at  any  time  that  either  of  the 
parties  "  becomes  dissatisfied  he  may  be  dismissed  on  ten 
day's  notice  or  the  miners  may  employ  a  checkweighman.4 

The  checkweighman  serves  two  purposes.  In  one  capac- 
ity he  prevents  patent  dishonesty—tampering  with  the  scales, 
short  recording  of  weight.  In  the  second  capacity  he  exer- 
cises supervision  over  "  docking  "  for  impurities.  In  this 
function  "  the  trimmer  calls  the  attention  of  the  weighman 
and  checkweighman  (to  impurities)  so  as  to  deduct  weight 
of  such  impurities  as  estimated  by  the  trimmer  or  Dock 
Boss  from  the  ascertained  weight  of  such  cars."  5 

In  both  of  these  functions  the  need  is  a  matter  of  history. 
Sidney  Webb  speaks  of  the  Mines  Regulation  Act  of  1861 
as  securing  to  the  workers  of  England  "  the  supremely  val- 

1  Hogg,  West  Virginia  Code,  sec.  509,  acts  1891,  ch.  2,  §  4   West  Pub- 
lishing Co.,  St.  Paul,  1914. 

2  State  v.  Peel  Splint  Coal  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  802  (1892). 

Hogg,  <*  cit.,  sec.  514,  acts  1901,  ch.  20,  §  1.  This  act  also  extends 
the  aw  to  any  manufacturing,  mining  or  otherwise  public  enterprise 
employing  labor  ■  where  the  amount  of  wage  is  dependent  on  measure 
or  weight. 

*Ibid.,  sec.  517,  acts  1901,  ch.  20,  §  4. 

-Agreement  of  Northern  West  Virginia  Operators'  Association  and 

District  17,  U.  M.  W.,  sec.  18. 


$2  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [32 

uable  institution  of  the  checkweigher."  l  In  the  testimony 
taken  before  the  House  committee  investigating  conditions 
in  the  coal  mines  of  Colorado  many  instances  of  short 
weight  are  given.  Mr.  J.  W.  Bell,  at  one  time  superintend- 
ent of  the  Wooten  Land  and  Fuel  Co.,  said  that  he  had  no 
control  over  the  tipple  boss  who  was  appointed  by  and  re- 
ported to  the  vice-president  and  general  manager.  Bell  in- 
vestigated one  mine  and  found  that  the  miners  were  getting 
short  weight  by  "  dumping "  the  car.2  The  foreman  at 
Bo  wen  mine  (who  at  the  time  he  offered  testimony  was 
living  with  the  strikers  in  the  tent  colony  at  Ludlow)  said 
that  the  superintendent  had  wanted  some  repair  work  done. 
He  couldn't  afford  it  "  but  he  says :  '  Never  mind,  go 
ahead;  we  will  find  some  way  of  doing  it.'  '  The  method 
employed  was  extremely  simple.  When  the  mine  was  not 
working  on  Saturday  and  Sunday  the  foreman  took  men, 
who  were  paid  by  weight,  and  put  them  to  work  as  day- 
laborers  at  hour  rates.  For  this  overtime  they  were  given  a 
certain  credit.  On  Monday  they  returned  to  their  regular 
occupation.  But  they  were  systematically  under-credited 
with  coal  loaded  until  the  mine  had  fully  recouped  the  out- 
lay for  repair  work.3  Similar  testimony  is  given  by  others.* 
The  men  do  not  always  desire  a  checkweighman.  Law- 
rence R.  Lynch,  writing  of  the  Paint  and  Cabin  Creek  strike 
of  191 2- 13,  says  that  "  it  was  proved  that  the  miners  had 
frequently  objected  to  the  employment  of  a  checkweighman, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  his  wages  must  be  paid  by  the  men 
whom  he  thus  protects."     But,  he  concludes,   "  from  the 

1  Sidney  Webb,  The  Story  of  the  Durham  Miners,  p.  53,  Fabian 
Society,  London,  1921. 

a House  Report  387  (1914),  "Conditions  in  the  Coal  Mines  of 
Colorado,"  pp.  194-5- 

'Ibid.,  p.  311. 

4  Cf.  ibid.,  pp.  77,  78,  2034,  2182,  2303. 


33]  THE  CHECKWEIGHMAN  33 

standpoint  of  fairness  and  justice  "  it  is  "  highly  desirable 
that  a  check  be  placed  upon  the  company  weighman."  l 

The  non-union  operators  are  opposed  to  the  employment 
of  a  checkweighman.  I  have  found  no  recent  instance  of 
refusal  to  comply  with  the  state  law.  Mr.  Ernst,  manager 
of  the  Pond  Creek  Coal  Company,  said  that  he  did  not  want 
a  checkweighman  on  the  tipple  for  two  reasons :  first,  it  is 
an  additional  cost  to  the  men;  and  second,  the  matter  of 
weight  is  a  source  of  constant  dispute  —  "  no  real  loader 
ever  admits  that  he  is  satisfied  with  the  weight  you  give 
him  " — and  the  checkweighman  aggravates  this  condition. 

To  some  extent  Mr.  Ernst's  latter  charge  is  probably  true. 
The  checkweighman  holds  his  position  at  the  expense  of 
the  men.  His  functions  usually  are  negative  in  character — 
merely  agreeing  that  the  scales  are  correct,  that  the  men  are 
credited  with  the  recorded  weight,  that  the  cars  are  not  run 
over  the  scales  too  fast.  In  fact,  his  duties  are  similar  in 
effect  to  those  of  the  partisan  watcher  at  the  polls.  In  time, 
we  may  well  believe,  the  men  wonder  why  they  pay  him. 
His  job  is  more  pleasant  than  mining  both  in  point  of  the 
labor  involved  and  of  prestige.  To  give  more  apparent 
reason  to  his  employment  it  is  possible  that  he  may  unneces- 
sarily protest  the  accuracy  of  the  scales. 

The  checkweighman  enjoys  a  degree  of  freedom  from 
the  operator's  control  that  no  other  man  in  or  about  the 
mines  enjoys.  He  is  selected  by  a  majority  ballot  of  the 
workers  and  is  responsible  to  them.  Mr.  Giklay,  a  Kanawha 
operator,  complained  to  the  board  of  conciliation  in  1914: 

We  had  chechweighmen  some  years  ago  that  used  to  think 
they  were  not  only  checkweighmen  but  that  they  owned  the 
property,  and  they  acted  on  the  mine  committee,  and  they 
kept  up  a  continual  annoyance,  and  we  put  this  clause  in  that 

1  Lawrence  R.  Lynch,  op.  cit.,  p.  654. 


34  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [34 

you  shall  not  recognize  any  checkweighman  on  any  com- 
mittee.1 

The  operators  have  now  secured  a  clause  in  almost  all  agree- 
ments that  the  checkweighman's  duties  "  shall  be  only  those 
prescribed  by  the  laws  of  the  state  of  West  Virginia."  2 

But  the  opposition  is  also  more  fundamental  than  this. 
The  checkweighman  typifies  organization.  As  Mr.  Charles 
H.  Peet,  a  Colorado  superintendent  of  mines,  said  in  1914, 
granting  a  checkweighman  "  would  be  a  kind  of  recog- 
nizing of  the  union."  3  Mr.  Charles  F.  Carter,  who  gives 
the  operators  a  very  clean  bill  of  health  after  Paint  Creek, 
writes : 4 

[The  Check-off]  is  worked  in  various  ways,  but  most  fre- 
quently by  means  of  the  "  check-weighman  ",  who  collects  the 
dues  directly,  being  given  a  number  the  same  as  the  miners, 
and  taking  in  rotation  from  each  miner  a  car  of  coal  or  a 
certain  weight  of  coal,  which  is  credited  on  the  books  of  the 
company  to  the  "  check-weighman  ".  .  .  .  The  assertion  that 
the  "  check-weighman  "  is  needed  to  protect  the  poor  miner 
from  his  dishonest  employer  is  merely  a  specious  pretext  td 
deceive  the  credulous  public. 

Sidney  Webb  writes  that  the  first  permanently  enduring* 
trade  union  in  the  coal  industry,  the  Northumberland  and 
Durham  Miners'  Mutual  Confident  Association,  was  in  part 
due  to  the  institution  of  a  checkweigher  at  nearly  every  pit.& 
Not  only  has  "  the  promotion  of  collective  action  by  the 

1  Board  of  Conciliation  Proceedings  for  the  Kanawha  District,  1914, 
vol.  iv,  p.  16. 

2  Joint  Agreement  of  Kanawha  Operators  and  Dist.  17,  1914-17,  p.  5. 
8  House  Report  387,  vol.  ii,  p.  1944- 

*  Charles  F.  Carter,  "  The  West  Virginia  Coal  Insurrection,"  North 
American  Review,  Oct.,  1913,  vol.  198,  pp.  464-5. 
5  Webb,  Durham  Miners,  p.  54. 


35]  THE  CHECKWEIGHMAN  35 

men  been  a  direct  incitement  to  combination,"  but  the  neces- 
sary capacities  of  a  checkweighman  are  the  same  as  those 
for  a  union  official.  He  must  be  "  a  man  of  character,  in- 
sensible to  the  bullying  or  blandishments  of  manager  or 
employer,  ...  of  strictly  regular  habits,  accurate  and 
business-like  in  mind,  and  quick  at  figures."  1  The  ranks 
of  checkweighmen  thus  supply  large  numbers  of  union 
officials. 

It  is  this  feature  which  is  fundamental.  With  the  weigh- 
man  is  very  likely  to  come  the  union.  Certainly  the  oper- 
ator will  lose  that  complete  freedom  to  operate  his  plant  as 
he  sees  fit.  He  will  be  forced  to  deal  with  a  man  whom  he 
cannot  control,  who  can  tell  him  that  he  must  change  certain 
conditions  or  that  his  minor  officials  such  as  the  weighman 
and  trimmer  are  not  performing  their  functions  properly. 

Theoretically  there  is  no  reason  why  a  checkweighman 
may  not  be  in  a  non-union  field.  The  law  allows  it.  There 
is  danger  that  a  sweeping  generalization  may  seem  to  be 
disproved  by  a  few  exceptions.  But  with  this  qualification 
we  may  say  that  in  practice  a  checkweighman  is  found  at 
all  union  mines  and  is  never  found  in  non-union  fields.2 
One  may  say,  therefore,  that  the  checkweighman  is  the 
result  of  the  organization  of  the  field.  Practically  he  is 
often  unnecessary  —  at  least  in  his  capacity  of  preventing 
dishonesty.     But  historically  he  has  often  been  needed. 

1  Webb,  Sidney  and  Beatrice,  History  of  Trade  Unionism,  Longmans, 
Green  &  Co.,  London,  1902,  p.  291. 

2  One  reason  for  this  is  the  fear  of  men  in  non-union  fields  to  any- 
thing approaching  collective  action.     Cf.  supra,  p.   15. 


CHAPTER  IV 
The  Company  Store 

It  should  be  remembered  that  the  company  store  and  the 
truck  system  are  not  the  same.  The  truck  system  is  the 
payment  of  wages  in  kind  or  other  than  lawful  money. 
The  company  store  is  properly  a  store  operated  by  an  in- 
dustrial concern  at  which  the  men  employed  by  the  company 
may  trade.  It  is,  however,  open  to  abuses  and  in  its  worst 
condition  becomes  virtually  truckage.  It  is  the  possibility 
of  abuse  that  leads  to  condemnation. 

The  coal  industry  is  subject  to  certain  peculiarities  that 
modify  general  condemnation  of  the  company  store.  The 
operator  who  opens  a  mine  in  new  territory  is  engaged  in  a 
task  requiring  numbers  of  laborers  often  without  any  im- 
mediate labor  market.  Prior  to  his  advent  the  country  has 
been  "  frontier "  land.  The  operator  must  furnish  the 
worker  everything.  He  must  construct  houses,  must  pro- 
vide means  of  obtaining  food,  clothing  and  all  the  neces- 
saries of  life.  At  this  stage  of  development  the  company 
store  is  an  absolute  necessity.  But  wj^en  the  mine  is  estab- 
lished with  its  community  of  fifty  or  a  hundred  families, 
the  independent  dealer  finds  a  market  and  may  enter  if  he 
is  allowed. 

The  company  store  is  then  no  longer  an  essential  from 
the  miner's  point  of  view.  It  enters  upon  a  second  period 
of  its  existence.  Under  a  well-meaning  operator  it  is  partly 
beneficent  in  purpose.  Mr.  S.  M.  Dalzell,  President  of  the 
Illinois  Coal  Operators'  Association  and  General  Manager 
36  [36 


37]  THE  COMPANY  STORE  $7, 

of  the  Spring  Valley  Coal  Co.,  testified  in  1899  that  his 
company  demanded  the  right  to  prevent  exhorbitant  prices.1 
But  under  the  highly  competitive  conditions  of  the  coal  in- 
dustry the  store  comes  to  occupy  another  position.  The 
operator  can  see  no  reason  why  he  should  not  have  the 
profits  of  the  trade  of  his  own  employees,  instead  of  some 
retailer.2  Mr.  Neil  Robinson,  an  operator  of  Charleston, 
West  Virginia,  testified  that  under  the  severe  competition 
of  the  late  '90's  the  price  of  coal  did  not  pay  for  production. 
The  store  profits  were  "  quite  a  little  help."  In  fact,  ".  .  . 
were  it  not  for  the  revenue  derived  from  the  store  business 
I  suppose  quite  a  number  of  mines  would  be  compelled  to 
go  out  of  existence."  3 

This  condition  per  se  is  not  directly  harmful  to  the  miner. 
He  can  make  little  complaint  whether  his  purchases  swell 
the  profits  of  the  operator  or  of  the  independent  store- 
keeper. But  with  such  competition  the  temptation  to  profit 
is  so  great  that  exploitation  becomes  almost  inherent  in  the 
company  store.  Mr.  Dalzell  testified  that  he  could  not  make 
a  general  statement  as  to  the  advantage  and  disadvantage 
of  the  company  store  to  the  miner.  ".  .  .  .  Because  there 
are  two  classes  of  employers :  I  cannot  divide  them.  I  do 
not  know  how  many  treat  their  employees  fairly  in  that 
respect  and  how  many  do  not.  If  the  stores  are  operated  as 
they  say  they  are  operated  in  West  Virginia,  I  would  say 
that  they  are  very  much  to  the  disadvantage,  not  only  of 
the  employee,  but  of  the  coal  trade  generally."  4 

1  Report  of  the  Industrial  Commission,  1901,  vol.  xii,  p.  115,  Wash- 
ington, D.  C. 

1  Ibid.,  p.  2J7. 

8  Ibid.,  pp.  15-16.     Cf.  John  Mitchell,  ibid.,  p.  43. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  116.  His  testimony  regarding  West  Virginia  as  the  worst 
example  is  not  to  be  accepted  without  discounting  his  possible  prejudice 
as  a  competitor  of  West  Virginia. 


38  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [38 

But  if  Mr.  Dalzell  did  not  know  what  the  company  store 
meant  generally,  others  did.  The  New  York  and  Cleve- 
land Gas  and  Coal  Co.  operated  mines  near  Pittsburgh. 
They  were  certainly  no  better  than  any  other  coal  company,1 
but  they  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  company  store  took 
a  certain  amount  from  the  miner  in  higher  prices.  They 
discounted  this  at  5  cents  per  ton,  about  ten  per  cent  of  the 
wage  rate.  This  figure  was  accepted  by  the  miners,  for 
they  offered  in  1896  to  enter  into  an  agreement  with  the 
other  operators  of  the  Pittsburgh  district  to  give  up  the 
company  store  and  accept  the  New  York  and  Cleveland 
scale.2 

Company  store  is  a  generic  term.  In  some  instances  the 
company  operates  the  store  itself.8  The  Colorado  Fuel 
and  Iron  Co.  organized  an  auxiliary  company  that  main- 
tained stores.4  Still  other  companies  gave  the  store  pri- 
vilege to  an  independent  business  man.  He  either  paid  a 
certain  percentage  or  merely  yielded  to  supervision.5 

The  coal  company  controlled  the  trade  under  any  of  these 
systems  by  issuing  scrip  or  company  orders,  advances  on 
the  wages  of  the  men  redeemable  by  the  company  through 
the  store.  A  man  has  mined  10  tons  of  coal  at  75  cents  a 
ton.  He  receives  credit  on  the  company's  books  for  $7.50. 
He  may  wait  until  pay  day  and  receive  cash  or,  if  he  has  no 
reserve,  he  requests  a  credit  advance.  The  company  issues 
non-negotiable  6  orders  usually  in  fractional  denominations 

1  Cf.  Arthur  Suffern,  Conciliation  and  Arbitration  in  the  Coal  Trade, 
Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  New  York,  1915,  p.  27;  Industrial  Commission, 
1901,  vol.  xii,  pp.  60  et  seq. 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  60-61. 

*Ibid.,  p.  15. 

iIbid.,  p.  262. 

">Ibid.,  p.  115. 

•Under  the  laws  of  West  Virginia  these  are  not  non-negotiable.  See 
below  in  this  chapter. 


39]  THE  COMPANY  STORE  39 

with  which  the  man  purchases  at  the  store.  Since  the  in- 
strument is  intended  to  be  non-negotiable  the  company  re- 
deems it  only  for  the  accredited  store. 

The  abuses  of  this  system  may  be  direct  or  indirect.  We 
may  assume  that  company  prices  in  the  period  we  are  de- 
scribing (about  twenty  years  ago)  were  generally  higher 
than  independent  prices.1  The  compulsion  to  trade  at  the 
company  store  may  be  unmistakable.  Mr.  Richard  Bryden, 
now  a  successful  coal  operator  in  Piedmont,  W.  Va.,  told 
me  the  following  incident  of  his  boyhood.  The  superin- 
tendent approached  him  one  evening  and  asked  him  if  his 
mother  wouldn't  like  a  present  of  a  barrel  of  flour.  The 
little  nine-year-old  said  he  thought  not.  The  superintend- 
ent urged  and  the  boy  remained  obdurate.  He  arrived 
home  and  found  the  flour.  On  pay  day  he  was  debited  with 
one  barrel  of  flour.  I  cite  this  not  to  prove  a  general  con- 
dition, although  Mr.  Bryden  gave  the  impression  that  it 
was,  but  rather  that  such  cases  did  exist.  Other  evidence 
can  be  found.  Benjamin  James  said  that  he  was  threatened 
with  discharge  in  1897  by  the  foreman  of  the  Lehigh  Valley 
Coal  Company's  mine  at  Jeanesville,  Pa.,  unless  he  traded 
at  the  company  store.  The  general  strike  of  that  year  pre- 
vented the  execution  of  the  threat.2 

But  this  direct  type  of  compulsion  was  comparatively  rare. 
John  Mitchell  says :  "  I  do  not  mean  at  present  that  they 
are  compelled  to  [deal  at  the  company  store],  but  there  are 
better  conditions  of  employment  given  to  men  who  deal 
there;  they  can  earn  more  wages.  The  one  who  refuses  to 
buy  there  is  often  given  unfavorable  conditions  of  employ- 
ment." 3      Mr.    Robinson,    the   operator   who   thought    the 

1  Cf.  Testimony  of  James  Smith,  Commissioner  of  Dep't  of  Labor 
in  Colorado,  ibid.,  p.  217.  Benjamin  James,  National  Executive  Board 
member,  U.  M.  W.,  testifies  powder  was  $2.75  per  keg  at  company 
stores  and  only  $1.25  to  $1.50  at  independent  stores. 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  141-142. 

1  Ibid.,  p.  43. 


4o  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [40 

store  "  quite  a  little  help,"  says  that  he  doesn't  know  of  any 
case  of  favoritism  "  but  where  a  man  has  a  large  family 
and  helps  in  the  store,  it  would  be  perfectly  natural  for  the 
operator  to  help  in  return."  x  Such  compulsion,  although 
indirect,  is  nevertheless  very  real. 

In  another  respect  the  organized  miner  objects  to  the 
company  store.  It  is  maintained  that  purchases  made  under 
a  loose  credit  system  are  made  with  less  care  than  cash  pur- 
chases.2 Under  the  system  of  wage  payment  that  prevails 
in  the  coal  industry  wages  are  paid  semi-monthly.  The 
miner,  however,  is  not  paid  for  the  coal  which  he  has  mined 
during  the  fourteen  days  immediately  preceding  pay  day 
but  for  the  period  between  the  two  preceding  pay  days.  In 
other  words,  a  miner  coming  to  a  mine  on  the  first  of  the 
month  receives  no  pay  until  the  first  of  the  following  month. 
In  the  meantime  it  is  necessary  for  him  to  live.  If  he  has 
sufficient  reserve,  he  receives  payment  in  full  for  the  firsr 
half  of  the  month  less,  of  course,  certain  deductions  for 
rent,  smithing,  doctor  and  powder.  Those  men  who  lack 
this  reserve  are  forced  to  seek  credit  somewhere.  This 
credit  they  receive  from  the  company  in  the  form  of  scrip. 

The  United  Mine  Workers  have  waged  a  steady  campaign 
for  more  frequent  pay-days.  In  the  old  days  the  usual 
interval  for  payment  was  a  month.  Through  legislation 
and  direct  pressure  on  the  operators  the  interval  is  now 
about  two  weeks.  The  present  program  of  the  organization 
calls  for  a  weekly  pay-day. 

The  operators'  position  on  frequent  pay-days  was  stated 
in  1901  by  Mr.  Beaman  of  the  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Co. 
He  said  that  they  will  necessitate  an  increase  of  working  capi- 
tal.    Coal  was  customarily  sold  on  30  days'  time.     To  re- 

1  Ibid.,  p.  16. 

2  Cf.  E.  H.  Weitzel,  Mgr.  and  Chief  Engineer,  Col.  Fuel  and  Iron  Co., 
House  Report  387  (1914),  vol.  ii,  p.  1798. 


4i ]  THE  COMPANY  STORE  4I 

quire  payment  every  15  days  would  double  the  capital  needed 
because  money  comes  in  only  every  30  days.  In  his  eyes  30 
days  is  the  equivalent  of  cash — seemingly  for  both  operator 
and  miner.  It  will  also  double  the  bookkeeping  to  make  out 
two  pay-rolls.1 

Mr.  Beaman  also  tries  to  prove  that  infrequent  pay  is 
good  for  the  miner.  Frequent  pay-days  mean  frequent 
drunks.  His  solution  of  the  miners'  ills  is  prohibition. 
".  .  .  If  the  legislature  would  prohibit  their  sale  (i.  e.,  in- 
toxicating liquors)  at  or  near  the  mines,  it  would  do  more 
to  promote  the  general  welfare  of  the  miners  than  any  law 
that  could  be  enacted."  2 

David  Ross,  Secretary  of  the  Illinois  Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics,  says  frequent  pay  is  better  for  the  men — and  had 
not  led  to  more  frequent  drunkenness.3  Even  under  his 
system  it  appears  from  the  testimony  of  Mr.  Beaman  that 
frequent  actions  garnisheeing  a  man's  wages  are  instituted 
by  saloons  which  have  advanced  credit.  His  "  protection  " 
seems  a  trifle  frail.  Although  he  may  have  been  ignorant 
of  the  situation,  a  letter  of  Mr.  L.  M.  Bowers,  chairman  of 
the  board  of  directors  in  19 13,  to  the  secretary  of  Mr.  John 
D.  Rockefeller,  Jr.,  makes  it  apparent  that  prohibition  had 
hardly  been  a  strong  point  with  the  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron 
Co.  "  The  company  became  notorious  in  many  sections  for 
their  support  of  the  liquor  interests.  They  established 
saloons  everywhere  they  possibly  could. "  *  Mr.  D.  C.  Coates, 
President  of  the  Colorado  Federation  of  Labor,  points  out 
that  there  are  sometimes  five  or  six  weeks  between  pays. 
This  ties  up  too  much  of  a  man's  earnings.     He  is  at  the 

1  Industrial  Commission,  1901,  vol.  xii.  pp.  289-290. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  277. 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  183-184. 

4  Report  of  Commission  on  Industrial  Relations,  1912.  vol.  i,  p.  43. 


42  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [42 

mercy  of  the  company  store,  or  if  trading  with  an  inde- 
pendent merchant,  is  forced  to  pay  the  latter  increased 
amounts  to  cover  loss  and  capital  the  merchant  has  tied  up.1 

The  attack  of  the  miners'  organization  on  the  company 
store  is  thus  two-fold.  They  maintain  that  prices  are  higher 
and  men  are  forced  to  trade  to  their  disadvantage.  In  the 
second  place,  the  man  receiving  credit  from  the  store  is  in- 
clined to  spend  more  freely  than  he  who  pays  cash. 

The  miners  have  presented  their  case  poorly.  Their  accu- 
sations have  been  far-reaching  and  proof  has  been  almost 
negligible.  Mr.  W.  E,  Hutchinson  testified  'before  the  Senate 
committee  that  it  is  "  generally  true  "  that  a  man  not  trad- 
ing at  the  company  store  was  given  a  place  where  he 
"  couldn't  make  out  ".  He  himself  traded  at  an  outside 
store  for  half  a  month  and  then  was  given  a  "  scrubby  little 
place  ".  Nothing  was  said  to  him.  He  returned  to  the 
company  store  and  in  about  six  weeks  received  back  his  old 
place.2  As  an  isolated  instance  this  proves  nothing.  He 
was  not  spoken  to.  The  general  impression  prevailed  that 
it  was  wiser  to  trade  at  the  company  store,  but,  as  Senator 
Carraway  brings  out  in  his  questioning,  in  good  seasons 
some  man  had  to  work  the  poor  places  and  it  might  some- 
times be  a  man  who  traded  at  the  company  store.3  To 
prove  actual  discrimination  it  is  necessary  to  produce  many 
such  circumstantial  cases. 

The  charge  of  higher  prices  is  presented  in  an  equally 
haphazard  manner.  Mr.  Hutchinson,  for  example,  says 
that  pork  sold  for  55  and  60  cents  in  company  stores  that 
sold  for  35  cents  at  independent.  "  Plain  white  meat  "  sells 
for  40  and  45  cents  as  compared  with  25  and  30  cents.4 

1  Industrial  Com.,  1901,  vol.  xii,  p.  250. 

2  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  i,  pp.  77-7S. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  78. 
*Ibid.,  pp.  76-77. 


43] 


THE  COMPANY  STORE 


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45 ]  THE  COMPANY  STORE  45 

The  company  stores  were  in  the  habit  of  increasing  prices 
whenever  there  was  an  increase  in  wages.1  The  independent 
stores  would  also  increase  slightly  "  but  not  in  accordance 
with  the  company  stores."  The  difference  in  prices  was 
sufficiently  great  so  that  he  was  willing  to  chance  losing 
his  good  position  to  trade  at  an  outside  store  and  almost 
made  up  for  the  lowered  earnings  of  the  poorer  work-place. ' 

The  companies  have  presented  their  case  far  better  than 
the  miners.3  They  give  data  showing  the  comparison  of 
prices  in  company  stores  and  in  independent  stores  in  the 
city  of  Williamson.      (Table  2.) 

The  first  average  in  the  above  table  is  simply  the 
arithmetic  mean  of  all  the  prices.4  The  second  average 
is  the  mean  of  relatives  using  the  prices  of  the  Wilhelmina 
store  as  the  base  for  the  index.  (Table  3.)  The  third 
average  is  computed  from  the  same  index  numbers  as  the 
second  with  the  omission  of  potatoes  and  soup  meat.5     From 

lIbid.,  p.  76. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  79- 

'All  figures  which  the  operators  give  are  open  to  criticism.  They 
present  earnings  and  store  prices  during  the  latter  part  of  1020  and 
the  early  part  of  1921.  This  was  the  strike  period.  The  figures  may 
differ  from  those  of  pre-strike  conditions  either  because  the  companies 
have  been  forced  to  offer  better  conditions  to  secure  labor  or  because 
they  set  about  house-cleaning,  knowing  that  an  investigation  was  prob- 
able. But  with  respect  to  prices  the  companies  could  hardly  be  expected 
to  present  comparative  data  of  an  early  date.  They  have  taken  current 
prices  in  preparing  a  brief  for  the  committee.  Earlier  data  should  have 
been  collected  by  the  union  knowing  that  at  some  time  the  break  ,vas 
coming. 

4 1  gave  some  weight  to  both  navy  and  pinto  beans  by  multiplying  by 
three  to  get  rid  of  the  fraction.  The  difference  is  so  slight  as  to  be 
hardly  reflected  in  the  result.  The  figures  for  potatoes  were  omitted 
because  quotations  are  partly  for  new  and  partly  for  old.  Had  they 
been  included  the  result  would  only  have  been  emphasized. 

5  In  constructing  the  index  I  disregarded  old  potatoes  and  left  the 
space    blank.     Three    of    the   companies    are    selling    old    potatoes    and 


46 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS 


[46 


TABLE  4 

Average  Wages  Paid  to  Sample  of  Best  Loaders  in  Kanawha 
and  Williamson  Coal  Mines  * 


Field 

Total 
Earnings 

Deductions 

Cash 
Paid 

Store 
Deducts 

Month 

Store  2 
$36.57 

Total 

Total 
Earnings 

April. 

Williamson.  . 

$198.16 

$43.18 

$15498 

18.46% 

Kanawha  .    . 

162.90 

39.86 

52-73 

110.17 

24.47% 

October. 

Williamson.  . 

29303 

44.27 

52.14 

240.89 

15.1% 

Kanawha  .    . 

207.10 

36.32 

50-37 

156.73 

17-5% 

these  figures,  averaging  the  independent  stores  and  the  seven 
company  stores,  the  prices  are  about  8.8%  higher  by  the 
first  method  and  9.22%  by  the  third  method  in  the  inde- 
pendent stores. 

There  are  several  factors  that  render  judgment  impos- 
sible on  this  basis.  The  rents  in  Williamson  are  probably 
higher  than  for  surrounding  mining  towns.  The  list  of 
commodities  is  not  representative.      But  in  spite  of  these 

Sycamore  has  listed  potatoes  at  3  cents  a  bushel,  an  evident  mistake. 
It  has  seemed  more  accurate  to  drop  this  item  entirely. 

In  the  case  of  soup  meat  the  differences  are  very  evidently  due  to 
differences  in  quality.     Roundsteak  has  an  index  of 


114 


114 


114 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


167 


100 


139 


100 


100 


108 


in 


114        114 
Pork  loins  of 

100        100        114        114        100 
Whereas  soup  meat  fluctuates  widely 

139        139  167        194 

1  Olmsted,  op.  cit.,  table  opposite  p.  56. 

2  The  deductions  are  not  exactly  comparable  for  in  Kanawha  the 
loader  usually  buys  his  powder  and  shoots  coal.  In  Williamson  a 
shooter  is  employed  to  do  this.  Thus  a  man  in  Kanawha  who  trades 
at  a  company  store  will  have  additional  deductions  for  powder. 


47]  THE  COMPANY  STORE  47 

patent  shortcomings  we  are  forced  to  conclude  that  the  com- 
pany prices  are  not  higher  than  independent  prices. 

In  the  matter  of  compulsion  the  operators  have  also  in- 
troduced some  interesting  evidence.  They  have  compared 
the  earnings  and  net  cash  receipts  of  two  equal  groups  of 
men  in  the  Kanawha  and  Williamson  fields.  For  the  month 
of  April  they  present  as  evidence  the  wages  paid  to  the  five 
highest  coal-loaders  in  each  of  six  mines  in  both  of  these 
fields,  and  similar  data  for  twenty-six  mines  in  October  of 
1920.      (Table  4.) 

From  the  figures  in  the  above  table  it  would  appear 
that  no  greater  compulsion  was  applied  to  the  non-union 
than  to  the  union  men.  Expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the 
total  earnings  the  deductions  for  store  charges  are  greater 
in  the  union  than  in  the  unorganized  district.  In  absolute 
amounts  the  figure  is  higher  in  October  and  lower  in  April. 

Some  union  leaders  have  taken  the  position  that  the  com- 
pany store  and  the  issue  of  scrip  are  illegal.  Their  position 
seems  to  be  mistaken.  The  law  has  attempted  to  regulate 
the  company  store  and  the  method  of  wage-payment  but  it 
has  been  unable  constitutionally  to  abolish  the  store  and  the 
miner  is  protected  so  far  as  law  can  protect  in  respect  to  his 
wages.  What  violations  of  the  law  exist  are  due  rather  to 
the  inability  of  the  weak  to  take  full  advantage  of  legal  pro- 
tection than  to  shortcomings  in  the  law. 

The  legal  position  of  the  company  store  in  West  Virginia 
is  now  fixed.  The  legislature  attempted  in  1887  t0  prohibit 
miners  and  manufacturers  interested  in  selling  merchandise 
from  selling  to  their  workers  at  a  higher  per  cent  of  profit 
than  when  selling  to  other  persons.1  This  was  held  to  be 
an  unconstitutional  interference  with  private  contracts  and 
business.2     In  1891  a  law  enacted  in  Illinois  provided  that 

1  Hogg,  sec.  537,  acts  1887,  ch.  63,  §  4. 

2  State  v.  Fire  Creek  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  33  W.  Va.  188. 


48  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [48 

"  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  person  ....  in  any  mining 
or  manufacturing  business  in  this  state  to  engage  in,  or  be 
interested  directly  or  indirectly  in,  keeping  of  a  truck  store, 
or  controlling  of  any  store  ....  for  the  furnishing  of 
supplies,  tools,  clothing,  provisions,  or  groceries  to  his  ...  . 
employees."  This  was  held  to  violate  the  constitutional 
provisions  protecting  persons  against  the  deprivation  of 
property  without  due  process  of  law.1  Thus  a  store  may 
legally  be  conducted  by  a  mining  company. 

The  Act  of  1 89 1  in  West  Virginia  provides  that  it  shall 
be  a  misdemeanor  for  any  company  or  person  to  compel  any 
employee  to  accept  goods  in  payment  of  wages  due  him  or 
to  become  due  him.  And  further,  that  if  any  such  company 
shall  sell  directly  or  indirectly  to  an  employee  "  goods  or 
supplies  at  prices  higher  than  the  reasonable  or  current 
market  value  thereof  at  cash,"  the  company  shall  be  liable 
for  damages  to  double  the  difference  in  value.2  This  section 
of  the  law  has  not  been  tested  in  court  but  it  could  not  be 
attacked,  as  was  the  act  of  1887,  on  the  basis  of  discrimina- 
tion because  it  includes  all  businesses  and  not  mining  alone. 

The  time  of  payment  is  regulated  by  custom  rather  than 
law.  Various  bills  for  semi-monthly  pay  have  been  en- 
acted. In  1 88 1  a  law  in  Pennsylvania  provided  for  pay- 
ment in  lawful  money  at  regular  intervals.  The  court  held 
that  it  was  unconstitutional  "  as  preventing  persons  sni  juris 
from  making  their  own  contracts."  3  In  Arkansas  it  has 
been  held  to  be  a  matter  "  of  purely  private  concern  "  and 
"  necessarily  harmless  "  when  two  parties  contract  as  to  the 
time  of  payment.4  Illinois  has  made  a  similar  finding  with 
respect  to  a  law  providing  weekly  payment  of  the  wages 

^rorer  v.  People,  141  111.  171  (1892). 
2  Hogg,  sec.  540,  acts  1891,  ch.  76,  §  2. 
3Godcharles  v.  Wigeman,  6  Atl.  354  (1886). 
4  Leep  v.  St.  Louis,  58  Ark.  407  ( 1894) . 


49]  THE  COMPANY  STORE  49 

earned  by  employees  to  within  six  days  of  the  date  of  such 
payment  and  forbidding  contracts  for  other  times  of  pay- 
ment.1 But  more  recent  decisions  have  reversed  these.  In 
Indiana  the  courts  have  held  it  within  the  legislative  power 
and  constitutional  to  declare  unlawful  every  contract  by 
which  the  right  to  receive  payment  at  least  once  in  two 
weeks  is  waived.2  The  law  in  West  Virginia  provides  for 
payment  of  wages  at  least  once  every  two  weeks  "  unless 
otherwise  provided  by  special  agreement."  3  In  1914  the 
Supreme  Court  upheld  a  provision  of  the  New  York  State 
laws  providing  for  semi-monthly  pay  of  railway  employees 
and  forbidding  contracts  to  the  contrary.4  In  the  main, 
however,  the  times  of  payment  in  West  Virginia  have  been 
settled  by  extra-legal  agreement.  In  union  fields  the  con- 
tract between  the  operators'  associations  and  the  union  have 
fixed  the  date.  In  non-union  fields  it  has  been  a  matter  of 
individual  agreement — actually,  a  matter  for  the  determina- 
tion of  the  individual  operator. 

The  semi-monthly  pay-day  is  now  universally  found  in 
West  Virginia.  The  initiation  of  such  a  movement  appears 
to  have  been  in  the  union  fields.  Although  the  operators  of 
the  Williamson  Coal  Operators'  Association  are  now  paying 
twice  a  month,  in  19 16  the  monthly  pay-day  was  used  by 
the  Pond  Creek  Coal  Co.5 

The  regulation  of  the  payment  of  wages  in  lawful  money 
of  the  United  States  has  been  settled  by  statute  and  judicial 
decision.  Winthrop  Lane  quotes  Samuel  B.  Montgomery, 
State  Commissioner  of  Labor  and  recently  candidate  for 
governor  of  West  Virginia: 

1  Frorer  v.  People,  141  111.  171  (1892). 
'Hancock  v.  Yaden,  121  Ind.  366  (1890). 

•  Hogg,  sec.  534,  acts  1887,  ch.  63,  §  2. 

*  Erie  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  233  U.  S.  685. 

1  Pond  Creek  Coal  Co.  v.  Riley  Lester  &  Bros.,  188  S.  W.  907.  Olmsted 
told  the  Senate  Committee  in  1921  (vol.  i,  p.  271)  that  this  field  had 
adopted  the  semi-monthly  period  in  1913. 


5o  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [50 

The  issuing  of  scrip  by  a  coal  company  has  been  carried  on 
for  years  and  is  a  violation  of  the  law  for  the  reason  that 
this  scrip  is  issued  in  lieu  of  lawful  money  and  is  only  re- 
deemable in  merchandise.1 

Mr.  Montgomery  may  be  stating  a  condition  of  fact,  but  he 
is  not  correct  in  the  statement  of  the  law. 

In  1887  West  Virginia  passed  a  law  providing  that  per- 
sons engaged  in  mining  and  manufacturing  were  prohibited 
from  issuing  any  checks  or  orders  in  lieu  of  wages  unless 
they  were  redeemable  in  lawful  money  of  the  United  States 
for  face  value  and  bore  interest  at  the  legal  rate,  payable  by 
the  company  within  thirty  days.2  It  was  held  in  1889  that 
this  section  was  unconstitutional  because  it  included  only  a 
certain  class  of  employers  and  infringed  their  liberty  of 
contract.3 

In  1 89 1  this  statute  was  amended  so  as  to  come  within  the 
interpretation  of  the  courts.  This  act  made  it  unlawful  for 
any  person  engaged  "  in  any  trade  or  business  "  to  issue 
directly  or  indirectly  to  his  employees  in  payment  of  wages 
due  or  in  anticipation  of  such  wages  any  evidence  of  in- 
debtedness payable  or  redeemable  otherwise  than  in  lawful 
money.  If  any  such  scrip  is  issued  it  shall  be  construed  by 
the  courts  "  to  be  a  promise  to  pay  the  sum  specified  in 
lawful  money  "  by  the  person  issuing  the  same.4  This  law 
was  sustained  by  an  equally  divided  court  in  1892,  when  the 
president  of  the  court  said :  "  It  seems  clear  to  my  mind 
that  both  of  the  acts  which  we  are  now  considering  were 
passed  with  a  view  to  cutting  off  opportunities  for  fraud, 
and  therefore  they  were  fairly  within  the  police  power  of 

1  Lane,  Civil  War  in  West  Virginia,  p.  28. 

2  Hogg,  sec.  536,  acts  1887,  ch.  63,  §  3. 

3  State  v.  Goodwill,  33  W.  Va.  179. 

4  Hogg,  sec.  539,  acts  1891,  ch.  76,  §  1. 


5I]  THE  COMPANY  STORE  5I 

the  legislature."  1  The  United  States  Supreme  Court  has 
also  upheld  a  law  applying  to  manufacturers  and  miners  in 
the  state  of  Virginia,  requiring  payment  in  lawful  money 
or  in  orders  redeemable  in  lawful  money.2 

Redeemability  is  thus  an  established  legal  requirement. 
But  these  laws  do  not  prohibit  the  issue  of  scrip  in  antici- 
pation of  wages  due.  The  suits  have  all  dealt  with  the  obli- 
gation of  the  company  to  pay  full  face  value  for  the  scrip 
which  they  issue.  In  Kentucky,  for  example,  the  Pond 
Creek  Coal  Co.,  a  member  of  the  Williamson  Operators' 
Association,  refused  to  redeem  coupons  to  the  amounts  of 
$1524.48  and  $411.00  held  by  Riley  Lester  &  Bros.,  inde- 
pendent merchants  who  had  accepted  coupons  redeemable 
only  in  merchandise  at  the  company  store,  an  auxiliary  of 
the  coal  company.  The  law  required  payment  of  wages  in 
cash;  and  although  the  coupons  were  issued  in  anticipation 
of  the  date  when  wages  were  due,  on  this  date  the  coupons 
unused  at  the  company  store  must  be  redeemed.  Otherwise 
the  employer  could  "  practice  the  most  cruel  extortion  and 
demand  and  obtain  exhorbitant  profits  through  the  enforced 
necessity  of  his  employees  patronizing  his  store."  3  This 
would  destroy  the  value  of  the  law.  The  employee  possess- 
ing this  right  to  demand  and  receive  cash  may  transfer  this 
right  to  his  assignee. 

Thus  under  the  law  the  company  may  maintain  a  store 
and  under  the  statutes  of  West  Virginia  the  profits  may  not 
be  excessive.  No  compulsion  may  be  used  to  force  workers 
to  trade  at  company  stores.  The  issue  of  scrip,  redeemable 
in  cash  on  pay-day,  is  legal,  but  this  scrip  may  in  effect  be 
used  for  trading  at  an  independent  store.  Redemption  must 
be  at  full  face  value. 

1  State  v.  Peel  Splint  Coal  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  802.     Completely  upheld 
Atkins  v.  Grey  Eagle  Coal  Co.,  76  W.  Va.  i 
2Keskee  Consolidated  Coke  Co.  v.  Taylor,  234  U.  S.  224  (1914). 
8  Pond  Creek  Coal  Co.  v.  Riley  Lester  &  Bros.,  188  S.  W.  907  (191O). 


LIB 


52  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [52 

In  practice  conditions  seem  no  worse  in  non-union  than 
union  fields.  In  so  far  as  the  company  store  is  an  evil,  it  is 
an  industrial  evil  that  unionism  has  not  cured.  It  is  signifi- 
cant that  Samuel  Montgomery  in  writing  of  the  company 
stores  as  "  one  of  the  sore  spots  in  the  whole  scheme  of 
things,"  says  that  a  wage  increase  is  almost  invariably  offset 
by  increased  prices.     "Ina  given  coal  field  1  we  reached  a 

wage  settlement  at  one  o'clock  Sunday  morning On 

the  following  Tuesday  morning  retail  prices  were  advanced 
exactly  enough  to  absorb  the  wage  increases."  2  Prices,  so 
far  as  data  are  available,  seem  to  be  about  the  same  in  com- 
pany and  independent  stores. 

The  grievance  against  the  company  store  is  partly  that  it 
has  the  advantage  of  location  and  can  undoubtedly  profit 
slightly  from  this,  that  the  system  has  been  outrageously 
abused  in  the  past  and  is  still  connected  in  the  miner's  mind 
with  these  abuses,  that  there  is  danger  of  a  relapse  into 
former  conditions  in  times  of  depression  unless  the  miner 
guards  his  interests,  and  that  with  any  credit  system  the 
man  spends  more  freely  than  if  he  were  paying  cash. 

The  union  has  tried  to  deal  with  this  evil.  Frequent  pay- 
days and  the  consequent,  greater  facility  of  independent  cash 
purchase  is  the  ideal.  In  the  matter  of  wage  payment  the 
xunion  has  undoubtedly  been  the  controlling  factor  in  short- 
ening the  interval  between  pay-days.  The  union  has  one 
further  advantage.  Legally  compulsion  to  trade  at  the  com- 
pany store  may  not  be  used,  but  the  evidence  of  indirect 
compulsion  would  hardly  be  accepted  in  court.  The  union 
contract  contains  a  clause  providing  for  freedom  in  pur- 
chasing. Any  grievance  arising  under  this  clause  may  be 
taken  up  through  the  usual  adjustment  machinery.  Here 
evidence  need  not  fully  comply  with  the  strict  requirements 
of  a  court  of  law. 

1  This  was  very  evidently  a  union  field  in  which  a  "  wage  settlement " 
could  be  made. 
'Lane,  op.  cit.,  pp.  28-29. 


CHAPTER  V 
The  Company  and  Private  Life 

The  so-called  "  feudalism  "  of  the  coal-mining  regions 
presents  a  very  interesting  problem.  Philip  Murray,  vice- 
president  of  the  U.  M.  W.,  sketched  conditions  that  have 
"  never  been  approached  since  the  time  of  the  feudal 
baron  ".*  The  ownership  of  the  land  is  the  basis  of  this 
control  which  extends  to  housing,  stores,  schools  and 
churches.  Conditions  are  dependent  upon  the  "  generosity 
or  lack  of  generosity  of  the  operators  "  and  the  miner  be- 
comes virtually  a  slave.  Mr.  Lane  says  of  the  miner: 
"  The  coal  company  touches  his  life  at  every  point.  If 
there  is  a  playground  for  his  children,  it  is  because  the  coal 
company  has  generously  supplied  it.  If  the  prices  charged 
him  for  food  are  reasonable,  it  is  because  the  coal  company 
decrees  it.  If  the  physical  aspects  of  his  life,  on  the  whole, 
are  tolerable,  it  is  because  he  is  fortunate  enough  to  have  a 
beneficent  employer."  2 

To  most  people  this  condition  will  appear  "  bad  "  and 
"  un-American  ".  Certainly  it  can  hardly  be  calculated  to 
teach  self-government  and  community  organization.  But 
let  us  consider  for  a  moment  the  conditions  under  which 
this  extensive  company  control  grew,  that  make  the  oper- 
ator regard  it  as  a  "  natural  "  state  of  affairs  and  "  a  his- 
torical growth  ".2     In  opening  a  coal  mine  there  can  be  no 

1  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  p.  655. 
1  Lane,  op.  cit.,  p.  30. 

53]  53 


54  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [54 

such  choice  as  to  the  location  of  the  mine  as  there  may  be 
in  building  a  factory.  The  land  is  undeveloped,  sometimes 
timbered,  sometimes  under  partial  cultivation.  The  com- 
pany must  bring  its  workers  from  a  foreign  labor  market. 
When  they  arrive,  they  must  be  housed.  "  The  first  and 
practically  the  only  reason  assigned  by  many  mine  opera- 
tors for  housing  their  men  is  that  there  are  no  houses  avail- 
able or  likely  to  be  provided."  * 

Housing,  one  form  of  "  paternalism,"  seems  absolutely 
necessary.  Manufacturers  face  the  problem  in  less  acute 
form  than  mine  operators.  But  even  of  manufacturers 
the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  writes  that  "  there  is  a 
dearth  of  houses  and  that  private  enterprise  is  failing 
to  supply  low-cost  accommodations  for  working-men  ".2 
In  this  particular  connection  the  Bureau  is  not  certain 
that  private  enterprise  is  not  kept  out  by  the  low  rental 
established  by  employers  and  the  resulting  small  profit. 
But  in  any  event  not  until  the  employer  "  has  estab- 
lished the  community  and  demonstrated  the  likelihood  of  its 
permanence  do  secondary  interests  establish  themselves  and 
social  control  and  self-direction  by  the  members  of  the  com- 
munity take  shape  ".3  The  element  of  permanence  is  par- 
ticularly pertinent  to  the  coal  industry,  for  there  is  almost 
a  certainty  that  the  community  will  last  only  20  or  25  years. 
Under  such  conditions  neither  miners  nor  private  builders 
will  build.4  Even  Murray  admits  that  "  because  of  the 
isolated  character  of  the  country,  some  of  the  evils  cannot 

1  Housing  by  Employers,  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Bui.  263, 
Washington,  D.  C,  1920,  p.  21.  Also  consult  topographical  maps  pub- 
lished by  the  U.  S.  G.  S.  and  note  the  meager  settlement  of  the  un- 
developed coal  land  in  W.  Va. 

1Ibid.,  p.  20. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  21. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  19. 


55]  THE  COMPANY  AND  PRIVATE  LIFE  55 

be  immediately  eliminated,  such  as  the  necessity  of  the  oper- 
ators building  houses  and  running  company  stores  ".* 

The  camps  that  have  resulted  from  company  development 
are  not  beautiful.  The  monotony  is  deadening.  The  houses 
are  either  strung  along  one  road  or  are  laid  out  on  rectan- 
gular lines.  They  are  of  uniform  construction,  for  the 
most  part  frame  cottages  of  either  the  story  and  a  half  or 
two  story  type.  They  are  even  all  painted  the  same  color. 
In  one  town  in  the  Williamson  field  all  the  houses  are  a 
drab  yellow  with  green  trim.  Another  is  red  with  white 
trim. 

One  feature  must  be  emphasized.  From  all  observations 
that  have  been  made  thus  far,  conditions  are  no  better  in 
union  than  in  non-union  fields.2  "  Some  companies  are 
reasonably  good  to  their  employees,  and  supply  fairly  com- 
fortable houses,  clean  streets,  and  such  essentials  as  sewer- 
age systems.  This,"  says  Mr.  Murray,  "  is  found  to  be 
good  policy  sometimes  in  fighting  the  unions."  3  The  im-  / 
plication  seems  to  be  that  sewerage  systems  are  found  in  all 
union  districts.  The  far-sighted  non-union  employer  will 
equalize  conditions.  But  "  such  essentials  as  sewerage  sys- 
tems "  seem  to  be  utter  strangers  to  the  coal  industry  even 
in  union  fields.  In  the  study  of  housing  by  employers  the 
Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  finds  that  2.5  per  cent  of  the 
houses  examined  in  Pennsylvania  and  West  Virginia  had 
cesspools  or  sewers,  whereas  in  the  completely  organized 
Indiana  and  Ohio  fields  but  1.3  per  cent,  and  in  the  un- 
organized Alabama,  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  fields  about  1 
per  cent  had  these  conveniences.4  The  sample  is  too  small 
to  be  conclusive,  particularly  in  Ohio  and   Indiana.      But 

1  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  p.  655. 

1  Cf.  Lane,  p.  30.     Chs.  2  and  3,  "  Good  and  Bad  Mining  Towns." 

3  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  p.  655. 

4  Bui.  263,  pp.  46-47- 


56  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [56 

when  compared  with  the  figures  for  other  industries  exam- 
ined, it  will  be  seen  that  those  for  bituminous  coal  mining 
are  very  low.  Iron^mining  towns  in  the  northern  district 1 
have  cesspools  or  sewers  for  16  per  cent  of  the  houses,  and 
in  Alabama  for  3.8  per  cent;  the  copper-mining  towns  of 
Michigan  and  Tennessee  for  32.6  per  cent.2  Various  fac- 
tors may  cause  this  difference.  The  iron  and  copper  min- 
ing plants  studied  housed  only  26.6  and  32.7  per  cent  of 
their  employees,  respectively.  These  were  possibly  of  a 
more  highly  skilled  group  than  the  coal  miners,  of  whom 
61  per  cent  lived  in  company  houses.3  But  the  smallness 
and  isolation  of  the  community  is  regarded  by  the  Bureau 
as  the  determining  factor.4 

There  are  certain  features  of  the  coal-mining  industry 
that  make  for  dreariness.  Over  some  of  these  the  company 
may  exercise  partial  control.  "  In  the  coke  region  of  Penn- 
sylvania the  towns  are  practically  destitute  of  vegetable 
^growth.  The  fumes  from  the  ovens  have  killed  all  green 
life.  No  regard  has  been  had  for  the  prevailing  direction 
of  the  wind  in  locating  dwellings  and  coke  ovens."  5  But 
in  many  of  the  West  Virginia  camps  there  are  natural  bar- 
riers to  town  planning.  The  mountains  rise  precipitously 
on  either  side  of  a  narrow  valley.  The  raiJroad  must  pass 
up  the  floor  of  the  valley..  There  must  also  be  a  road. 
There  usually  is  a  creek.  These  three  occupy  almost  all  the 
level  ground.  The  houses  are  strung  along  the  track  to  be 
gradually  grayed  with  soot.  The  company  may  operate  coke 
ovens,  in  which  case  "  huge  clouds  of  smoke  envelop  the 
houses;  heavy  masses  of  it  press  against  the  doors  and 
windows  "  6 — for  a  large  company  desiring  to  have  men 

1  Michigan,  Wisconsin  and  Minnesota. 

*  Bui.  263,  p.  47. 

lIbid.,  p.  11.  "Ibid.,  p.  58. 

*Ibid.,  p.  47.  6Lane,  p.  38. 


57]  THE  COMPANY  AND  PRIVATE  LIFE  57 

near  the  plant  can't  put  all  its  houses  out  of  smoke  range. 
Other  houses  are  perched  on  the  hillside,  one  side  resting 
on  stilts  ten  feet  high,  the  other  on  the  hill.  It  is  a  long 
climb  to  such  a  house.  Better,  perhaps,  the  smoke  than  a 
walk  up  that  hill  after  a  day's  work. 

Then  again  nature  may  give  an  almost  ideal  location.  I 
have  in  mind  one  of  the  towns  of  the  Consolidated  Coal 
Co.  in  the  northeastern  corner  of  West  Virginia.  The 
houses  are  of  stone  and  freshly  white-washed.  The  trim 
was  green.  The  camp  was  located  on  the  side  of  a  grad- 
ually sloping  hill.  One  looked  for  miles  over  green  valleys. 
The  wind  blew  across  the  fresh  spaces  before  it  came  to  the 
houses.  Such  a  location  has  possibilities,  but  it  is  rare  in 
West  Virginia  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  union  or  non- 
union activities. 

Some  escape  from  the  hideousness  of  mining  town  con- 
struction may  be  had  by  removing  the  camp  from  the  mine.1 
There  are  certain  advantages  in  locating  near  the  mine. 
The  man  doesn't  have  to  walk  so  far  in  damp  clothing,  but 
the  change-house  at  the  mine  mouth  and  the  shorter  work- 
ing day  minimize  this  advantage.  Similarly  more  frequent 
pay-days  allow  the  woman  to  purchase  at  an  independent 
store  near  her  house  and  lessen  the  advantages  of  proximity 
to  the  time  office  where  scrip  is  issued.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  the  plant  it  is  desirable  to  have  men  in  responsible 
positions  near  the  mine  in  case  of  disaster,  to  effect  econo- 
mies in  construction  by  hauling  all  material  for  plant  and 
town  to  the  same  place,  to  heat  and  light  from  a  single  plant 
with  short  transmission,  and  to  prevent  litigation  by  having 
contiguous  surface  rights  for  the  right  of  way. 

Mr.  White  says  in  this  bulletin  that  these  advantages 
have  been  over-emphasized.     There  are  constructional  ad- 

1  Bureau    of    Mines,    Bulletin    no.    87,    pp.    7-8,    Housing   for   Mining 
Towns,  Washington,  19 14. 


58  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [58 

vantages  in  picking  a  location  with  flat  or  gentle  slope. 
The  drinking-water  problem  may  be  solved  by  choosing  a 
site  near  a  spring  or  river.  And  for  the  miner  ".  .  .  the 
noise,  the  smoke,  and  dust  from  the  tipple,  breaker  and  coke 
ovens,  washery  and  boiler  plants  will  be  avoided,  and  '  slate  ' 
dumps  and  culm  heaps  will  not  be  before  one's  eyes  year  in 
and  year  out  ".  1 

But  again  the  topography  of  West  Virginia  becomes  an 
important  factor.  A  man  with  practical  knowledge  of  coal 
mining  should  pass  on  the  weight  of  mine  disaster  as  a 
reason  for  proximity  to  the  mine.  But  even  a  layman  mak- 
ing casual  observations  can  see  the  difficulty  of  construction 
far  from  the  mines  in  the  southern  part  of  West  Virginia. 
If  one  examines  the  Matewan  quadrant  of  Kentucky  2  and 
locates  Stone,  the  center  of  Pond  Creek  Coal  Co.  construc- 
tion, it  can  be  seen  that  the  camp  is  located  where  the  valley 
is  about  a  tenth  of  a  mile  wide.3  One  and  a  quarter  miles 
below,  near  Coburn  School,  is  a  level  space  approximately 
one-fifth  of  a  mile  in  width  and  about  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  long  that  might  allow  of  some  "  town  planning  " — but 
this  property  is  part  of  the  Sharondale  plant,  at  least  at  its 
lower  extremity.  With  this  one  possible  exception  there  is 
no  better  place  on  Pond  Creek  for  a  camp  than  that  occu- 
pied at  Stone. 

So  far  as  the  features  of  camp  construction  can  be  con- 
trolled, the  improvement  seems  to  be  between  modern  and 
old  rather  than  between  union  and  non-union  mines.4  The 
earliest  houses  were  built  of  board  and  batten,  generally  not 
ceiled  or  plastered  inside.5     The  frame  house  is  still  the 

1  Bui.  S7,  P-  8. 

2  U.  S.  G.  S.  Topographical  Maps. 

3  The  width  of  the  valley  is  measured  on  the  same  contour  line :  i.  e., 
there  can  be  no  more  than  a  50  ft.  rise  in  this  distance. 

4  Cf.  Lane,  p.  34.    Also  Bui.  263,  p.  66. 

5  Bui.  263,  p.  56. 


59]  THE  COMPANY  AND  PRIVATE  LIFE  59 

usual  type,1  but  in  all  the  camps  that  I  saw  the  houses  are 
ceiled.  The  Kanawha  and  Hocking  plant,  union  and  de- 
scribed by  Lane  as  one  of  the  worst,  was  complained  of  as 
early  as  1902.  The  Logan  field,  non-union  and  on  the 
whole  one  of  the  best  in  West  Virginia,  is  one  of  the  most 
recent  fields  to  be  developed. 

The  rising  standard  of  living  is  partly  responsible  for 
this  improvement.  One  superintendent  in  Pennsylvania 
writes,  "  the  time  is  gone  when  it  is  possible  to  pack  for- 
eigners in  boxes  for  houses;  we  must  supply  them  with 
clean,  home-like  quarters ;  for  neatness  of  the  town  tends  to 
cheerfulness  and  contentment  of  employees.  The  operator 
must  consider  the  welfare  of  his  worker  ".2  Another  says 
that  "  unsettled  labor  conditions  and  high  wages  necessi- 
tated a  better  type  of  house  than  operators  in  the  past  were 
in  the  habit  of  furnishing  ".3 

In  a  study  of  industrial  housing,  Mr.  Knowles,  an  in- 
dustrial architect,  is  not  able  to  show  any  cash  return  to  the 
employer.  He  describes  a  very  different  type  of  house 
from  that  found  in  the  coal  fields,  one  costing  $5400.  A 
return  of  ten  per  cent  is  not  possible  unless  the  plan  is  sub- 
sidized or  wages  are  raised.4  There  are,  however,  many 
savings.  These  are  particularly  due  to  a  decrease  in  labor 
turn-over  and  increased  loyalty  and  efficiency  of  the  work- 
ers.5 This  evidence  throws  valuable  incidental  light  on  the 
approach  of  employers  generally  to  housing. 

In  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  study,  the  results  of 
housing  from  the  employer's  point  of  view  show  the  same 

1  Bui.  263,  p.  56. 
1  Ibid.,  p.  21. 
3  Ibid.,  p.  21. 

*  Knowles,    Morris,    Industrial   Housing,   p.   23,    McGraw-Hill,    Now 
York,  1920. 
6  Ibid.,  pp.  13-16. 


60  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [60 

line  of  approach.  Unfortunately  the  answers  from  the  coal 
operators  have  not  been  separately  classified.  Most  of  the 
operators  answered  that  housing  was  necessary.  "  The  larger 
operators,  however,  generally  saw  the  possibilities  of  the 
work.  In  addition  to  the  necessity  was  the  desire  to  im- 
prove the  housing  in  such  a  way  as  to  secure  secondary  or 
indirect  results."  * 

In  respect  to  the  rent  charged  and  the  profits  made  from 
housing  by  the  company,  the  union  has  no  ground  for  com- 
plaint. There  is  not  much  statistical  evidence  available  on 
this  subject,  but  all  that  I  have  seen  points  to  the  fact  that 
rents  per  se  give  almost  no  money  return  on  the  investments. 
The  Red  Jacket,  Jr.,  Coal  Co.  of  Mingo  County  testifies: 

The  amounts  charged  the  said  defendants  were  not  sufficient 
by  a  large  amount  to  pay  the  interest  on  the  amount  invested 
in  said  houses,  the  insurance,  taxes  and  up-keep  and  there 
was  no  profit  whatever  derived  by  your  complainant  from  said 
houses ;  it  being  its  plan  and  intention  that  the  said  defendants 
should  occupy  said  houses  at  the  low  rate  charged  as  a  part 
of  the  consideration  for  their  labor.2 

H.  A.  Goodloe,  general  manager  of  Wilhelmina  Coal  Co., 
testifies  that  one  of  his  employees  rents  a  house  at  $10  a 
month  for  which  a  fair  rent  would  be  $20  a  month.  It  is 
in  part  consideration  for  the  man's  services.3 

In  the  study  by  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  of  11,710 
dwellings  reported  by  32  companies  in  Pennsylvania  and 
West  Virginia,  the  rents  per  month  were  as  follows : 4 

1Bul.  263,  p.  19. 

1  Bill  of  compaint  iRed  Jacket,  Jr.,  Coal  Co.  v.  Cecil  Rudisill  et  al.t 
Mingo  Ct.  Ct.  (1920  or  1921). 

3  Evidence  in  Ct.  Ct.  of  Mingo  Co.,  pp.  9-10,  Wilhelmina  Coal  Co. 
v.  Young. 

4  Bui.  263,  p.  59. 


6i] 


THE  COMPANY  AND  PRIVATE  LIFE 


6r 


$6  and  under  $7 

7  "        "8 

8  "  g 


17.4%  of  total  number 
28.8       "      u 
22.0       "      u 


68.2% 


The  ordinary  rent  is,  therefore,  between  $6  and  $9  with 
almost  one-half  paying  less  than  $8.  The  cost  of  these 
dwellings  is  between  $500  and  $750/ 


$290  and  under  $500 
500  M  "  75o 
750    "         "      1000 

All  others 


2000  houses 

5043 

2410 
2250 


11,703 


17.0%  of  total  number 

43-1 
20.6       " 

19.3       " 


100.0% 


These  figures  of  cost  of  construction  apply  to  only  a  small 
number  of  houses  in  West  Virginia,  but  it  seems  safe  to 
assume  that  they  are  representative.  For  if  we  compare 
the  mean  cost  in  the  fields  studied,  we  find  that  the  average 
for  West  Virginia  and  Pennsylvania  is  $687 ; 2  for  Colo- 
rado and  Wyoming,  $686.50; 3  for  Indiana  and  Ohio,  about 
$639.*  In  other  words,  the  mean  cost  throughout  the  in- 
dustry is  about  the  same,  and  we  may  assume  considerable 
similarity  for  Pennsylvania  and  West  Virginia. 

The  data  supplied  on  cost  of  maintenance  have  been  rather 
scanty;  but,  such  as  they  are,  they  indicate  low  returns  on 
the  investment.  Four  companies  in  Pennsylvania  show 
average  rent  receipts  for  the  years  1911-15  of  $137,744.44 
and  expenditures  for  maintenance  of  $52,526.70,  or  38.1 
per  cent.  Maintenance  includes  general  repairs,  fencing, 
the   work  of  keeping  the   premises   clean,   street   cleaning, 

1  Bui.  263,  p.  64. 
1  Ibid.,  p.  64. 
•  Ibid.,  p.  97. 
'/Ml,  p.  89, 


62  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [62 

lighting  and  drainage.  But  it  does  not  include  insurance  or 
depreciation.1  A  single  company  in  West  Virginia  which 
does  not  specify  what  maintenance  covers,  gives  figures  for 
the  same  period  showing  a  ratio  of  39.7  per  cent.2  Two 
Pennsylvania  companies  include  taxes  and  insurance  in 
maintenance  and  have  a  ratio  of  63.4  per  cent.  The  net 
return  on  the  investment  is  three  per  cent.3 

A  very  rough  estimate  of  the  possibility  of  profits  can  be 
made  from  the  average  cost  and  average  rent.  The  average 
rent  is  $7.78  a  month,  or  $93.36  a  year.  This  represents  a 
gross  return  of  13.7  per  cent  on  the  investment  in  the  house 
alone.4  This  does  not  include  the  value  of  the  land  or  any 
apportioned  share  of  the  town  improvements.  From  this 
gross  return  must  be  paid  general  repairs,  maintenance  of 
the  town  roads,  lighting  and  improvement,5  insurance, 
taxes  and  an  amortization  of  the  investment.  Thus,  it 
seems  fair  to  state  that  in  the  matter  of  housing  as  it  exists 
today  in  the  coal  industry,  the  operators  are  not  "  goug- 
ing "  6  their  employees. 

1  Bui.  263,  p.  67. 
7  Ibid.,  p.  68. 
3  Ibid.,  p.  68. 

4Knowles,  p.  23,  accepts  gross  returns  of  10  per  cent  as  fair.  But 
the  house  represents  only  70-80  per  cent  of  the  investment  (pp.  18-21). 

5  The  poll-tax  mentioned  below  (p.  129)  for  this  purpose  is  rare. 

6  This  is  still  more  clearly  brought  out  in  the  Monthly  Labor  Review, 
April,  1922,  p.  12.  In  an  examination  of  comparative  costs  of  miners' 
and  non-miners'  families  in  coal  districts  the  investigator  finds  that 
rents  are  lower  for  miners  than  others. 

Miners  Families  Non-miners 

Number  of  families 246  53 

Average  size  of  family 5.7  5.1 

Annual  rent $180.15  $240.52 

It  is  of  interest  to  note  that  "  rent "  and  "  fuel  and  light "  are  the  only 
items  of  the  family  budget  which  are  lower  for  miners. 


\ 


63]  THE  COMPANY  AND  PRIVATE  LIFE  63 

There  are,  however,  certain  conditions  arising  out  of 
company  housing  that  are  of  interest.  The  first,  and  prob- 
ably the  most  important  consideration,  is  the  control  which 
the  employer  may  exercise  over  the  employee.  The  houses 
are  constructed  because  of  a  need  for  accommodating  the 
working  force.  But  this  very  condition  means  that  the 
employee  can  find  shelter  only  in  his  employer's  house.1 
This  gives  the  employer  a  hold  over  the  miner  in  times  of 
strike.  One  operator  writes  that  one  reason  for  his  housing 
work  is  "  to  have  men  concentrated  so  as  to  have  proper 
supervision  over  them,  to  better  control  them  in  times  of 
labor  agitation  and  threatened  strikes."  2  Two  others  give 
similar  answers. 

This  control  arises  in  two  ways :  first,  the  power  to  eject 3 
the  miner  no  longer  employed;  and  second,  control  over 
ingress  and  egress  on  company  property.  This  last  power 
may  be  either  the  general  power  over  "  trespassers  "  who 
must  use  company  roads,  or  it  is  frequently  specifically  pro- 
vided in  the  lease.  The  Island  Creek  Coal  Co.  of  Logan 
County  is  not  very  specific  on  this  point : 


'&■ 


Fourth,  That  the  said  lessee  shall  not  permit  any  gambling 
or  gaming  of  any  description  for  money  or  anything  of  intrin- 
sic value,  or  permit  any  improper  or  suspicious  persons  to 
come  upon  or  remain  on  the  said  demised  premises,  and  the 
lessor  shall  at  all  times  have  the  right  to  enter  upon  the 
demised  premises  for  the  purpose  of  ejecting  any  and  all  such 
persons."4 

1  See  depositions  of  Stofflet,  pp.  103-104,  that  09  per  cent  live  in  comp- 
any houses;  Craven,  answers,  pp.  26-27,  that  94  per  cent  in  such  houses. 

1  Bulletin  263,  p.  21. 

8  At  law  there  exists  a  distinction  between  an  ejectment  and  an  eviction, 
the  latter  implying  an  act  not  within  the  landlord's  right.  I  use  the 
terms  interchangeably,  as  has  been  customary  in  these  West  Virginia 
troubles,  but  in  the  sense  of  ejectment. 

idence,  Logan,  pp.  463-463/1.     Italics  mine. 


64  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [64 

The  Logan  Mining  Co.  defines  the  "  improper  or  suspicious 
persons  " : 

Said  employee  shall  not  harbor,  or  permit  to  use,  occupy  or 
otherwise  be  upon  said  premises  any  person  objectionable  to 
the  Company.1 

The  other  feature  of  the  operator's  control  is  his  power 
to  evict  the  miner  upon  the  termination  of  the  relationship 
of  employer  and  employee.  This  is  undoubtedly  a  tremen- 
dous power.2  As  Lane  says,  "  the  coal  companies  can,  if 
they  desire,  render  large  numbers  of  people  shelterless 
almost  over  night.  They  can  do  this  regardless  of  the  ill- 
ness of  members  of  these  families,  or  of  their  ability  to  find 
houses  elsewhere."  3  Frank  Keeney,  district  president,  told 
me  that  during  the  Cabin  Creek  strike  he  was  threatened 
with  eviction  in  the  winter  of  191 2- 13  when  two  of  his 
children  had  diphtheria.  One  of  the  men,  Savage,  evicted 
at  Mate  wan  just  before  the  "  battle  of  Mate  wan  "  had  re- 
fused to  get  out  because  of  his  "  wife's  critical  condition  ".* 
Mr.  Lane  asks :  "  Is  it  desirable  that  the  100,000  coal  miners 
of  West  Virginia  should  have  homes  in  which  they  enjoy 
some  security  of  residence?"  5 

But  in  approaching  the  question  of  the  desirability  of  this 
condition,  let  us  forget  for  the  moment  that  the  system  may 

1  Evidence,  Logan,  pp.  268-269.    Italics  mine. 

*  The  use  of  this  power  may  be  over-emphasized.  Mr.  Avis,  attorney 
for  the  operators,  forces  Fred  Mooney,  district  secretary  of  the  miners, 
to  admit  that  since  the  strike  order  no  evictions  had  been  made  except 
by  regular  court  process.  (Typewritten  record  of  Senate  Investigation, 
p.  133- )  Olmsted  points  out  that  before  the  strike  there  had  been 
10  evictions.  Since,  there  had  been  369  made  "  under  actions  of  unlawful 
entries  and  detainers  "  through  the  courts.     (Ibid.,  pp.  866-867.) 

■  Lane,  p.  50. 

4  Evidence  of  Matewan  Trial,  p.  3518  et  seq. 

•  Lane,  p.  47- 


65]  THE  COMPANY  AND  PRIVATE  LIFE  65 

be  abused,  that  it  may  work  fearful  hardships  on  the  indi- 
viduals evicted.  Let  us  approach  the  problem  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  operator. 

The  concept  of  desirability  which  Mr.  Lane  suggests 
has  a  different  quality  from  mere  legal  status.  There 
is  an  element  of  social  utility  or  social  justice.  But  light 
is  thrown  upon  our  investigation  by  a  consideration  of 
the  legal  relations  of  the  employee  as  tenant  and  the  em- 
ployer as  landlord.  The  relationship  has  been  held  in  West 
Virginia  to  be  that  of  master  and  servant,  not  that  of  land- 
lord and  tenant.  Originally  this  relationship  seems  to  have 
been  that  of  the  servant  living  within  the  house.  Slightly 
different  from  this  is  that  of  the  landlord  who  employed  a 
man  and  his  family  to  operate  his  farm.  The  man  received 
a  certain  wage  per  day  and  his  house  rent  as  compensation. 
The  possession  of  the  house  was  held  to  be  incident  to  the 
employment,  and  termination  of  the  latter  terminated  also 
the  right  to  possess  the  house.1  Now  this  relationship 
again  changes  slightly  and  is  that  of  the  industrial  employer. 
A  man  was  employed  by  the  Morris  Canal  Co.  to  operate  a 
lock.  As  part  of  his  compensation  he  received  the  use  of  a 
house  and  land  adjoining  the  lock.  Here  also  the  right  to 
the  use  of  the  house  is  only  incident  to  employment.2  Simi- 
larly a  man  is  employed  at  a  sub-station  on  a  power  line. 
He  receives  $55  a  month  and  rent — consciously  calculating 
the  latter  to  be  worth  $5  or  $10  a  month,  so  that  he  accepted 
the  position  in  place  of  one  he  had  held  for  $60.  He  strikes, 
and  his  right  to  the  use  of  the  house  ceases,  for  "  The  rela- 
tion of  landlord  and  tenant  did  not  exist.  It  was  the  rela- 
tion of  employer  and  employed;  the  plaintiff  being  in  pos- 
session of  property  belonging  to  the  employer  by  virtue  of 
his  employment."  2 

1  Bowman  v.  Bradley,  151  Pa.  351  (1892). 

'Mitchell  v.  Morris  Canal  &  Banking  Co.,  31  N.  J.  Law  09  (1864). 

'Lane  v.  Au  Sable  Electric  Co.,  147  N.  W.  546  (1914). 


66  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [66 

These  cases  differ  in  one  legal  respect  from  those  in  West 
Virginia.  Rent  is  clearly  part  of  wages.  In  West  Virginia 
the  miners  pay  rent.1  In  South  Carolina  a  man  paid  JO 
cents  a  week  to  a  manufacturing  company.  In  this  state, 
under  section  3508  of  the  Civil  Code  of  1912,  domestic  ser- 
vants, common  laborers  and  tenants-at-will  are  entitled  to 
ten  days'  notice.  The  company  gave  three  days'  notice  and 
then  ejected.  Here  it  was  held  that  the  man  fell  in  none  of 
these  categories  and  occupied  the  house  only  during  em- 
ployment.2 The  author  would  not  cite  this  case  as  a  model 
of  logic  to  prove  his  point,  for  it  seems  an  excellent  example 
of  social  legislation  interpreted  by  legal  technicality  with 
utter  disregard  of  the  spirit  of  the  act.  It  does,  however, 
indicate  that  in  the  eyes  of  the  law  the  mere  act  of  paying 
rent  does  not  necessarily  change  the  relationship. 

These  are  in  cases  not  covered  by  lease.  By  many  of  the 
companies,  particularly  since  the  recent  trouble,  the  under- 
standings which  have  always  existed  are  put  into  the  form 
of  a  written  contract.  One  of  the  largest  companies  in  the 
Williamson  field  now  has  a  lease  specifying: 

That  it  is  expressly  agreed  by  the  parties  hereto  that  the  ten- 
ancy created  by  this  contract  is  incident  to  the  employment  of 
the  said  lessee  by  the  said  lessor.  .  .  . 

It  is  expressly  agreed  by  said  lessee  that  said  lessor  has  the 
right  to,  and  may  terminate  this  lease  at  any  time  with  01* 
without  cause,  as  it  alone  may  elect,  without  notice,  both  time 
and  notice  being  waived  by  lessee. 

In  the  Island  Creek  Coal  Co.  contract, 

....  it  is  expressly  agreed  by  the  parties  hereto  that  the 
tenancy  created  by  this  contract  is  incident  to  the  employment 
of  the  said  lessee  by  the  said  lessor.  .  .  .  3 

1  Some  employers  {supra,  p.  60)  feel  that  a  low  rental  is  still  partly 
in  lieu  of  wages. 

2  Graniteville  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Renew,  1026.  E.  18  (1920). 

3  Evidence,  Logan,  p.  463/1. 


67]  THE  COMPANY  AND  PRIVATE  LIFE  67 

The  first  is  the  far  more  complete  renunciation  of  claim  to 
possession.  It  is  evidently  written  after  the  Wilhelmina  v. 
Young  case  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  Mingo  County  in  192 1.1 
All  possible  loop-holes  have  been  stopped  up.  For  example, 
Young  claimed  that  the  company  had  urged  him  to  cultivate 
a  garden.  This,  he  said,  constituted  a  claim  to  possession. 
This  contract  now  specifies : 

That  said  lessee  agrees  that  in  the  event  he  should  be  allowed 
to  cultivate  a  garden  upon  said  premises,  that  said  fact  shall 
in  no  wise  affect  the  tenancy  in  said  house  created  by  this  con- 
tract. 

Even  under  the  less  detailed  type  of  contract  eviction  has 
been  sustained.  This  was  decided  in  1892  in  West  Virginia 
on  a  lease  which  specified  termination  "  whenever  the  said 
lessee  from  any  cause  ceases  to  work  for  said  company  ". 
In  this  case  "  in  the  face  of  an  admission  that  he  (the  em- 
ployee) had  voluntarily  ceased  to  work  for  the  company, 
thereby  violating  the  express  stipulation  of  the  lease,  it  is 
immaterial  whether  any  notice  to  quit  was  given  at  all.  .  .  ."  2 

In  those  cases  in  which  the  employee  accepts  rent  as  part 
of  his  remuneration,  the  position  seems  clear.  He  has  no 
better  claim  to  his  house  than  to  a  continuation  of  his  wage. 
When  he  pays  rent,  the  situation  seems  to  change.  But 
does  it?  As  we  have  seen,  the  employer  builds  the  house 
because  there  are  no  other  houses  available  for  his  em- 
ployees. The  house  is  really  a  tool  of  production.  It  is  as 
necessary  to  mine  operation  as  the  cutting  machine  which 
the  man  uses.  Even  if  the  rent  is  at  a  market  rate  and 
therefor  not  partly  a  wage  in  kind,  the  situation  is  hardK 
changed.      The   protection   given   by   law   to   the   tenant   is 

1  Not  reported.     See  Lane,  pp.  47  ct  scq.,  for  an  account. 
2Hackett  v.  Marmct  Co.,  8  U.  S.  App.  149  (1892). 


68  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [68 

against  his  landlord,  a  person  with  whom  his  legal  relations 
only  necessarily  involve  the  right  to  the  use  of  a  house. 
Here  the  relationship  is  different.  Any  law  which  might 
be  enacted  would  be  not  only  a  protection  in  his  capacity  as 
tenant  but  also  in  his  capacity  as  employee. 

There  are  two  conditions  under  which  a  general  law  pro- 
tecting the  employee  as  tenant  must  operate.  In  the  first  of 
these  the  employee  leaves  voluntarily.  He  may  go  to  an- 
other mine  or  he  may  strike.  In  the  second  case  he  has 
been  discharged  with  or  without  cause. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  first  of  these  conditions.  We 
will  assume  two  mines,  A  and  B.  Mine  B  is  engaged  in 
enlarging  its  labor  force  to  meet  a  temporary  increase  in  its 
sales  market.  A  bonus  is  offered  to  the  men  at  Mine  A  who 
leave  the  mine  but  continue,  as  tenants  subject  to  thirty 
days'  notice  and  in  practice  forty-five  days',1  to  live  in  the 
houses  at  A.  The  laboring  force  at  A  is  reduced  below 
normal  and  no  new  men  can  be  brought  in  because  there  is 
no  housing  accommodation.  Such  a  condition  is  obviously 
undesirable. 

But  the  man  may  leave  voluntarily  because  of  a  strike, 
as  did  the  Michigan  sub-station  man.  As  the  law  functions 
in  this  case  there  is  no  hope  for  the  employer  to  operate  his 
plant  during  a  strike.  The  employment  of  strike-breakers 
does  present  a  social  problem.  It  is  this  which  is  "  almost 
without  exception  "  the  cause  of  violence  in  industrial  dis- 
putes,2 We  must  also  remember  the  rigidity  of  the  law. 
What  constitutes  a  strike?  The  bituminous  coal  strike  of 
1919  was  "  called  off  "  by  John  L.  Lewis  on  November  11. 
For  the  next  four  weeks  the  Central  Competitive  Field  was 

1  In  West  Virginia  the  law  specifies  30  days'  notice  from  the  next 
date  that  rent  is  paid.  Rent  is  checked  out  of  the  pay-envelope.  The 
minimum  notice  is,  therefore,  30  days' ;  the  maximum,  45. 

2  Final  Report  of  Commission  on  Industrial  Relations,  1915,  Wash- 
ington, D.  C,  p.  142. 


59]  THE  COMPANY  AND  PRIVATE  LIFE  69 

shut  down  almost  completely.  Were  these  men  striking? 
Such  difficulties,  added  to  the  fact  that  a  law  in  effect  pro- 
hibiting the  employment  of  strike-breakers  *  would  be  as 
unjust  and  unwise  as  is  the  enjoining  of  picketing,  make  a 
law  of  this  type  out  of  the  question. 

The  law  might,  however,  deal  only  with  cases  of  dis- 
charge or  lockout.  It  is  conceivable  that  the  courts  might 
regard  the  housing  of  miners  as  vested  with  a  public  in- 
terest. Under  such  an  interpretation  the  law  could  be  held 
constitutional  and  leases  made  in  the  future  waiving  rights 
granted  by  the  law  might  be  regarded  as  contrary  to  public 
policy  and  void.  Such  a  law  would  afford  the  worker  much 
needed  protection  in  his  security  of  job.  But  it  is  improb- 
able that  without  constitutional  amendment  such  a  law  could 
include  cases  of  dismissal  both  with  and  without  cause. 
Again,  remember  the  rigidity  of  law  and  the  flexibility  of 
the  term  "  cause  ".  Certainly  if  there  is  any  extra-legal 
method  of  adjustment  it  is  better  than  recourse  to  the 
courts.2 

There  is  an  extra-legal  method.  The  union  contract 
deals  with  hiring  and  firing.  Theoretically  the  employer  is 
recognized  as  having  absolute  control.  It  is  merely  pro- 
vided that  there  be  no  discrimination  against  a  union  man 
for  his  union  activities.  Practically  this  introduces  as  effec- 
tive 3  a  bar  against  summary  dismissal  as  the  law  which 

1  Such  a  law  would  undoubtedly  be  held  unconstitutional  by  courts 
with  the  present  judicial  background.  Perhaps  Justice  Taft  would 
paraphrase  his  recent  decision :  "  There  can  be  no  such  thing  as  violent 
strike-breaking!  " 

2  Consider  the  effectiveness  of  extra-legal  methods  of  dealing  with 
company  stores.     See  the  chapter  above. 

3  William  Wiley,  an  operator  of  Sharpless,  W.  Va.,  testified  that  he 
had  absolutely  no  control  over  his  lessees.  By  virtue  of  the  union 
agreement,  they  enjoyed  the  most  absolute  security  of  tenure.  (Senate 
Investigation,  vol.  ii,  pp.  986-987.)  For  an  extreme  example,  Bee 
below,  p.  161. 


jq  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [70 

would  merely  specify  that  no  employer  should  dispossess  an 
employee  on  less  than  thirty  days'  notice  unless  the  employee 
leave  his  employ  voluntarily  or  be  discharged  for  cause. 

There  are  other  elements  besides  housing  in  this  " feudal" 
control.  Before  progressing  with  the  study,  we  find  one 
very  enlightening  remark  in  the  government  bulletin  on 
housing.  In  the  coal  fields  near  Pittsburg  it  was  found 
that  men  would  travel  five  or  six  miles  a  day  rather  than 
live  in  a  mining  camp.  Where  there  are  absolutely  no  re- 
creational facilities,  the  men  become  drifters.1  This  state- 
ment largely  explains  welfare  work.  Philip  Murray  says: 
"  The  houses  are  practically  all  company  houses.  The 
stores  and  amusement  places  are  also  company-owned. 
Frequently  the  companies  build  the  churches  and  the  school- 
houses  and  supplement  or  pay  in  full  the  salaries  of  the 
preachers  and  teachers.  The  Y.  M.  C.  A.  buildings  are 
built  and  owned  by  the  company  and  the  secretary  is  usually 
one  of  its  employees."  2  This  is  often  true,  but  Mr.  Murray 
does  not  ask  why.  He  merely  says  this  "  is  not  the  en- 
vironment that  develops  self-respecting  and  responsible 
citizens  "  3 

So  far  as  I  am  aware,  no  evidence  has  ever  been  brought 
forward  to  show  that  the  initiative  in  these  community 
problems  is  taken  by  the  miners  themselves.  There  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  it  would  be.  The  miner  does  not 
continue  long  in  one  mine.  There  is  some  evidence  to  indi- 
cate that  the  operators  are  no  more  paternalistic  and  domi- 
nant than  the  situation  requires.  The  Pond  Creek  Coal 
Co.,4  employing  about  1100  men,  has  a  Y.  M.  C.  A.  equipped 

xBul.  263,  p.  242. 

2  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  p.  655. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  655- 

4  This  is  now  the  Fordson  Coal  Co.     H.  M.  Ernst  writes  to  me  under 
date  of  March  10,  1923,  that  the  two  Y.  M.  C.  A's.  are  practically  self- 


71]  THE  COMPANY  AND  PRIVATE  LIFE  yj; 

for  motion  pictures,  pool  and  bowling.  There  is  a  paid 
secretary.  But  so  far  as  the  company  is  concerned,  its  only 
contribution  is  the  building.  Costs  of  operation  and  the 
secretary's  salary  are  paid  by  the  men. 

The  aid  to  schools  is  somewhat  similar  in  nature  to  other 
welfare  work.  The  workers  with  whom  I  spoke  were  sin- 
cerely interested  in  the  education  of  their  children.  One 
negro  woman  came  up  to  me  on  my  visit  to  the  Lick  Creek 
tent  colony  and,  mistaking  me  for  a  representative  of  the 
union,  asked  whether  or  not  this  year  there  could  be  a  school 
for  the  children  as  "  two  winters  is  such  a  lot  to  lose  ".  If, 
therefore,  a  school  system  is  an  inducement  to  the  worker 
to  remain  with  the  company,  it  becomes  to  the  selfish  in- 
terest of  the  company  to  maintain  a  good  school.  If  the 
company  now  gives  money  to  improve  the  educational  sys- 
tem, it  may  well  ask  that  the  money  be  wisely  expended. 

The  companies  have  undoubtedly  made  rather  large  ex- 
penditures for  schools.  The  State  Superintendent  reports 
in  1920  that  "  one  of  the  big  factors  affecting  the  present 
school  situation  is  the  problem  of  securing  convenient  and 
desirable  homes  for  teachers.  The  teacherage  promises  the 
best  solution  in  many  communities."  x  Such  a  house  was 
established  by  the  Consolidation  Coal  Co.  at  Kayford, 
Kanawha  County.  It  contains  six  rooms  and  bath,  is 
lighted  by  electricity,  and  rents  for  $15  a  month.  Four 
teachers  share  this  house. 

The  more  usual  form  of  expenditure  is  either  a  supple- 
ment  to   teachers'   salaries   or   school   construction.      This 

sustaining.  This  last  year  one  was  able  to  finance  a  Lyceum  course. 
The  secretary  is  furnished  by  the  State  and  National  Y.  M.  C.  A. 
organizations.  The  executive  board  is  composed  of  five  to  seven  mem- 
bers who  are  employees  or  local  ctizens.  This  board  is  appointed  by 
the  secretary  as  the  active  membership  is  too  small  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  national  organization  to  hold  an  election. 

1  Biennial  Report  of  State  Superintendent  of  Free  Schools  of  West 
Virginia,  1920,  p.  16. 


72  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [j2 

supplementary  salary  takes  two  forms :  either  it  is  intended 
to  secure  a  better  grade  of  teacher  or  to  keep  the  schools 
open  a  longer  period.  In  Logan  the  Stone  Branch  Coal  Co, 
offered  $15  a  month  in  addition  to  the  county  salary.  The 
Guyandote  Coal  Co.  offered  the  difference  between  $75  and 
$90  a  month.1  This  is  in  a  school  district  where  50  per 
cent  of  the  teachers  were  receiving  $60  a  month,  and  40  per 
cent  were  receiving  $45. 2  The  attempt  was  to  attract  a 
better  grade  of  teacher.  Again  in  the  Logan  district  of 
Logan  County  the  Main  Island  Creek  Coal  Co.  gave  a 
supplement  of  $1375  to  the  county  salary  of  $1125  for  a 
principal  of  the  Omar  schools.3  The  Island  Creek  Coal  Co. 
has  extended  the  usual  six  months  term  to  nine  months  by 
paying  $4360.50  in  teachers'  salaries.  It  also  supplies  jani- 
tor service,  repairs,  and  has  installed  a  septic  closet  in  each 
outhouse.4 

Similarly  the  operators  have  aided  in  school  construction. 
Mr.  E.  F.  Scraggs,  Superintendent  of  Schools  in  Logan 
County,  says :  "  The  financial  circumstances  of  the  boards 
up  there  (Logan)  sometimes  prevents  them  from  building 
school  houses,  and  the  coal  companies  at  a  number  of  places 
have  built  these  school  houses,  and  it  cost  them  from  $7000 
down  to  $5000  and  up  to  $8000,  and  they  are  waiting  on 
the  Board  until  the  Board  is  financially  able  to  reimburse 
them."  5 

Again,  in  medical  inspection  the  companies  are  rendering 
aid.  In  the  Triadelphia  district  of  Logan  County  with 
1900  school  children  this  inspection  is  furnished  by  the 
company  doctor  and  includes  75  per  cent  of  the  schools. 

1  Evidence,  Logan,  p.  226. 

a  Ibid.,  p.  236.    Scraggs,  Exhibit  No.  4. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  227. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  456. 
iIbid.,  p.  233. 


73]  THE  COMPANY  AND  PRIVATE  LIFE  73 

So  also  in  the  Logan  district  "  a  lot  of  medical  inspection 
is  being  looked  after  in  the  schools  by  company  physicians." 
The  cost  of  this  inspection  to  the  county  would  be  about 
$2700  for  5000  pupils.1 

All  this  undoubtedly  results  in  placing  the  school  authori- 
ties and  indirectly  the  county  authorities  under  certain  obli- 
gations to  the  coal  companies.  The  system  of  privately 
supported  education  was  attacked  in  the  Final  Report  of 
the  Commission  on  Industrial  Relations  in  191 5,  with  par- 
ticular reference  to  the  large  endowments  such  as  the  Rocke- 
feller Foundation.  Through  the  foundations  a  small  group 
of  men  are  coming  to  dominate  "  the  education  and  '  social 
service '  of  the  Nation." 2  These  funds  have  resulted 
largely  from  "  the  exploitation  of  American  workers  through 
the  payment  of  low  wrages  or  ...  .  the  exploitation  of 
the  American  public  through  the  exaction  of  high  prices. 
The  funds,  therefore,  by  every  right,  belong  to  the  Amer- 
ican people."  3  Subject  to  no  political  control,  these  foun- 
dations constitute  "  a  menace  to  national  welfare  "  4 — par- 
ticularly with  reference  to  work  in  the  field  of  industrial 
relations  and  by  indirect  pressure  on  education. 

In  Logan  this  danger  exists.  The  charge  of  I.  G.  Wil- 
liams was  never  fully  substantiated,  but  it  sounds  plausible. 
Williams  5  had  been  a  mine  foreman.  He  was  discharged 
for  union  sympathies  and,  all  according  to  his  testimony, 
was  blacklisted.  When  he  was  unable  to  find  work  about 
the  mines,  the  citizens  of  Big  Creek  petitioned  him  to  teach 
school.  He  went  to  Mr.  Scraggs,  who  promised  to  recom- 
mend him  for  a  "  one  grade  ",  and  made  application  for  an 

1  Evidence,  Logan,  pp.  234-236. 

2  Op.  cit.,  p.  118. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  119. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  121. 

5  Evidence  Logan,  pp.  553-555. 


74  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [74 

emergency  certificate.  After  teaching  for  several  weeks  he 
was  notified  that  the  application  for  an  emergency  certifi- 
cate was  refused.  The  reason,  so  he  was  told  by  Ed.  Chap- 
man, member  of  the  Board  of  Education,  was  that  one  of 
the  deputy  sheriffs,  George  Chafin,  had  said:  ".  .  .  you 
must  not  give  him  the  school.  Why?  Because  he  is  a 
union  sympathizer.  We  are  going  to  run  him  out  of  this 
county.  He  can't  get  a  job  anywhere.  You  give  him  that 
and  he  will  be  here  six  long  months."  Scraggs  had  been 
examined  earlier  and  Ed.  Chapman  never  was  questioned. 
The  chief  clerk  in  the  office  of  Mr.  Shawkey,  Superintend- 
ent of  Schools  for  the  State,  testified  that  the  reason  for 
the  refusal  was  that  Scraggs  had  written  a  letter  saying  that 
"  there  is  some  question  that  has  been  brought  up  as  to  his 
high  school  education,  or  its  equivalent,  and  at  the  present 
time  I  am  not  prepared  to  say  as  to  whether  I  shall  recom- 
mend him  or  not."  x  Be  the  facts  of  this  case  what  they 
may,  it  seems  highly  probable  that  such  a  situation  might 
develop  in  a  county  where  the  authorities  are  greatly  in- 
debted to  private  donors — after  all  one  particular  teacher  is 
not  worth  several  thousand  dollars.2 

If  we  examine  the  standing  of  the  schools  in  West  Vir- 
ginia and  in  Mingo  and  Logan  counties  in  particular,  we 
may  understand  the  desire  of  the  operators  to  exercise  some 
degree  of  control  over  expenditure.  The  schools  of  West 
Virginia  rank  38  in  the  United  States.  Within  the  state, 
in  comparison  of  counties,  Logan  and  Mingo  rank  25  and 
26  respectively.3     Under  these  circumstances  a  man  invest- 

1  Evidence,  Logan,  p.  595. 

2  The  Portsmouth -Sol  vay  Co.  in  the  Williamson  field  has  increased 
the  $75  county  salary  to  $150  and  $130.  Where  this  expenditure  is  made 
by  the  companies,  the  companies  are  allowed  to  appoint  the  teacher. 
(Senate  Invest.,  1921,  vol.  i,  p.  298.) 

3  Report  of  State  Supt.  of  Free  Schools,  1920,  pp.  34-35. 

These  rankings  are  made  in  studies  quoted  as  authoritative.  The 
best  state  or  county  school  system  is  ranked  as  1.  The  method  of  de- 
termining the  order  of  merit  is  not  discussed. 


75] 


THE  COMPANY  AND  PRIVATE  LIFE 


7S 


ing  several  thousand  dollars  in  education  may  well  ask  that 
it  be  expended  in  more  satisfactory  manner  or  in  such  a  way 
as  will  raise  the  general  standard.1 

1  The  right  of  the  operator  to  control  this  expenditure  must  be 
admitted  if  the  expenditure  is  voluntary  and  necessary.  These  con- 
ditions would  not  be  met  if  the  county  is  poor  because  property  has 
gone  untaxed.  The  law  of  West  Virginia  provides  that  all  property 
shall  be  assessed  "at  the  price  for  which  such  property  would  sell  if 
voluntarily  offered  for  sale  by  the  owner  thereof,  upon  such  terms 
as  such  property,  the  value  of  which  is  sought  to  be  ascertained,  is 
usually  sold,  and  not  the  price  which  might  be  realized  if  such  property 
was  sold  at  forced  sale."  (West  Virginia  Code,  1918,  ch.  29,  sec.  12, 
Barnes  edition.)  Both  the  law  and  the  instructions  to  assessors  follow 
closely  the  recommendations  of  the  National  Tax  Association.  (Cf., 
Proceedings  of  the  Seventh  National  Conference  of  the  Natl.  Ta# 
Ass.,  1913,  pp.  387-391.) 

The  tax  rate  is  slightly  lower  for  the  non-union  counties  of  Mingo 
and  Logan  than  it  is  in  Kanawha  where  the  schools  rank  8th  in  the 
state  (Table  below).  There  have  been  charges  made  that  property  is 
under-assessed.  Samuel  B.  Montgomery  in  his  campaign  for  the  gov- 
ernorship in  1920  made  this  charge.  The  superintendent  of  schools, 
Mr.  Shawkey,  says :  "...  assessing  bodies  are  either  kind  or  foolish. 
In  Barbour  County  they  assessed  at  $75  an  acre  land  that  sold  at  $765  and 
charged  the  difference  to  the  boys  and  girls.  Fair  assessment  of  the 
property  of  the  state  with  some  intelligent  effort  to  find  who  has  property 
would  make  schools  possible  that  would  not  disgrace  us."  (Supt.  of 
Schools,  op.  cit.,  1920,  p.  32.) 


Year 


1904 
1906 
1908 
1910 
1912 
1914 
1916 
1918 
1919 


Tax  Rate  in  County  * 


Logan 

Mingo 

Kanawha 

1-505 

3.095 

2.465 

1.560 

•925 

.715 

.706 

.964 

1.068 

.787 

.822 

I-I33 

.839 

•977 

1.068 

.940 

1.304 

1.309 

1. 165 

1.419 

I-53I 

I-350 

1.202 

1.920 

2.408 

1.696 

2.512 

*Rcport  of  State  Tax  Commissioner  of  IV.  Va.,  1919-20,  pp.  416,  419, 
425. 


y6  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [76 

Another  evidence  of  "  feudal  control  "  is  in  the  matter 
of  medical  treatment.  The  usual  procedure  is  for  every 
company  to  deduct  a  certain  fixed  amount  per  month  for 
the  doctor  and  in  some  instances  for  the  hospital.  The 
Island  Creek  Coal  Co.  deducts  $1  a  month  for  a  married 
man  and  50  cents  a  month  for  a  single  man  for  the  doctor, 
and  25  cents  for  the  hospital.  For  a  married  man  this 
amounts  to  $15  a  year  and  entitles  him  to  "  free  treatment 
for  himself,  or  any  member  of  his  family,  in  any  sickness, 
with  the  exception  of  some  venereal  diseases."  1  The  Lun- 
dale  Coal  Co.  charges  75  cents  for  single  men  and  $1.25 
for  married,  with  free  hospital  treatment.  Here  "  it  is  op- 
tional with  the  men  whether  they  contribute  these  amounts  " 
— a  rather  unusual  procedure.  The  loss  to  this  company 
for  eight  months  of  1919  on  the  hospital  was  $3774.68.2 

The  institution  of  a  company  doctor  has  not  met  with 
the  approval  of  the  union,  although  it  exists  in  union  mines. 
In  1 91 7  a  bill  was  introduced  in  the  House  of  the  West 
Virginia  legislature  "  To  secure  to  laborers,  employees  and 
other  inhabitants  of  this  state  the  right  to  medical  or  other 
treatment  of  their  own  choice  ".  This  bill  was  referred  to 
the  Committee  on  Medicine  and  Sanitation  and  never  came 
out.3  In  1 91 8  Local  2968,  located  at  Winden,  introduced 
a  resolution  in  the  State  Federation  of  Labor  convention: 
"  That  no  coal  company  .  .  .  shall  dictate  who  the  family 
physician  of  the  workers  shall  be,  and  that  money  shall  not 

But  on  the  whole  the  evidence  is  not  yet  available  for  one  not 
thoroughly  conversant  with  the  local  situation  and  particularly  with 
the  coal  industry  to  pass  judgment  on  the  sufficiency  of  the  tax  rata 
and  assessments.  From  the  information  now  available  we  must  say 
that  the  expenditures  for  schools  are  being  made  in  good  faith  as  a 
business  investment. 

1  Evidence  Logan,  pp.  451-455. 

7  Ibid.,  pp.  279-281. 

1  Journal  of  House  of  Delegates,  W.  Va.,  191 7,  p.  lxix,  H.  B.  193. 


7j]  THE  COMPANY  AND  PRIVATE  LIFE  jj 

be  withheld  from  any  employee  to  pay  any  company  physi- 
cian not  engaged  by  said  employee."  x  The  union  demanded 
in  the  scale  convention  of  1914:  "That  we  reserve  the 
right  to  hire  and  discharge  the  physician,  and  permission 
given  the  physical!  to  have  an  office  on  company  premises, 
and  that  his  pay  be  checked  off  through  the  office."  2 

Dr.  Walter  E.  Vest,  a  physician  of  good  standing  in 
Huntington,  W.  Va.,  told  me  that  the  great  evil  of  the  com- 
pany doctor  is  "  farming  ".  A  doctor,  either  through  per- 
sonal friendship  or  political  pull,  secures  charge  of  many 
more  camps  than  he  can  control.  In  theory  he  acts  as  con- 
sultant, but  in  fact  the  camps  may  be  a  hundred  miles  apart. 
The  practice  is  carried  on  by  young  men  just  out  of  school 
or  old  men  who  are  on  the  decline.  Dr.  Vest  pointed  out 
that  no  good  man  can  afford  to  go  in  permanently  for  ordi- 
nary camp  practice  because  of  the  danger  of  falling  into  a 
rut.     He  cannot  keep  abreast  of  the  times. 

Under  this  condition  the  doctor  must  be  either  a  state 
doctor,  a  company  doctor  or  one  elected  by  the  men.  Al- 
though the  state  doctor  may  be  preferable  to  the  company 
doctor,  West  Virginia  is  many  years  from  any  such  system. 
In  truth  the  men  themselves  don't  appear  to  consider  this 
possibility.  If  the  doctor  is  appointed  by  the  men,  Dr.  Vest 
feels  that  politics  would  enter  to  an  even  larger  extent  than 
under  the  present  system.3 

From  this  survey  of  the  field  of  company  paternalism 
two  phases  appear  to  be  objectionable.  There  is  an  ele- 
ment of  control  over  the  educational  system  that  is  far 
from  satisfactory.  Education  is  a  public  function  and  it 
should  particularly  not  be  vested  in  a  private  body  that  de- 

1  Proceedings  of  Annual  Convention,  West  Virginia  State  Federation 
of  Labor,  1918,  p.  54. 
1  Board  of  Conciliation,  1914,  vol.  i,  p.  12. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  12.    The  operators  advance  a  similar  argument. 


yS  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [78 

sires  to  advance  certain  doctrines.  But  there  are  certain 
educational  fundamentals  that  are  not  doctrinaire.  Two 
times  two  has  so  little  to  do  with  profits  that  it  will  equal 
four  in  a  school  for  socialism  or  for  capitalism.  The  art 
of  reading  and  writing  —  not,  of  course,  what  to  read  or 
write — is  the  same  for  all  men  of  the  same  language.  If 
only  these  fundamentals  are  taught,  the  worker  has  gained 
somewhat.  Before  we  may  condemn  the  operator  for  his 
voluntary  contributions  and  the  subsequent  supervision  of 
their  expenditure,  somebody  must  obtain  an  expert  study  of 
the  taxing  system  and  its  functioning  in  West  Virginia. 
To-day  we  have  scattered  evidence  of  the  inadequacy  of  the 
assessment  rate.  We  may  infer  from  other  investigations 
that  the  coal  lands  are  probably  too  lightly  taxed.  The  first 
step  is  not  to  condemn  a  practice  on  the  basis  of  this 
"  hunch  ",  but  to  verify  it.  It  is  work  for  a  specialist — 
work  that  has  not  yet  been  done. 

The  second  matter  does  not  require  further  facts.  But 
the  solution  of  the  problem  will  vary  on  account  of  preju- 
dice and  circumstances.  We  can  state  the  problem  clearly, 
but  every  man  will  give  his  own  answer.  To  the  operator 
in  non-union  fields  the  company-owned  house,  to  use  a 
technical  expression,  yields  three  usances.  In  one  capacity 
it  enables  him  to  secure  a  labor  force  by  furnishing  the  men 
shelter.  In  the  second,  it  may  return  him  a  profit  on  a 
capital  investment.  In  the  third,  his  control  over  tenants 
gives  him  power  to  exclude,  or  make  additionally  difficult 
the  entrance  of  the  union.  The  problem  arises  with  this 
third  use  of  the  house. 

It  rests  on  two  legal  sanctions.  The  first  of  these  is 
against  trespassers.  It  enables  the  operator  to  keep  out 
disorderly  houses  and  liquor  and  also  union  organizers. 
Functions  such  as  the  first  two  may  be  with  at  least  equal 
propriety  vested  in  the  community.     It  is  difficult  to  see, 


79]  THE  COMPANY  AND  PRIVATE  LIFE  79 

therefore,  why  this  particular  legal  sanction  should  not  be 
removed. 

The  second  sanction  is  that  which  allows  eviction  with 
the  termination  of  the  relationship  of  employer  and  em- 
ployee. It  is  particularly  useful  in  the  event  of  threatened 
organization  of  the  field.  As  was  pointed  out  at  some 
length  above,  a  change  of  the  law  will  entail  hardship  for 
the  operator.  But  with  considerable  justice  we  may  con- 
tend that  this  right  is  of  greatest  use  in  union  disturbances. 
The  hardship  on  the  worker  is  greater  in  these  times  than 
that  under  the  changed  law  would  be  on  the  operator  in  times 
other  than  those  of  industrial  unrest.  Furthermore,  society 
at  large  does  not  approve  of  refusing  to  deal  at  all  with  the 
union;  and  although  it  would  accord  the  operator  protection 
against  union  aggression,  this  extreme  use  of  the  second 
legal  sanction  constitutes  a  breach  of  trust. 

But  the  qualification  made  in  the  introduction  with  regard 
to  personal  liberty  as  a  cause  or  condition  demanding  the 
introduction  of  the  union  applies  here.  It  is  not  correct  to 
say  that  company  housing  keeps  out  the  union;  therefore 
the  union  must  come  in  to  abolish  this  control.  The  sequence 
is  the  reverse.  The  union  must  come  in.  Company  hous- 
ing keeps  it  out.  Therefore  certain  phases  of  company 
housing  must  go.  If  one  is  convinced  of  the  first  proposi- 
tion and  the  union  is  still  excluded,  then  he  may  reluctantly 
seek  to  change  the  law,  choosing  the  lesser  of  two  evils. 

In  the  light  of  facts  now  available  the  indignation  of 
Philip  Murray  and  Winthrop  Lane,  indeed  of  liberal  opinion 
generally,  is  not  justified.  The  paternalism  of  the  coal  camp 
is  an  industrial  phenomenon.  It  is  forced  on  the  operator 
largely  through  the  isolation  of  mining  camps.  In  many 
cases,  specifically  medical  treatment,  the  construction  of 
recreational  centers,  work  in  the  schools,  the  activities  of 
the   operator  are  commendable,    and  the   absence   of   such 


go  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [8a 

conditions  is  regarded  as  lamentable  by  these  same  people 
when  they  merely  discuss  the  facilities  of  camps  and  camp 
life.  The  company-owned  house  is  an  absolute  necessity. 
It  is  found  in  all  coal  fields,  union  and  non-union.  For  an 
employee  to  be  forced  to  find  shelter  for  himself  would  be  a 
tremendous  hardship  and  would  bind  him  irrevocably  to  the 
locality.  Private  enterprise,  if  our  figures  are  correct,  could 
not  supply  housing  so  cheaply.  There  seem  to  be  two  other 
possibilities :  housing  supplied  by  government  or  by  the 
union.  Perhaps  here  lies  the  constructive  suggestion  of  the 
critics  of  the  housing  of  miners.  If  so,  let  them  at  least 
intimate  their  purpose.  So  far  they  have  merely  said  with 
horror  that  such  conditions  have  "  never  been  approached 
since  the  times  of  the  feudal  baron  ". 


CHAPTER  VI 
Improvements  in  the  Miners'  Conditions 

Although  it  appears  to  be  true  that  conditions  at  any 
given  time  are  approximately  the  same  in  union  as  in  non- 
union fields,  it  would  be  altogether  erroneous  to  leave  the 
impression  that  over  a  period  of  years  conditions  have  not 
improved  in  the  industry.  As  will  be  shown  in  subsequent 
chapters,  this  improvement  is  attributable  solely  to  the  grow- 
ing strength  of  the  miners'  organization. 

Consider,  for  example,  the  matter  of  housing.  It  will  be 
recalled  that  we  concluded  that  improvement  was  to  be 
found  in  new  fields  as  contrasted  with  old,  rather  than  union 
with  non-union.  With  the  passage  of  time  there  has  been 
a  betterment.  To  quote  again  the  words  of  the  Pennsyl- 
vania operator :  "  The  time  is  gone  when  we  may  pack 
foreigners  in  boxes  for  houses."  It  is  legitimate  to  ask 
why  that  time  has  gone.  The  most  probable  answer  is  that 
the  standard  of  life  of  workers  generally  or  coal  miners 
specifically  has  changed.  The  effectiveness  of  the  miners' 
demands  is  measured  by  their  ability  to  leave  the  industry 
or  particular  field  to  go  to  better  conditions.  Housing  in 
non-union  fields  has  undoubtedly  made  considerable  ad- 
vances for  the  sole  purpose  of  combatting  the  union.  Al- 
though it  cannot  be  said  that  the  operators  have  made  a 
direct  concession  to  the  union,  it  must  l>e  admitted  that  the 
strength  of  the  union  is  the  cause  of  the  improvement. 

Working  hours  have  been  reduced.  (Table  5.)  The 
eight-hour  day  has  become  almost  the  universal  rule.  It 
has  been  adopted  in  non-union  as  well  as  union  fields.  Over- 
81]  81 


82 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS 


[82 


TABLE  5 
Hours  in  Full-time  Working  Day  * 


Year 


1903  . 

1904  . 

1905  . 

1906  . 

1907  . 

1908  . 

1909  2 

1910  . 

1911  . 

1912  . 

1913  • 

1914  . 

1915  • 

1916  . 

1917  . 

1918  . 


Number  of  Men  World  n 


hours  9  hours         10  hours 


214,968 
262,591 

252>673 
291,452 
303.232 
314.756 

327,986 
330,045 
321,982 
347,018 
344.814 
325.308 

316,133 
429,096 

529.339 


65,409 
58,061 
56,401 
62,556 
54,948 
55.278 

59,756 

57,35i 
60,015 
85,267 
87,357 
92,838 

93,6i9 
68,313 

39,304 


101,189 
101,986 
104,855 
108,800 

H5.775 
125,998 

140,627 
137,601 
141,107 
127,847 
135.876 
127,268 
129,283 
45,758 
15,609 


All  others 


3,166 
1,620 
45.640 
14,799 
38,397 
19,489 

26,745 
24,191 
2;, 006 
11,150 

15.OH 
11,603 

21,527 
59.644 
30,538 


time  is  somewhat  more  common  in  non-union  fields,  al- 
though in  neither  type  of  field  is  punitive  overtime  paid. 
But  although  the  eight-hour  day  is  almost  universal,  it  is  a 
typically  union  phenomenon.  The  change  can  be  traced  in 
Wyoming  in  1907  when  this  region  was  organized.  (Table 
6.)  In  almost  every  issue  of  the  "  Mineral  Resources  "  is 
the  statement  that  in  well-organized  districts  the  eight-hour 
day  is  universal  and  that  the  nine  and  ten-hour  day  are 
characteristic  of  the  non-union  or  "  open  shop  "  field.3     This 

1  Figures  compiled  from  Annual  Reports  of  the  U.  S.  Geological 
Survey,  Mineral  Resources.  No  statistics  of  hours  are  given  for  years 
earlier  than  1903.  Expressed  as  percentages  the  figures  in  the  table 
show  that  55.8%  of  the  men  worked  an  eight-hour  day  in  1903;  59.1% 
in  1910;  and  86.1%  in  1918. 

2  Data  not  available. 

3  Cf.  ibid.,  1912,  pt.  ii,  p.  50;  1914,  pt.  ii,  pp.  617-618. 


83]  IMPROVEMENT  IN  MINERS'  CONDITIONS  83 

TABLE  6 
Number  of  Men  Working  and  Full-time  Working  Day  1 


Year 

8  hours 

9  hours 

10  hours 

All  others 

1906  .    . 

1907  .    . 

8 
6,382 

25 
197 

5»5oo 

401 
66 

can  be  very  clearly  seen  in  an  examination  of  the  distribu- 
tion among  states  of  the  nine  and  ten-hour  men.     (Table  7.) 

TABLE  7 

Number  of  Men  Working  9  and  10  Hour  Full-time  Day,1  1917 


State 


Alabama  .  . 
Kentucky  .  . 
Pennsylvania. 
Virginia.  .  . 
West  Virginia 
All  others  .    . 

Total  . 


10  hours 


20,766 
3.833 
6,135 
4,160 
7,126 
3.738 


45.758 


It  will  be  seen  that  the  overwhelming  majority  of  cases  are 
found  in  the  states  which  contain  strong  non-union  fields. 

The  gross  abuses  of  the  company  store  have  become,  so 
far  as  we  can  determine,  a  matter  of  history.  The  favorit- 
ism and  tyranny  of  the  petty  boss  have  been  minimized. 
Pay  days  are  more  frequent.  The  old  five  and  six  weeks' 
interval  is  gone  and  the  worker  is  now  paid  every  two  weeks. 
The  disheartening  "  bob-tailed  "  check  —  that  discouraging 

1  U.  S.  G.  S.,  Mineral  Resources,  1007,  pt.  ii,  pp.  44-45. 

2  Ibid.,   1918,    pt.   ii,    p.   722.     The   states   named   are   those  in   which 
large  non-union  fields  are  found. 


84  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [84 

statement  that  a  man's  advances  have  exactly  equalled  his 
earnings — is  becoming  more  rare.  In  much  of  this  we  can 
trace  the  direct  influence  of  the  union. 

The  miner's  safety  has  received  consideration  by  the  legis- 
latures of  every  coal-mining  state.  In  almost  all  states  a 
bureau  or  department  of  mines  is  maintained  with  an  exec- 
utive and  a  corps  of  mine  inspectors.  These  inspectors  are 
required  to  make  periodic  and  emergency  examinations  of 
the  mines  as  regards  ventilation,  drainage  and  general 
safety.  The  amount  of  air  and  the  method  of  ventilation 
are  specified  by  law.  Child  labor  is  regulated  and  female 
labor  is  prohibited.  In  mines  known  or  suspected  of  liber- 
ating dangerous  gases  a  fire  boss  must  be  employed  to  test 
the  mine  before  the  shift  is  allowed  to  enter. 

It  is  difficult  to  evaluate  the  relative  influence  of  the 
miners'  unions  and  public  opinion  on  legislation.  Certain 
abuses  were  so  outrageous,  the  results  so  dramatically  tragic 
that  no  public  could  remain  indifferent  forever.  The  earliest 
legislation  in  England  was  the  result  of  agitation  that  arose 
before  the  miners  had  become  an  articulate  body.  Some  of 
it,  the  freeing  of  the  Scotch  colliers  from  serfdom  in  1799, 
for  example,  has  a  less  humanitarian  motive  than  might  be 
imagined.1  At  a  time  when  freedom  and  the  dissolution  of 
the  feudal  system  were  the  hue  and  cry  of  Europe,  it  might 
well  be  thought  that  the  life  bondage  of  a  man  to  the  land 
might  be  decried,  a  bondage  so  complete  that  on  the  birth 
of  a  child  the  collier  received  a  fee  from  his  master  for  the 
increase  of  the  latter's  "  live-stock  ".  But  such  was  not  the 
case.  The  coal  masters  were  short-handed.  The  old  sys- 
tem failed  to  work.  They  themselves  urged  the  grant  of 
freedom. 

1  Bald,   Robert,   A    General   View  of  the   Coal   Trade   of  Scotland, 
Edinburgh,  1812,  p.  73. 


85]  IMPROVEMENT  IN  MINERS'  CONDITIONS  85 

Other  legislation,  however,  was  humanitarian.  The  con- 
dition of  women  in  the  coal  mines  1  was  such  that  public 
opinion,  after  decades  of  agitation,  forced  a  change. 
Women  did  the  work  of  horses  and  dogs.  Half  naked, 
black  and  sweating,  they  crawled  through  the  low  tunnels 
on  hands  and  knees  dragging  coal  to  the  surface.  Stagger- 
ing under  as  much  as  170  pounds — in  one  case,  300 — carry- 
ing a  lighted  candle  in  their  teeth,  they  toiled  up  a  slope  for 
150  yards  and  then  climbed  a  long  spiral  stair.  Some  of 
them  repeated  this  twenty-four  times  a  day.  And  yet,  so 
mild  were  the  early  reformers,  they  demanded  only  that 
this  labor  be  prohibited  at  once  to  married  women  and  that 
the  period  of  readjustment  be  made  as  easy  as  possible  by 
allowing  the  buxom  unmarried  girl  to  continue,  for  she  may 
labor  thus  and  remain  light-hearted,  gay  and  strong.  Even- 
tually by  the  Regulation  of  the  Mines  Act  of  1842  women, 
and  children  less  than  twelve  years  of  age,  were  prohibited 
from  such  labor. 

In  the  face  of  such  a  history  —  an  agitation  of  at  least 
thirty  years  to  reform  the  most  degrading  and  sentimentally 
revolting  condition  —  we  may  well  believe  that  the  clause 
which  has  appeared  in  content  in  the  constitution  of  every 
miners'  union  from  1849  to  date 

To  secure  by  legislative  enactment  laws  protecting  the  limbs, 
lives  and  health  of  our  members  ....  and  such  other  legis- 
lation as  will  be  beneficial  to  the  members  of  our  craft.2 

1  Cf.  ibid.,  pp.  127-145,  particularly  pp.  131-134.  A  Treatise  on  the 
Coal  Trade  with  Strictures  on  its  Abuses  (Robert  Edington,  London, 
1813)  does  not  even  mention  these  things.  It  is  wholly  concerned  with 
the  high  price  of  coal  due  to  combinations  and  corrupt  officials.  His 
only  mention  of  workers  and  their  troubles  is  (p.  158)  in  connection 
with  the  sad  plight  of  London  coal-heavers  who  receive  low  wages  and 
are  forced  to  surrender  a  large  part  of  these  to  petty  tyrants  of 
the  trade. 

2  Constitution  of  U.  M.  W.  of  A.,  1920,  article  ii,  sec.  8,  Indianapolis. 


86  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [86 

has  had  much  to  do  with  the  legal  improvement  of  condi- 
tions. 

This  is  further  attested  by  our  knowledge  of  the  fickle- 
ness of  public  interest.  It  is  "  news  "  to  have  men  trapped 
below  ground  by  a  fire — until  they  are  brought  forth  dead. 
It  is  "  news  "  when  gas  explodes  in  a  coal  mine,  killing 
scores  or  hundreds — until  we  have  seen  the  picture  in  our 
paper  of  the  blanketed  corpse  being  carried  past  the  desti- 
tute widow  who  stands  in  the  rain  with  a  shawl  over  her 
head.  But  it  requires  more  than  such  a  morbid  sentimen- 
tality to  change  this  condition.  This  "  more  "  is  some  such 
body  of  personally  interested  men  as  the  organized  miners. 
For  them,  if  such  an  accident  is  "  news  ",  its  news  value 
ceases  only  when  the  years  have  worked  a  readjustment  in 
the  lives  of  all  those  affected.  There  is  equal  news  in  the 
falls  of  slate  that  kill  their  hundreds  one  by  one;  in  the  un- 
protected wire  that  electrocutes  quickly,  quietly;  in  the 
faulty  brake  that  allows  a  cargo  of  human  freight  to  crash 
down  an  incline  to  death.  Although  we  cannot  say  that 
the  public  has  not  been  stirred  occasionally  to  action,  we 
must  grant  much  credit  to  the  miners  for  the  enactment — 
and  no  less  important,  the  enforcement — of  legislation. 

There  has,  of  course,  been  a  nominal  increase  in  miners' 
wages  in  the  last  twenty  years.  It  would  seem  that  there 
has  also  been  a  real  increase.  Just  as  the  data  presented  in 
the  earlier  chapter  on  wages  have  serious  limitations,  so 
when  we  try  to  discover  improvement  in  the  miner's  lot 
over  a  period  of  years  the  paucity  of  the  data  is  a  stumbling 
block. 

The  reader  will  remember  that  there  are  three  methods 
of  presenting  wages  and  earnings.  One  may  deal  with 
maximum  earnings,  the  amounts  earned  by  either  excep- 
tionally qualified  or  fortunate  individuals ;  with  wage  rates ; 
or  with  average   annual  earnings   of   large  numbers.     Of 


87] 


IMPROVEMENT  IN  MINERS'  CONDITIONS 


8/ 


TABLE  8 

Year  or  Period  of  Agreement,  Gross-tonnage  Rates,  and  Index 

Numbers  Based  on  Gross-tonnage  Rates  of  Pick  Miners 

in  Hocking  Valley  District  of  Ohio 

[1902=  100.] 


Year  or  period  of  agreement 


Apr.  1,  1902,  to  Mar.  31,  1903  . 
Apr.  1,  1903,  to  Mar.  31,  1904  . 
Apr.  1,  1904,  to  Mar.  31,  1905  . 
Apr.  1,  1905,  to  Mar.  31,  1906  . 
Apr.  1,  1906,  to  Mar.  31,  1907  . 
Apr.  1,  1907,  to  Mar.  31,  1908  . 
Apr.  1,  1908,  to  Mar.  31,  1909 
Apr.  1,  1909,  to  Mar.  31,  1910  . 
Apr.  1,  1910,  to  Mar.  31,  191 1  . 
Apr.  1,  191 1,  to  Mar.  31,  1912  . 
Apr.  I,  1912,  to  Mar.  31,  1913  . 
Apr.  I,  1913,  to  July  15,  1914  . 
July  15,  1914,  to  Mar.  31,  1915. 
Apr.  1,  1915,  to  Mar.  31,  1916  . 
Apr.  1,  1916,  to  Apr.  16,  1917  . 
Apr.  16,  1917,  to  Oct.  29,  1917  . 
Oct.  29,  1917,  to  Mar.  31,  1918. 
Apr.  1,  1918,  to  November,  1919. 
November,  1919,  to  Mar.  31,  1920 
April,  1920 


Gross-tonnage  rate 

Hocking  Valley 

district  for 

run  of  mine 


Index 
numbers 


100.00 
112.50 
106.25 
106.25 
112.50 
112.50 
112.50 
112.50 
118.75 
118.75 
125. CO 
125.00 
130.00 
130.00 
130.08 

149-31 
168.54 
168.54 
192.13 
214.69 


these  the  last  is  the  most  valuable  method;  the  first,  the 
least. 

However,  the  astounding  differences  in  earnings  that 
seem  large  to  the  operators  are  suggestive.  Consider  the 
contrast  between  Evans'  statement  in  1906  *  and  Olmsted's 
testimony  in  1921.2  In  1906  "a  good  man  .  .  .  who  is 
able  and  willing  to  work  "  can  make  $5  a  day.  For  the  six 
months  including  March,  1906,  the  earnings  cited  are  $513, 

1  Supra,  pp.  23-24. 

2  Supra,  pp.  24-25. 


88 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS 


[88 


$597,  $456  and  $571. 1  Although  the  operators  protest  that 
these  are  merely  the  earnings  of  "  good  men  ",  they  are 
undoubtedly  exceptional  if  the  figures  in  Table  11  are  valid. 
In  1 92 1  the  extreme  cases  are  $763,  $658  and  $561  for  one 
month.  The  wage  rate  for  day  labor  was  more  than  the 
earnings  of  the  best  workmen  in  1906. 

Accepting  this  testimony  merely  as  an  indicator,  pass  to 
the  wage  rate.  Hocking  Valley  is  the  basing  district  in 
wage  adjustments:  i.  e.,  the  precedent  is  set  by  the  conven- 
tion that  determines  this  wage  scale.  The  district  conven- 
tions apply  this  change  to  the  local  scale.  The  rates  are 
given  by  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics.2  (Table  8.)  We 
find,  as  would  be  expected  since  Hocking  Valley  is  the 
basing  district,  a  similar  advance  in  the  Kanawha  district 
of  West  Virginia.     (Table  9.)     The  operators'  association 

TABLE  9 

Net  Tonnage  Rate  s  for  Pick-Mining  in  Coalburg  Seam,  Kanawha 

County,  West  Virginia,  1903  to  1922 

[1903  =  100.] 


Period  of  agreement 


April  1,  1903-Mar.  31,  1904 
April  1,  1904-Mar.  ~ 
April 


1904-Mar.  31,  1906 
April  1,  1906-Mar.  31,  1908 
April  1,  1908-Mar.  31,  1910 
April  1,  1910-Mar.  31,  1912 
April  1,  1912-Mar.  31,  1914 
April  1,  1914-Mar.  31,  1917 
April  1,  1917-July  1,  191 8  . 
July  [,  1918-Dec.  31,  1918. 
July  27,  1920-Mar.  31,  1922 


Index 
numbers 


100. 
94-23 
100.00 
100.00 

105.77 
108.65 
108.65 
121. 15 
130-77 
196.15 


1  Joint  Conference,  Dist.  17,  1906,  p.  53. 

2  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Bui.  279,  Hours  and  Earnings  in 
Anthracite  and  Bituminous  Coal  Mining,  1919,  p.  13. 

3  Compiled  from  chart  of  wage  scales  for  all  classes  of  labor  issued 
by  Kanawha  Operators'  Association. 


89] 


1MPR0VEMEXT  IX  MIXERS'  COXDITIOXS 


89 


gives  no  rate  back  of  1903.  (Assuming  the  same  relation 
between  1902  and  1903  in  the  two  fields,  the  final  Kanawha 
rate  becomes  220.67,  a  figure  more  nearly  comparable  to 
the  final  Hocking  Valley  index.) 

But  wage  rates  are  misleading.  They  neglect  the  influ- 
ence of  the  number  of  days  worked.  The  extreme  impor- 
tance of  the  regularity  of  employment  can  be  seen  from 
Louis  Bloch's  Coal  Miners'  Insecurity.  (Table  10.)  The 
earnings  in  the   four  states  vary  from  $782  to  $988,  the 

TABLE  10 

Relationship  of  Days  Worked  and  Annual  Earnings  in  the 
Central  Competitive  Field  1 


State 

Average 
Earnings 
1913-18 

Average 
Days  Worked 

Average 
Earnings  Per 
Day  Worked 

West.   Pennsylvania  . 

Illinois 

Indiana 

Ohio    .    , 

$988 
865 
860 
782 

232 
201 
199 
181 

$4,258 

4.303 
4.322 
4.320 

latter  being  26  per  cent  greater.  The  earnings  per  day  are 
almost  constant,  and  what  variation  does  occur  is  with  a 
negative  relationship  to  annual  earnings :  i.  e.,  the  men  earn- 
ing more  per  day  are  earning  less  per  year.2  What  the  men 
are  primarily  interested  in,  therefore,  are  annual  earnings 
figures. 

These  unfortunately  are  not  available  in  complete  form 
for  the  country.     There  have  been  discontinuous  investiga- 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  34.     Computed  from  data  in  table  9. 

2  It  must  not  be  assumed  that  there  is  any  proof  of  the  beneficence  of 
low  wages.  It  is  more  likely  to  prove  that  men  working  with  greater 
irregularity  do  harder  work  when  they  have  the  chance. 


90 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS 


[90 


tions.1  Not  wholly  conclusive,  but  better  for  our  purposes, 
are  figures  by  the  West  Virginia  Department  of  Mines. 
(Table  11.)     These  give  the  average  annual  earnings  of 


TABLE  11 

Average  Yearly  Earnings  of  Pick  Miners  in  West  Virginia  and 
Retail  Price  of  Food  in  United  States  (1897-1918) 

(1903  =  100.) 


Year 


1897 
1898 

1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 


Average  l 
Earnings 


$275.58 
316.39 
367.84 
45L77 
459.56 
533.56 
499.06 
484.96 
508.01 
599-37 
643.05 
503.84 
481.17 
573-94 
570.48 
618.52 
737.62 
726.67 
632.16 
883.48 
1137.81 
I335-36 


Relative 
Earnings 


55-2 
63.4 
73-7 
90.5 
92.1 
106.9 

1 00.0 
97.2 

101  8 

121. 1 
128.9 

IOI.O 

96.4 

115.0 

114. 3 
123.9 

147.8 
145.6 
126.7 
177.0 
228.0 
267.6 


Relative  3 
Retail  Prices 


84-3 
86.9 
87.9 
89.8 
94.6 

99-9 
100.0 
101.3 
101.5 

104.9 

109.8 
II3-4 
1 1 9. 6 
125.6 
124.7 
134.4 
135-7 
138.2 
136.4 
154.8 

203-5 
232.4 


1  For  these  figures  and  references  see  The  Case  for  the  Bituminous 
Coal  Miners,  1920,  pp.  17-19.  The  references  are  to  Bureau  of  Labor 
figures  for  1902,  Immigration  Commission  figures  for  1907-08,  United 
Mine  Workers'  figures  for  191 3  and  operators'  figures  for  1919.  There 
are  also  investigations  by  the  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  for 
1919,  1921  and  1922. 

!  Report  of  West  Virginia  Department  of  Mines,  1918,  p.  237. 

3  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  xi,  no.  3,  Sept.,  1921,  Paul  Douglas, 
"  The  Movement  of  Real  Wages,  1890-1918,"  p.  420. 


gi]  IMPROVEMENT  IN  MINERS'  CONDITIONS  91 

pick-miners  in  West  Virginia  from  1897  to  19 18.  They  are 
compared  in  the  table  with  Paul  Douglas'  index  of  retail 
food  prices.1  It  will  be  seen  that  from  1897  to  1903  the 
improvement  in  earnings  was  far  more  rapid  than  the  rise 
in  the  cost  of  living.  Until  1907  earnings  advanced  more 
rapidly  than  food.  Then  came  a  slight  relapse  until  19 13. 
But  from  191 3  to  191 8  earnings  again  moved  ahead.2 

On  the  whole,  therefore,  we  may  say  that  the  miner  is 
better  off  in  recent  years  than  he  was  twenty  or  thirty  years 
ago.  He  has  been  raised — perhaps  more  exactly,  has  raised 
himself — from  the  lowest  plane  of  brute  existence  to  a  toler- 
able standard  of  decency.  He  has  not  gone  as  high  as  he 
feels  he  should.  Some  of  his  aspirations  we  shall  examine 
later.  The  advance  has  been  slow.  It  has  been  costly.  He 
wages  a  perpetual  fight  to  keep  from  reverting  to  the  posi- 
tion from  which  he  rose. 

We  may  now  pass  to  an  examination  of  the  forces  at  work 
that  make  him  progress  and  that  retard  his  progress.  These 
forces  lie  in  the  nature  of  the  industrial  development. 
Their  working  can  be  traced  through  the  history  of  coal 
mining. 

1  For  a  discussion  of  the  adequacy  of  the  retail  price  of  food  as  an 
index  of  the  cost  of  living  see  op.  cit.,  pp.  416-419.  Douglas  uses  a 
base  of  1890-1899.  I  have  shifted  this  to  1903.  My  reason  for  choos- 
ing 1903  is  to  avoid  an  impression  of  enormous  increase  from  1903  to 
1913  which  reference  to  earlier  years  would  give.  The  year  1903  was 
chosen  also  because  this  was  the  year  of  the  introduction  of  the  first 
continuous  joint  scale,  which  covered,  it  is  true,  only  a  small  part  of 
the  state. 

2  Nothing  can  be  deduced  from  these  figures  as  to  the  adequacy  of 
earnings.  This  is  a  question  under  consideration  by  the  U.  S.  Coal 
Commission.  Our  point  is  gained  if  it  seems  probable  that  miners'  real 
wages  have  increased  since  the  union  l>ecame  a  powerful  force. 


CHAPTER  VII 

Development  of  the  Coal  Industry  and  the  Miner 

From  the  point  of  view  of  this  book  there  is  little  to  be 
gained  from  a  more  intensive  study  of  the  organization  of 
the  coal  industry  than  those  which  have  already  been  made. 
This  field  has  been  treated  by  others  with  at  least  sufficient 
thoroughness  to  allow  us  to  restate  the  facts.  Our  interest 
is  not  primarily  in  the  organization  or  a  remedy  for  its 

TABLE  12 

Average  Annual  Production  and  Estimated  *  Full  Year  Production 

of  Bituminous  Coal  Mines  in  the  United  States  from 

1800  to  19 19,  by  Five-year  Periods  2 


Possible 

Excess  of  full 

tonnage  at 

year  over  average 

Average 

Average 

Average 

same  rate 

annual  production 

tons  pro- 
duced per 

days 
operated 

tons  per 
day 

per  full 
year  of 

year 

per  year 

304  work- 

Tons 

Per 

ing  days 

cent 

1890-1894  .   . 

120,653,153 

211 

571,816 

173,832,064 

53,178,911 

.     44 

1895-1899  .   . 

156,058,560 

205 

761,261 

231,423,3*44 

75,364,784 

48 

1 900-1 904   ,    . 

251,954,028 

223 

1,129,839 

343,471,056 

91,517,028 

36 

1 905-1909  .  . 

353,002,993 

213 

1,657,291 

503,816,464 

150,813,471 

43 

1910-1914   .   . 

434,852,490 

216 

2,013,206 

612,014,624 

177,162,134 

4i 

1915-1919  .  . 

506,876,698 

224 

2,262,842 

687,903,968 

181,027,270 

36 

1  The  Coal  Miners'  Insecurity,  Louis  Bloch,  Russell  Sage  Foundation, 
1922,  p.  18. 

2  Data  for  production  and  average  days  of  operation  for  each  year 
from  United  States  Geological  Survey,  Coal  in  1918,  Part  A,  Production, 
pp.  711,  717;  and  subsequent  publications  of  United  States  Geological 
Survey. 

92  [92 


g.]     DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY  93 

faults;  but  rather  in  how  this  development,  which  has  been  a 
constant  feature  of  the  industry  for  many  years,  affects  the 
mine  worker. 

The  characteristic  of  the  coal  industry  is  over-develop- 
ment. (Table  12.)  Under  a  competitive  system  coal  mines 
have  been  opened  far  in  excess  of  the  country's  needs. 

The  coal  industry,  like  all  other  basic  industries  of  the 
country,  has  had  a  very  large  growth  during  the  last  fifty 
years.     The  annual  tonnage  has  increased  from  an  average 

Chart  I 
Men  Employed,  Net  Tons  Mined  and  Days  Worked,  1890-1922 


600 

y 

500 

^ 

V\i 

400 

300 

A  A 

T03S 

200 

0*73  C 

PflMBD 

v\ 

\ 

100 

\ 

0 

1890 


1895 


1900 


1905 


1910 


1915 


1920 


1925 


Miners  employed,  tonnage  produced,  and  average  number  of  days 
operated  by  the  bituminous  coal  mines  in  the  United  State,  1890  to 
i92r,  by  years.     Louis  Bloch,  op.  cit.,  p.  18. 


94 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS 


[94 


during  the  years  189094  of  120,653,153  tons  to  an  average 
of  506,876,698  tons  in  191 5-19.  We  reached  the  peak  of 
production  during  the  war  when  in  191 8  579,000,000  tons 
of  coal  were  shipped  from  the  mines.  Keeping  pace  with 
the  growth  of  coal  production  has  gone  the  number  of  men 
employed  in  the  industry.  Curiously  enough  the  number  of 
days  worked  remains  relatively  constant.     (Chart  I.) 

It  is  at  once  evident  that  the  total  production  rests  on 
four  factors :  the  mine  capacity  developed,  the  number  of 
men  employed,  the  productivity  of  the  men,  and  the  number 
of  days  worked.  The  first  and  second  are  closely  related 
and,  beyond  certain  limits,  may  be  regarded  as  one.  It  is 
quite  plain  that  increasing  any  one  of  these  factors  will  in- 
crease the  product.  The  daily  productivity  of  the  men  has 
increased  since  1890  from  2.56  tons  per  man  employed  to 
3.78  tons.     (Table  13.)     This  is  due  in  large  part,  no  doubt, 

TABLE  13 

Average  Productivity  of  Men  Employed  in  Coal  Mining,1 
1890-1918 


Year 

Tons  per  day 

Year 

Tons  per  day 

1890 

2.56 

2.57 
2.72 

2.73 
2.84 
2.90 
2.94 
3-04 
3-09 
3-05 
2.98 
2.94 
3.06 
3.02 
3.15 

3.24 
3-36 
3-29 
3.34 

1891 

1892 

1803 

1908 

I  9,QA 

I OOQ 

i8qc 

346 

3-5° 
3.68 

3.61 

3.71 
3-91 
3.90 
3.77 
378 

1896 

1807 

IQI2 

1898 

i8qo 

1 V1  J 

L?L  J 

IQi6 

171W 

iyvj-<; 

iy1/ 

1918 

1  U.  S.  G.  S.,  Mineral  Resources,  1918,  pt.  ii.  p.  71; 


95] 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY 


95 


to  the  increased  use  of  machines.  It  is  all  the  more  marked 
when  we  consider  that  the  normal  working  day  has  been 
gradually  reduced  from  ten  hours  to  eight  hours.  New 
mines  are  developed.1  More  men  are  brought  into  the  in- 
dustry. And  yet  the  number  of  days  worked  remains  sin- 
gularly constant.  This  vast  army  of  men  is  employed  on  an 
average  of  only  214  days  out  of  a  possible  304. 

This  peculiar  condition  is  presented  by  the  Russell  Sage 
Foundation    for    Illinois.2      (Table    14.)      Tilt    impression 


TABLE  14 

Average  and  Relative  Number  of  Employees  and  Days  of  Operation 

for  Bituminous  Coal  Mines  in  Illinois  from  1890  to 

1919,  by  Five-year  Periods  3 


Employee 

Days  of  operation 

Period 

Average 

Relative 

Average 

Relative 

1 890- 1 894 

33,6io 
36,251 
46,825 
66,400 
78,197 
82,937 

100 
108 

139 
198 

233 

247 

186 

173 
182 

178 
166 

169 

i8qc— i8qq 

93 

98 
96 
89 
9i 

1 900- 1 904 

I QO  C- 1 QOQ 

1910-1914 

IQI S-IQIQ 

1  The  number  of  mines  in  the  country  is  not  exactly  known,  the 
Census  figure  and  the  U.  S.  G.  S.  figures  differing.  This  lack  of  in- 
formation is  particularly  apparent  when  we  attempt  to  go  back  over  a 
series  of  years.  The  total  number  of  mines,  according  to  figures  in 
Mineral  Resources,  U.  S.  G.  S.,  has  increased  from  about  5S00  in  19 10 
to  nearly  11,000  in  1918.  More  important,  and  probably  more  accurate, 
is  the  increase  in  ftrst  and  second  class  mines,  those  producing  over 
100,000  tons  annually,  of  which  there  were  1381  in  1910  producing  71.7 
per  cent  of  the  total  bituminous  output,  and  1750  in  1918  producing 
7 1. 1  per  cent. 

2  Bloch,  op.  cit.,  p.  21. 

3  Data  from  State  of  Illinois,  Department  of  Mines  and  Minerals, 
Annual  Coal  Report,  1919,  p.  100. 


96 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS 


[96 


given  is  somewhat  exaggerated,  for  not  all  sections  of  the 
country  have  faced  a  declining  number  of  days  production. 
But  in  Illinois  the  number  of  men  employed  has  increased 
247  per  cent  since  1890  and  the  number  of  days  worked  has 
fallen  to  91  per  cent.  For  the  country  as  a  whole  there  is 
the  same  tendency  to  increase  capacity  without  increasing 
working  time.     (Table  15.)     It  is  evident  that  the  industry 

TABLE  15  1 

Average  and  Relative  Number  of  Employees  and  of  Days  of  Opera- 
tion for  Bituminous  Coal  Mines  in  the  United  States  from 
1890  to  19 19,  by  Five-year  Periods  2 


Employee 

Days  of  operation 

Period 

Average 

Relative 

Average 

Relative 

1890-1894 

i8qc-i8qq 

217,174 
251,739 
373,655 

492J443 

561,866 

591,801 

100 
116 
172 
227 
259 
273 

211 

205 
223 

213 
216 

224 

100 

97 
106 

IQOC-IQOQ 

IOI 

102 

IQIC— IQIQ 

*715  *yiy 

does  not,  by  mere  growth,  tend  to  become  more  secure  for 
the  worker — or,  for  that  matter,  for  the  operator. 

It  would,  of  course,  be  incorrect  to  give  the  impression 
that  in  good  years  the  number  of  days  worked  is  the  same 
as  in  poor  years.  From  year  to  year  the  changes  in  pro- 
duction largely  represent  changes  in  the  number  of  days 
worked.  Correlating  the  deviations  from  a  nine-year  mov- 
ing average  one  obtains  the  significant  relationship,  r=.64i, 

1  Bloch,  op.  cit.,  p.  21. 

2  Data  from  United  States  Geological  Survey,  Coal  in  1918,  Part  A, 
Production,  p.  717  and  subsequent  publications. 

*  Average  for  four  years.    Data  for  1909  lacking. 


q7]  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY  97 

between  tonnage  and  days  of  work.  It  is  also  true  that  the 
number  of  men  employed  tends  somewhat  to  adjust  itself 
to  the  number  of  days  worked.  A  year  below  the  average 
tends  to  force  some  men  out  of  the  industry.  A  year  of 
more  than  average  employment  will  attract  more  men  in  the 
following  year.1 

These  last  facts  give  an  explanation  of  the  condition 
which  the  chart  betrays.  The  ordinary  ups  and  downs  of 
year-to-year  business  are  adjusted  by  changing  the  number 
of  days  worked.  A  poor  year  will  drive  workers  into  other 
industries.  If  the  second  year  is  one  of  real  revival,  the 
"  short-handedness  "  of  the  mines  will  mean  more  than 
average  employment.  Men  come  back  the  next  year  2  and 
force  the  days  worked  back  toward  the  average.  So  it  see- 
saws back  and  forth  across  a  working  year  of  a  little  more 
than  200  days. 

Now  comes  the  real  growth  in  the  demand  for  coal,  the 
long-time  trend  that  has  raised  production  from  100,000,000 
tons  to  500,000,000  tons  in  thirty  years.  Part  of  this  might 
be  absorbed  by  increasing  the  operation  of  those  mines  now 
opened.  But  if  there  is  anything  at  all  in  our  figures,  an 
operating  year  of  much  more  than  200  days  increases  the 
potential  labor  force.  Thus,  although  the  trend  growth  may 
be  partially  absorbed  by  increased  operation,  this  very  fact 
"  creates  "  a  sufficient  available  labor  force  to  operate  new 
mines.  The  operator  who  sees  any  advantage  in  expanding 
his  plant  or  driving  a  new  mine  may  do  so,  so  far  as  find- 

1  Correlating  days  worked  and  number  of  men  employed,  we  find  no 
relationship.  What  relationship  exists  is  with  a  one-year  lag:  i.e., 
a  bad  season  one  year  reduces  the  number  of  men  in  the  industry  the 
following  year.  (Normal  correlation:  r=.io6.  One  year  lag  for 
whole  series:  r,  .406.) 

2  It  must  not  be  thought  that  one  year  most  accurately  expresses  this 
lag.  If  we  had  monthly  figures,  we  could  probably  much  more  closely 
determine  the  relationship. 


98  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [98 

ing  men  to  run  it  is  concerned.  But  by  this  expansion  he 
is  taking  up  part  of  the  excess  demand  and  tending  to  bring 
the  working  year  back  to  its  average. 

It  is  not  here  proposed  to  offer  a  solution  for  the  ills  of 
the  coal  industry.  But  the  author  wishes  to  protect  himself 
against  misunderstanding.  He  is  fully  aware  of  the  fact 
that  over-expansion  is  due  to  complicated  causes,  that  it  is 
not  wholly  due  to  competition.  It  would  be  disastrous  to 
our  economic  life  to  say,  without  further  plan,  "  Here  is  an 
over-developed  industry.  Let  us  monopolize  it  and  reduce 
the  operated  plant  to  such  a  size  that  capacity  operation  will 
meet  the  country's  annual  needs.  Then  let  us  plan  the 
growth  to  keep  pace  with  the  general  trend." 

In  the  first  place  the  normal  demand  cannot  be  repre- 
sented by  an  annual  figure.  It  is  monthly  capacity  that  must 
be  considered.  From  191 3- 18  the  average  production  varied 
from  24.9  million  tons  in  April  to  45.1  million  tons  in  Octo- 
ber. The  average  is  38.7  million  tons.  (Chart  II.)  The 
demand  must  be  made  more  regular  or  the  annual  capacity 
must  always  remain  about  16  per  cent  greater  than  the  an- 
nual demand. 

At  this  point  it  may  be  well  to  state  that  so  far  the  United 
Mine  Workers  have  proved  a  force  tending  to  increase 
rather  than  decrease  this  seasonal  feature.  The  contract 
between  operators  and  workers  expires  on  April  1  every 
second  year.  It  is  anticipated  that  there  will  be  a  suspen- 
sion of  work  and  coal  is  mined  in  excess  of  immediate  con- 
sumption needs.1  The  miners  may  strike.  In  this  case  the 
coal  is  brought  out  of  reserve  and  consumed.  When  the 
men  return  to  work,  they  again  face  a  normal  market.  But 
assuming  that  the  men  do  not  strike,  the  coal  reserves  have 
been  piled  up  against  the  possibility  of  a  suspension  and 

1  See  below  for  figures  on  the  piling  up  of  reserves  against  the  April, 
1922,  strike. 


99]  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY  99 

Chart  II 
Monthly  Production  of  Bituminous  Coal,1  Averages,  1913-1918 


3*7- 


10 


32 


24 


Jvf*#ir 


r   & 

^    * 


must  be  consumed.     The  excess  of  March  results  in  a  sub- 
normal April. 

The  data  for  Illinois  have  been  presented  for  the  years 
1906  to  191 3  inclusive  by  Louis  Bloch.  As  will  be  seen 
from  Chart  III,  there  are  three  monthly  production  curves. 
The  first,  a  composite  of  the  other  two,  includes  every  year. 
The  second  curve  deals  only  with  those  years  in  which  a 
contract  is  negotiated,  the  "  even  "  years.  Here  the  high 
point  comes  in  March  with  13.5  per  cent  of  the  total  annual 
production,  and  the  low  in  April  with  1.1  per  cent.  In  the 
third   curve,   the   "  odd  "   year  monthly  averages,   there   is 


1  U.  S.  G.  S.,  Mineral  Resources,  1918,  pt.  ii,  p.  702. 


100  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [I00 

Chart  III 
Showing  Per  cent  of  Coal  Produced  in  Illinois  by  Months 


/  9*6-/3 


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still  a  seasonal  fluctuation,  but  it  is  far  less  marked  than  in 
the  second  curve. 

We  may  conclude,  therefore,  that  there  is  a  seasonal  fluc- 
tuation in  coal  production.  Even  during  these  uninterrupted 
periods  the  peak  of  demand  is  found  in  December  with  an 
average  of  5,438,000  tons  as  contrasted  with  the  monthly 
average  for  these  same  years  of  4,450,000  tons.  To  meet 
even  this  fluctuation  the  total  plant  must  have  a  capacity  of 
22  per  cent  more  than  average  demand.  But  the  union 
aggravates  this  seasonality.  During  the  even  years  the 
average  production  per  month  was  3,997,000  tons.  The 
March  average  for  the  four  years  is  6,574,000  tons.     Here 


IOI]         DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY  IOi 

the  demanded  excess  of  capacity  over  average  needs  is  63 
per  cent.1 

Neglecting  all  discussion  of  "  why  ",  the  facts  of  the  coal 
industry  are  these:  There  is  an  excessive  capacity.  The 
miners  cannot  work  every  day,  in  fact  they  average  only 
about  214  days  out  of  304  possible  working  days.  The 
costs  of  operation  are  higher  per  unit  when  part  of  the 
plant  is  idle.2 

The  potentialities  of  the  situation  are  various.  Compe- 
tition is  set  to  work  with  crudest  force  to  drive  out  the 
marginal  man.  Each  operator  feels  that  he  may  be  the 
doomed  one.  He  knows  that  to  "  stay  "  he  must  secure  an 
average  number  of  day's  work.  He  can  do  this  only  by 
entering  the  market  with  his  coal  and  underbidding  some 
other  man.  Somewhere  along  the  line  he  must  cut  costs  of 
production.  It  may  be  lower  profits — or  no  profits,  which 
is  not  unknown  in  bituminous  coal  mining.  It  may  come 
out  of  his  labor  bill,  which  represents  more  than  half  the 
cost  of  coal,  f.  o.  b.  the  mine. 

The  worker  is  in  the  same  position  as  the  operator.  Their 
interest  in  working  the  mine  is  identical.  Their  interests 
diverge  only  when  it  becomes  a  question  of  decent  living  or 
saving  invested  capital.  The  miner  must  reckon  his  income 
not  at  so  much  per  day  or  month,  but  at  so  much  per  year. 
The  wage  rate  is  a  minor  consideration  because  the  domi- 
nant variable  in  earnings  is  working  time.     It  is  perfectly 

1  It  might  conceivably  be  urged  that  we  capitalize  this  irregularity  due 
to  the  contract  by  placing  the  expiration  date  at  the  end  of  the  normal 
dull  season,  say  about  August  1.  This  might  help  if  the  miners  always 
threatened  to  strike  and  never  did.  But  there  is  little  to  be  said  for  a 
system  that  would  make  the  consumer  suffer  more  than  he  does  now. 

2  Survey  Graphic,  April,  1Q22.  p.  1010.  Quoting  Engineers'  Committee 
of  Fuel  Administration  as  authority  for  the  statement  that  costs  of 
production  are  above  normal  by  29  per  cent  when  running-time  is  below 
normal  by  40  per  cent. 


t~ 


102  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [I02 

true  that  a  trapper-boy  is  better  off  who  works  250  days  at 
$3.00  a  day,  than  the  one  who  works  200  days  at  $3.25. 

This  feature  is  important.  The  operator,  who  likes  his 
men  and  is  liked  by  them,  goes  before  the  miners  and  says: 
*  Fellows,  you're  loafing  now  and  so  am  I.  There  is  no 
market  for  coal.  I  can't  sell  coal  and  pay  you  your  rate. 
You  know  me.  I'm  playing  square.  Look  at  my  books. 
You  nor  I  can  make  the  mine  pay  this  way.  Try  it  your- 
selves, if  you  want!  But  if  you'll  reduce  your  rates,  I'll 
reduce  the  price  of  coal.  You'll  work  steady  and  be  lots 
better  off.     So  will  I." 

What  he  says  is  true.  The  men  take  a  cut.  He  sells  coal. 
The  men  work  steadily — Until  his  neighbor  cuts  below  him 
and  works  steadily — Until,  etc. 

There  is  an  absolute  limit  at  which  this  competition  must 
cease.  This  is  represented  by  a  long  period  of  no  profits 
and  starvation  wages.  It  is  no  mythical  limit,  but  is  rather 
one  that  many  men  in  the  industry  remember.  One  can 
prove  anything  that  is  undesirable  by  taking  the  testimony 
of  the  operators  before  the  Industrial  Commission  of  1901.1 
One  large  company  with  a  capital  of  $1,000,000  and  run- 
ning over  a  million  tons  of  coal  a  year  made  a  profit  of 
$8000. 2  It  is  not  described  how  this  was  secured.  We 
know  that  wages  were  low.  We  may  surmise  that  much  of 
the  wage  was  trimmed  off  by  the  company  store,  for  most 
operators  were  forced  to  resort  to  the  store  to  keep  going. 

Only  one  factor  has  changed  in  these  thirty  years.  The 
industry  is  still  so  over-developed  that  under  free  competi- 
tion no  operator  could  maintain  present  standards.  If  they 
should  combine  to  maintain  standards — .  But  they  have  no 
such  monopoly.  Labor  has.  The  union  says  to  the  two- 
thirds  of  the  industry  it  controls,  "No  reduction  shall  take 

1  Industrial  Commission  Reports,  1901,  vol.  xii. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  xii,  p.  84. 


I03]         DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY  ^3 

place.  The  gain  is  only  temporary.  The  loss  to  us  is  likely 
to  be  permanent.  We  will  not  mortgage  the  future.  If 
every  operator  in  the  country  paid  our  scale,  you  would  not 
have  to  worry  much  about  wages.  They  don't,  it's  true. 
We've  done  our  best  to  make  them.  Eventually  we  will 
make  them.  In  the  meantime  we'd  rather  starve  idle,  than 
working." 

The  labor  monopoly  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of 
America  alone  stands  between  the  conditions  of  1920  and 
those  of  1896.  To  the  extent  that  the  monopoly  is  increased 
the  miners'  position  is  made  more  secure. 


/ 


CHAPTER  VIII 
Early  History  of  Unions  of  Coal  Miners 

We  have  now  reached  the  point  at  which  it  is  necessary 
to  consider  the  relative  merits  of  complete  organization  of 
the  coal  miners  in  America  and  the  disadvantages  of  a  fur- 
ther extension  of  the  union.  It  may  be  well  first  to  review 
the  history  of  the  organization  of  the  miners  in  this  coun- 
try. The  United  Mine  Workers  is  a  comparatively  young 
union.  It  dates  only  from  1890.  But  there  were  several 
decades  of  experience  behind  the  framing  of  its  constitu- 
tion. There  were  lessons  that  had  been  learned  at  great 
cost. 

The  early  history  of  the  movement  for  organization 
among  the  coal  miners  is  characterized  by  local  develop- 
ment. During  the  period  from  1849- 1890  there  were  suc- 
cessive attempts  to  bring  all  organized  coal  miners  into  one 
craft  union.  It  is  a  period  in  which  knowledge  is  gained 
by  experience.  Local  organization,  internal  dissention,  and 
costly  strikes  were  all  sources  of  weakness.  From  this  ex- 
perimental stage  is  evolved  a  single  industrial  union,  num- 
bering in  December,  1921,  about  550,000  workers  in  and 
about  the  mines. 

In  1849  ^e  first  local  unions  among  American  coal 
miners  were  formed  in  the  Pennsylvania  fields.  In  186 1, 
under  the  leadership  of  Thomas  Lloyd  and  Daniel  Weaver, 
the  scattered  locals,  which  by  this  time  were  found  in  the 
other  states  of  what  is  now  the  Central  Competitive  Field, 
were  brought  together  as  the  American  Miners'  Association. 
104  [104 


io5]  EARLY  HISTORY  OF  UNIONS  105 

This  organization  had  for  its  purpose  "  the  physical,  mental 
and  social  elevation  of  the  miner  ".  It  was  recognized  that 
this  result  could  be  achieved  only  through  union  and  the 
obliteration  of  "  all  personal  animosities  and  frivolous  na- 
tionalities ".*  For  a  few  years  the  association  prospered. 
The  organization  spread  particularly  in  northern  Illinois 
and  the  Blossburg  district  of  Pennsylvania.  But  with  the 
end  of  the  Civil  War  came  years  of  business  depression. 
Strikes  were  inaugurated  and  failed.  Internal  dissention 
grew  up,  and  in  1867  and  1868  the  American  Miners'  Asso- 
ciation went  out  of  existence." 

There  followed  a  period  of  local  organization.  Even 
during  the  first  period  of  national  union,  local  associations 
had  sprung  up  under  various  names  but  "  whose  forms  and 
usages  closely  resembled  those  used  by  branches  of  the 
national  union  ".8  In  1868  John  Siney  came  forward  at 
the  head  of  the  Workingmen's  Benevolent  Association  of 
Schuylkill  County,  an  organization  of  the  anthracite  fields.* 
This  association  was  strong  enough  to  negotiate  a  joint 
agreement  with  the  operators  in  1870,  the  first  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  industry. 

In  1873  tms  organization,  which  had  changed  its  name 
in  1870  to  the  Miners'  and  Laborers'  Benevolent  Associa- 
tion, took  the  lead  in  the  formation  of  the  second  national 
union,  the  Miners'  National  Association  of  the  United  States 
of  America.5  In  1874  this  organization  claimed  224  locals 
and  24,000  members.6     But  the  forces  which  wrecked  the 

1  Evans,  History  of  the  United  Mine  Workers,  vol.  i,  pp.  6-7,  2  vols., 
Indianapolis  (about  1910). 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  12-13. 
1  Ibid.,  pp.  12-13. 
*Ibid.,  pp.  13-18. 
iIbid.,  vol.  i,  p.  29. 
*Ibid.,  p.  72. 


106  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [I06 

organization  of  Daniel  Weaver  likewise  brought  this  second 
attempt  on  the  rocks.  A  series  of  petty  strikes  drained  the 
treasury  during  1874  and  1875.  There  was  no  reserve  to 
tide  it  over  the  period  of  depression.  In  1876  the  books 
were  closed  out 1  and  a  deficit  of  about  $700  was  met  by 
John  James,  the  secretary. 

The  next  national  organization  was  formed  in  1883. 
The  seven  intervening  years  were  again  years  of  local  and 
state  association.  It  was  in  Ohio  that  the  spirit  of  union- 
ism really  survived.  In  1883  the  Amalgamated  Associa- 
tion of  Miners  brought  together  the  miners  of  Ohio,  Penn- 
sylvania, Maryland  and  Illinois.  But  the  great  strike  in 
Hocking  Valley  lasting  from  July  to  December  in  1884 
placed  too  great  a  strain  on  the  organization  which  had 
bravely  set  out  to  "  bring  within  its  folds  every  miner  and 
laborer  in  and  about  the  mines  in  the  United  States."  2 

The  history  of  the  national  union  now  has  its  real  begin- 
ning. In  September,  1885,  there  was  formed  at  Indian- 
apolis the  National  Federation  of  Miners  and  Mine  Labor- 
ers. The  miners  were  fully  alive  to  the  need  of  national 
organization.  The  thirty-five  delegates  represented  Ohio. 
West  Virginia,  Iowa,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Pennsylvania  and 
Kansas.  These  states  had  organizations  that  from  "  a  local 
or  State  standpoint  gave  some  prestige  ".3  But  the  prestige 
must  as  yet  have  been  slight,  for  Ohio,  the  best  organized 
state,  had  only  about  one-third  of  the  miners  within  the 
union,  and  West  Virginia,  Iowa  and  Kansas  "  were  strug- 
gling hard  to  keep  their  heads  above  the  stream  ".4 

In  spite  of  this  numerical  weakness  conditions  favored 
the  growth  of  the  union.     For  eight  years  the  operators  had 

1Op.  cit.,  pp.  81-86. 
1  Ibid.,  p.  109. 
9  Ibid.,  p.  136. 
'Ibid.,  p.  138. 


IOy]  EARLY  HISTORY  OF  UNIOXS  ioy 

faced  a  seemingly  endless  series  of  small  strikes,  culminat- 
ing in  the  great  strike  of  Hocking  Valley.  The  loss  to  them 
had  been  considerable.  In  December,  1885,  representatives 
of  both  miners  and  operators  met  at  Pittsburg  and  issued 
a  call  for  a  convention  at  Columbus  in  February.  Colonel 
Rend  of  the  Chicago,  Pittsburg  and  Hocking  Valley  Coal 
Co.,  said  that  the  difficulties  of  the  industry  had  been  due 
to  "  competition  among  the  operators,  who  try  to  undersell 
each  other.  The  remedy  would  be  to  raise  the  price  of 
mining  reasonably  in  all  coal  fields  and  raise  the  price  of 
coal  accordingly.  .  .  .  Let  these  prices  be  fixed  by  a  joint 
committee  of  miners  and  operators."  *  This  last  sentence, 
comments  Evans,  explained  fully  the  "  foremost  cause  for 
the  inauguration  of  the  joint  movement  ".2 

In  1886  the  conference  met  3  and  settled  a  scale  of  wages 
for  the  year  May  1,  1886,  to  May  1,  1887.  Representatives 
of  both  miners  and  operators  were  present  from  Pennsyl- 
vania, Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio  and  West  Virginia.  Machin- 
ery was  provided  for  the  arbitration  of  disputes.  West 
Virginia  did  not  meet  to  renew  the  contract  in  1887,4  but 
aside  from  this  loss  the  system  continued  for  another  year. 

A  storm  was  gathering,  however.  It  was  predictable 
from  the  joint  conference  of  1887  anc^  tne  history  of  that 
year.  A  wage  advance  was  granted,  conditioned  on  the 
miners  forcing  "  those  districts  which  had  heretofore  re- 
fused to  comply  with  scale  provisions  "  to  meet  the  scale 
or  be  idle.5  The  first  advance  of  five  cents  was  to  go  into 
effect  on  May  I.  On  May  4  the  joint  conference  board  met 
at  Columbus  and  decided  that  although  the  miners  had  not 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.    172-173. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  173. 

8  Ibid.,  pp.  175  et  seq. 
*  Ibid.,  pp.  212-2H. 
5  Ibid.,  p.  221. 


I08  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [I08 

fulfilled  their  contract,  the  advance  should  be  granted  and 
an  extension  of  time  to  June  21  he  given  the  miners.1  The 
Illinois  operators  protested  that  they  had  maintained  scale 
rates  during  1886  but  that  competition  with  the  operators 
of  southern  Illinois  forced  them  to  insist  on  full  compliance 
with  the  terms  of  the  present  contract.  On  June  21  the 
operators  of  Pennsylvania,  Ohio  and  Indiana  allowed  the 
advance  to  stand  rather  than  return  to  old  conditions. 
Again,  on  November  1  an  advance  of  five  cents  was  due. 
provided  the  scale  of  May  1  had  been  universally  adopted. 
Here  again  the  three  states  allowed  the  advance  as  "  an  en- 
couragement to  future  efforts  in  the  same  direction  "  (bring- 
ing southern  Illinois  up  to  scale)  and  "  to  strengthen  the 
organization  (the  National  Federation)  which  we  desire  to 
perpetuate  ".2 

The  smash  was  in  sight.  In  1888  the  Illinois  operators 
stated  that  they  could  not  be  bound  by  the  conference  and 
withdrew.3  The  operators  resolved  that  "  we  as  operators 
in  convention  assembled,  do  pledge  ourselves  to  render  the 
miners  all  the  moral  and  financial  support  within  our  power 
to  enforce  scale  rates  by  blank  refusal  to  fill  any  contract 
for  operators  who  refuse  to  pay  scale  rates  in  this  competi- 
tive district  ".4  But  this  support  could  not  bring  the  Illi- 
nois operators  up  to  the  mark.  In  1889  the  Indiana  opera- 
tors withdrew,5  and  at  a  later  meeting  the  conference  of 
Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  miners  adjourned  sine  die  without 
agreement.6  The  joint  contract  that  had  been  entered  into 
to  benefit  both  parties  came  to  an  end. 

1  Op.   cit.,  pp.  229-233. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  272. 

s  Ibid.,  pp.  280-281. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  352. 

5  Ibid.,  pp.  435-437- 

6  Ibid.,  p.  446. 


I09]  EARLY  HISTORY  OF  UNIONS  109 

The  miners  of  the  country  had  not  fully  learned  the  need 
of  complete  unity.  In  1886  the  miners'  locals  formed  under 
the  Knights  of  Labor  had  been  brought  together  as  Na- 
tional District1  Assembly  No.  135,  Knights  of  Labor. 
This  organization  had  greater  power  in  southern  Illinois 
than  the  National  Federation.  Hence  the  national  organ- 
izers had  little  influence  in  1887  when  they  tried  to  bring 
this  district  up  to  the  scale.  A  joint  meeting  of  the  two 
executive  boards  agreed  upon  common  action.2  As  we  have 
seen,  they  accomplished  little,  the  officers  of  N.  D.  A.  135 
giving  as  the  reason  the  fact  that  three-fifths  of  the  coal  was 
mined  by  machine  on  a  day  rate.  No  strike  could  be  suc- 
cessful under  these  circumstances.3  But  whatever  the  merits 
of  the  case,  the  Indiana  operators  objected  to  meeting  the 
Knights  of  Labor  in  1888,  saying  that  they  had  waged  war 
against  the  National  Federation.'4 

There  had  been  a  loose  agreement  between  the  two  organ- 
izations in  November,  1887,  providing  that  both  should 
work  harmoniously  and  be  represented  on  boards  of  con- 
ciliation.5 But  after  the  experiences  of  1888  a  firmer  union 
was  sought  by  merging  both  organizations  into  the  Na- 
tional Progressive  Union.  The  result  was,  however,  hardly 
more  than  a  new  name  for  the  National  Federation.6  In 
1889  the  joint  conference  failed  partly  because  of  conflict- 
ing authority  in  enforcing  the  wage  contract.7 

Out  of  this  failure  came  the  United  Mine  Workers  of 

1  This  is  also  referred  to  (Evans,  vol.  ii,  p.  19)  as  Trades  Association. 
The  terminology  above  is  commoner,  however. 
1  Ibid.,  pp.  224-225. 
lIbid.,  p.  237. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  299. 
1  Ibid.,  pp.  274  et  seq. 

6  Ibid.,  pp.  394  et  seq. 

7  Ibid.,  p.  458. 


HO  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [II0 

America.  In  January,  1890,  the  organizations  met  jointly 
at  Columbus,  Ohio.  The  plan  of  amalgamation  proposed 
that  there  be  one  set  of  officers  and  one  fund  for  the  new 
organization,  that  in  merging  neither  organization  should 
surrender  its  "  essential  features  ",  and  that  in  any  local 
or  district  a  majority  vote  should  determine  the  practice 
of  open  or  secret  meetings.  The  amalgamation  was  com- 
plete.1 The  Master  Workman  of  N.  D.  A.  135  was  elected 
President.  The  interests  of  both  groups  became  a  common 
one.  Any  interference  from  the  Knights  of  Labor  was 
resented.  And  in  1898  all  mention  of  any  organization 
other  than  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America  was 
dropped  from  the  constitution.2 

If  we  understand  the  early  history  of  the  union  of  coal 
miners,  we  see  certain  lessons  that  must  have  been  learned. 
The  collapse  of  the  American  Miners'  Association,  the  Min- 
ers' National,  and  the  Amalgamated  Association  of  Miners 
sufficiently  emphasized  the  costliness  of  strikes.  The  wage 
increases  awarded  under  the  joint  agreements  showed  the 
possibility  of  improvements  gained  by  negotiation  rather 
than  by  force.  This  had  indeed  been  early  realized.  In 
1873  tne  Miners'  National  Association  gave  as  one  of  its 
purposes  "  to  remove  as  far  as  possible  the  cause  for  all 
strikes  and  to  adopt  wherever  and  whenever  it  is  practicable, 
the  principle  of  arbitration  ".  This  principle  is  reiterated 
in  all  later  constitutions.  For  three  years  the  miners  of 
Ohio  and  Pennsylvania,  and  to  a  less  extent  Indiana  and 
Illinois,  experienced  the  benefits  of  wage  scales  fixed  for 
the  year.  The  contract  was  abandoned  in  1889  and  for 
nine  years  the  industry  reverted  to  rate-cutting  and  strikes. 

There  is  further  shown  the  need  for  complete  organiza- 

1  Evans,  vol.  ii,  p.  13.     For  details  see  pp.  19  et  scq. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  538. 


!  H]  EARLY  HISTORY  OF  UNIONS  1 T 1 

tion.  The  contract  may  mutually  benefit  employer  and 
employee.  But  in  a  competitive  area  it  has  certain  limita- 
tions. This  was  shown  in  1887- 1889  when  the  first  inter- 
state agreement  was  abandoned,  largely  because  of  the  non- 
compliance of  a  group  of  operators  in  southern  Illinois. 
The  immediate  competition  of  this  group  forced  the  north- 
ern operators  out.  Their  lower  rates  and  mining  costs 
then  drove  out  Indiana.  The  structure  tumbled.  Is  it  to 
be  wondered  that  in  the  contract  of  1898  it  was  provided 
that  the  miners  guaranteed  to  protect  the  operators  against 
lower  wage  scales;  that  they  have  made  every  effort  to  ex- 
tend the  union  to  every  coal  field  in  the  country? 


CHAPTER  IX 
Conspiracy 

The  non-union  operators  of  West  Virginia  have  charged 
that  there  exists  a  conspiracy  between  the  United  Mine 
Workers  and  the  operators  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois  and 
Pennsylvania  to  close  the  mines  of  West  Virginia.  The 
plan  to  be  pursued  is  first  the  organization  of  the  field  and 
then  a  series  of  strikes  or  negotiations  to  raise  labor  costs 
to  such  a  point  that  the  mines  cannot  profitably  be  run. 

On  every  occasion  when  it  is  deemed  desirable  to  cast 
discredit  on  the  union  this  charge  is  brought  out  of  the 
moth-balls,  shaken  and  aired,  lengthened  or  shortened  ac- 
cording to  the  style,  and  paraded  before  the  judiciary  or 
the  public.  It  was  introduced  in  the  Hitchman  Coal  Co. 
case  that  originated  in  West  Virginia  in  1907,  and  again 
before  the  committee  investigating  the  Paint  Creek  strike 
in  191 3.  Yet  again  at  considerable  length  in  the  Mingo 
investigation  in  192 1,  having  only  received  passing  notice 
in  the  little  state  investigation  of  trouble  in  Logan  County 
in  1919.  It  has  figured  in  several  recent  cases  before  the 
courts. 

No  matter  in  what  connection  the  charge  is  brought  it 
rests  on  the  same  evidence :  a  clause  in  the  joint  agreement 
of  1898,  an  alleged  unwritten  understanding  in  this  same 
convention,  and  supporting  quotations  from  both  operators 
and  miners  at  subsequent  conventions. 

The  clause,  section  8  of  the  Chicago  agreement,  states : 1 

1  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  i,  p.  394. 
112  [112 


H3]  CONSPIRACY  H3 

That  the  United  Mine  Workers'  organization,  a  party  of  this 
contract,  does  hereby  further  agree  to  afford  all  possible  pro- 
tection to  the  trade  and  to  the  other  parties  hereto  against  any 
unfair  competition  resulting  from  failure  to  maintain  scale 
rates. 

The  alleged  understanding  was  that  the  union  guaranteed 
the  operators  of  the  Central  Competitive  Field  that  the 
competing  non-union  West  Virginia  districts  would  be 
forced  to  meet  the  scale  rate.  The  evidence  is  too  long,  too 
full  of  repetition  to  be  quoted  in  its  entirety;  but  it  can  be 
readily  found  in  several  sources.1 

In  the  briefs  of  the  Coronado  case  2  we  may  follow  the 
most  recent  presentation  of  the  information  with  the  ad- 
vantage that  both  parties  address  themselves  directly  rather 
than  incidentally  to  the  charge  which  is  set  forth  by  the  de- 
f  endants-in-error : 

The  impregnation  of  the  entire  organization  of  United  Mine1 
Workers,  officers  and  members,  in  their  negotiations  with  union 
operators  for  many  years  prior  to  1914,  with  the  motive  for 
the  suppression  of  the  business  of  non-union  mines — the  pre- 
vention of  their  competing  in  interstate  commerce  with  union- 
ized operations.3 

Two  quotations,  which  are  typical  rather  than  exceptional, 
will  serve  to  show  the  basis  of  the  operators'  charge.  The 
first  of  these  is  from  a  speech  in  the  1902  joint  convention 
by  Mr.  Robbins,  a  Pennsylvania  operator.  He  refers  to 
the  Chicago  agreement  of  1898  by  which  hours  were  re- 
duced from  ten  to  eight  and  wages  were  advanced. 

1  Cf.  op.  cit.,  pp.  394  et  seq. ;  also  United  Mine  Workers  of  America  v. 
Coronado  Coal  Co.,  Brief  for  Plaintiff-in-Error,  pp.  19-55;  Brief  for 
Defendant-in-Error,  pp.  33-71. 

1  United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  et  al.  v.  Coronado  Coal  Company, 
et  al.    42  Sup.  Court  570. 

•  Coronado,  Brief  of  Defendants,  p.  32. 


1 14  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [n4 

Four  years  ago,  in  the  city  of  Chicago,  we  agreed  to  be  in  the 
advance  guard  on  the  question  of  an  eight-hour  day,  with  the 
distinct  and  absolute  promise  that  unless  our  competitors  were 
brought  up  to  the  same  conditions  that  we  would  be  put  back 
where  we  were.  And  what  is  the  result?  None  of  our  com- 
petitors have  been  brought  up.  In  no  place  that  we  compete, 
that  I  know  of,  has  an  eight-hour  day  been  established.  We 
are  competing  constantly  with  operators  that  still  have  a  ten- 
hour  day.     Their  cost  is  proportionately  less.1 

This  is  the  more  typical  excerpt.  It  makes  the  four  usual 
points:  (i)  We  improved  your  conditions,  (2)  on  the 
promise  that  the  non-union  fields  would  be  forced  to  accept 
the  change.  (3)  They  have  not  done  so.  (4,  by  implica- 
tion) We  cannot  go  forward,  and  by  rights  should  go  back 
to  old  conditions. 

The  second  quotation  is  from  a  miner,  T.  L.  Lewis,  vice- 
president  of  the  union,  in  the  joint  convention  at  Columbus 
in  1901.2 

In  asking  that  question  I  am  going  to  answer  the  question 
as  I  understand  the  purposes  why  we  met.  And  in  doing  so, 
I  am  willing  to  assume  as  broad  a  position  and  stand  on  as 
broad  a  platform  as  any  man  in  this  hall,  it  matters  not  to  me 
who  represents  the  operators  or  miners. 

In  the  first  place,  as  I  understand  it,  we  had  something  of 
a  guerilla  fight  in  the  mining  industry — every  operator  was 
seeking  to  enter  the  market  and  sell  a  ton  of  coal  against  his 
competitors  at  whatever  cost.  In  order  for  them  to  do  that, 
it  was  necessary  for  them  to  reduce  the  wages  of  the  miners 
step  by  step,  until  it  became  a  question  with  the  miners  of  the 
country  whether  it  was  not  as  well  to  starve  being  idle  as  to 
starve  working.  I  am  free  to  admit  that  under  these  condi- 
tions many  of  the  operators  went  into  bankruptcy.     If  this 

1  Coronado,  Brief  of  Defendants,  p.  45. 
1  Ibid.,  pp.  43-45- 


II5]  CONSPIRACY  115 

be  true,  and  I  do  not  think  it  can  be  questioned,  then  it  was 
necessary  not  only  for  the  miners,  but  for  the  operators  as 
well,  to  assume  certain  responsibilities  to  give  stability  to  the 
mining  industry.  Realizing  this,  we  met  in  joint  convention. 
We  agreed  on  a  certain  scale  for  mining,  and  every  man, 
whether  he  was  in  the  organization  or  out  of  the  organization, 
on  our  side  of  the  compact  was  expecting  to  adhere  strictly  to 
every  term  embodied  in  that  contract.  We  know,  and  every 
man  in  the  hall  knows,  when  the  first  compact  was  made  that 
the  miners  of  this  competitive  field  were  not  as  well  organized 
as  you  and  we  would  both  like  to  have  seen  them  in  order  that 
there  would  be  no  friction  between  us  in  the  year  following 
that  agreement.  We  have  attempted  to  the  best  of  our  ability 
to  adhere  strictly  to  every  agreement  that  we  have  entered  into. 
It  is  true  that  we  have  asked — you  may  put  it  in  the  form  of 
a  favor  if  you  please — and  in  some  cases  we  have  insisted 
that  the  operators  would  not  only  recognize  the  United  Mine 
Workers  as  a  business  institution,  but  that  they  would  go  one 
step  farther  and  help  us  compel  the  rebellious  of  our  own 
ranks  to  be  parties  to  this  compact — for  the  benefit  of  the 
miners  and  operators,  jointly.  Now,  let  us  see  how  much 
farther  this  movement  must  go  to  be  successful. 

As  I  understand  it,  it  is  for  the  purpose  of  imping  out  com- 
petition between  us  as  miners  first,  viewing  it  from  our  sidd 
of  the  question;  next,  for  the  purpose  of  wiping  out  competi- 
tion as  between  the  operators  in  these  four  States. 

When  we  have  succeeded  in  that  and  we  have  perfected  an 
organization  on  both  sides  of  the  question,  then,  if  I  under- 
stand the  real  purpose  of  this  movement,  it  is  that  we  will 
jointly  declare  war  on  every  man  outside  of  this  competitive 
field  who  will  do  anything  in  any  way  endangering  the  peace 
that  exists  between  us.  What  is  necessary  to  do  this?  Or- 
ganize our  forces  in  the  competing  fields  so  far  as  the  United 
Mine  Workers  are  concerned.  Co  into  these  outside  compet- 
ing fields  and  tell  your  competitors  that  they  have  to  join  tliis 
movement  whether  they  like  it  or  not,  and  give  stability  to  the 
coal  business  of  the  United  States. 


n6  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [IX6 

This,  although  less  common  than  Mr.  Robbins'  presentation, 
is  not  rare.  The  industry  was  chaotic  in  1897.  To  save 
miners  from  starvation  and  operators  from  bankruptcy,  an 
understanding  by  both  parties  to  production  was  reached 
that  would  stabilize  conditions  in  the  four  states  involved, 
sacrificing  to  this  end  as  much  of  competition  as  was  neces- 
sary or  safe  within  the  law.  Having  done  this,  it  was  their 
purpose  to  proceed  to  outside  fields  in  order  to  maintain 
existing  gains  by  their  extension  to  other  districts.  The 
union  has  consistently  attempted  to  apply  this  policy,  ex- 
pending large  sums  of  money  on  organization,  facing  the 
risk  of  jail  to  preach  the  gospel  of  unionism  in  non-union 
fields. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  defence  offered  by  the  miners. 
In  the  first  place  they  contend  with  considerable  justice  that 
the  importance  of  these  speeches  is  exaggerated.  The  joint 
conference  records  are  the  story  of  a  biennial  bargain  in 
which  the  operators  tried  by  any  method  to  give  as  little  as 
possible  in  response  to  the  miners'  demands. 

It  was  a  kind  of  a  horse-trading  proposition,  where  we  didn't 
want  to  advance  their  wages,  when  they  were  asking  for  an 
advance,  we  would  advance  the  argument  that  they  would  have 
to  bring  West  Virginia  up  in  line  before  they  could  ask  for 
an  advance,  and  we  used  all  of  the  argument  that  we  could  to 
keep  from  paying  an  advance,  and  that  was  one  of  the  best 
arguments  that  we  had.1 

The  constant  argument  that  union  operators  were  paying 
more  than  their  competitors  determined  the  character  of 
the  debate.2 

The  Mine  Workers'  counsel  then  proceeds  to  argue  8  that 

1  Coronado,  Brief  for  Plaintiffs,  p.  26.    Quoting  Taylor  from  Record 
of  Testimony. 
*Ibid.,  p.  20. 
*  Ibid.,  pp.  27-28. 


II7]  CONSPIRACY  uy 

since  clause  8  expressly  says  "  failure  to  maintain  scale 
rates  ",  it  can  apply  only  to  parties  to  the  agreement,  for 
of  course  none  except  these  parties  could  be  accused  of  not 
maintaining  scale  rates.  A  less  technical  justification  of 
this  conclusion  may  be  found  in  the  history  of  the  agree- 
ment of  1886-89.  The  failure  of  the  Illinois  operators  to 
maintain  the  scale  resulted  in  a  rapid  collapse  of  the  agree- 
ment.1 This  clause  is  in  part  a  guarantee  against  such  a 
withdrawal  from  the  agreement. 

Counsel  for  the  miners  then  maintain  that  an  under- 
standing to  improve  conditions  in  non-union  fields  does  not 
constitute  an  interference  with  interstate  trade.2  Consider- 
able emphasis  is  laid  on  the  fact  that  the  same  men  were" 
operators  in  the  two  fields.3  The  miners  urged  these  men 
who  spoke  as  Ohio  or  Pennsylvania  operators  to  bring  their 
West  Virginia  properties  under  contract  rather  than  indulge 
in  shadow-boxing,  which  their  talk  of  competition  with 
themselves  virtually  was.  The  answer  to  this  last  point  was 
well  made  by  Mr.  Zerbe  of  Ohio  in  1910.4  The  operators 
were  business  men  who  saw  their  market  being  taken  by 
West  Virginia  coal.  In  self-defense  they  invested  in  non- 
union territory.  It  has  never  been  proven  how  great  the 
influence  of  this  class  of  operators  was.  If  they  were  the 
controlling  element,  the  talk  of  competition,  conspiracy  and 
the  rest  is  largely  cant.  But  from  the  nature  of  the  pre- 
sentation of  the  data  5  it  seems  necessary  to  conclude  that 
among  the  mass  of  West  Virginia  operators  these  men 
were  the  exceptions. 

1  Supra,   p.    107. 

'Coronado,  Brief  of  Plaintiffs,  p.  29. 
lIbid.,  pp.  30-31. 

*  Coronado,  Brief  of  Defendants,  pp.  57-58. 

5C/.,  e.  g..  Brief  of  Plaintiffs,  pp.  30-31,  specifying  by  name  only  one 
large  company  operating  in  both  fields. 


Il8  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [n8 

These  qualifications,  however  satisfactory  from  the  legal 
point  of  view,  are  quibbling.  Let  us  first  clear  up  any 
double  meaning  in  the  term  "  conspiracy  "  or  "  interference 
with  trade  ".  There  are  two  conditions  of  competition 
which  we  must  consider.  We  may  assume,  for  the  sake  of 
simplicity,  a  case  which  does  not  exist.  There  are  in  Ohio 
and  West  Virginia  two  coal  mines  which  operate  under 
identical  conditions.  The  same  amount  of  labor  with  the 
same  invested  capital  yields  the  same  product.  To  exclude 
all  confusing  factors  we  will  even  assume  the  freight  rate  to 
be  the  same  to  the  common  market.1  There  is  but  one 
variable  factor,  the  wage  rate.  In  the  first  case  to  be  as- 
sumed this  rate  is  identical  in  the  two  states.  The  operators 
and  miners  in  Ohio  are  conspiring  to  raise  the  West  Vir- 
ginia rate.  The  effect  will  be  to  create  a  differential  in  favor 
of  Ohio  and  cut  down,  if  not  wipe  out,  the  West  Virginia 
market.  In  the  second  case  West  Virginia  is  paying  less 
than  Ohio,  and  miners  and  operators  are  trying  to  bring  it 
up  to  the  Ohio  scale.  Here,  if  this  be  conspiracy,  its  pur- 
pose is  to  wipe  out  a  differential. 

-  It  is  in  the  second  sense  that  we  must  admit  a  conspiracy 
to  exist.  The  operator  is  quite  inactive.  But  once  every 
two  years  he  reminds  the  miner  how  necessary  the  result  is. 
The  operator  supplies  the  motive.  The  union  is  the  agent. 
This  is  what  the  defendants-in-error  in  the  Coronado  case 
seem  to  mean,  for  they  say : 

These  [joint]  conferences  were  the  schools  at  which  the  miners 
for  years  received  their  education  in  the  principle  that  the 
existence  in  the  markets  of  competitive  non-union  coal  was  dis- 
astrous to  their  movement  and  well-fare,  and  that  if  they  were 
to  be  able  to  continue  their  union  relations  with  the  operators 

1  It  is  commonly  held  and  accepted  to  some  extent  in  practice  that  the 
differential  freight  rate  must  be  covered  by  differences  in  mining  costs 
and  hence  in  setting  the  wage  rate. 


II9]  CONSPIRACY  119 

with  whom  they  had  already  entered  into  agreements,  they 
must  at  all  costs  both  force  independent  operators  to  accept 
union  conditions,  and  prevent  any  union  operators  from  break- 
ing away.1 

This  can  be  brought  out  by  many  other  quotations.  Al- 
most every  excerpt  refers  to  bringing  the  non-union  field  - 
up  to  scale.  It  is  only  occasionally  that  a  reference  directly 
states  the  object  of  putting  the  fields,  now  non-union,  out 
of  business.  The  motive  was  to  equalize  competitive  con- 
ditions in  order  to  remove  the  perennial  argument  of  the 
operators.  As  John  Mitchell  said  in  1908  while  president 
of  the  miners'  union: 

The  strength  of  your  union  is  not  in  the  best  organized  dis- 
tricts. Unfortunately,  and  I  say  it  regretfully,  its  strength  is 
its  least  organized  fields.  You  cannot  be  permanently  safe, 
you  cannot  rest  in  security  until  West  Virginia,  the  Irwin  field, 
the  Connellsville  and  the  Meyersdale  regions  of  Pennsylvania 
are  organized.2 

He  spoke  the  lesson  he  had  been  learning  in  the  years  of 
joint  conference  from  1898,  that  had  forced  him  to  recom- 
mend that  the  miners  accept  a  reduction  of  wages  in  1904.3 
As  to  the  other  type  of  conspiracy,  a  favoritism  for  the 
Central  Competitive  Field,  there  has  never  been  adequate 
proof.  I  have  found  only  one  instance.  In  1906  there  was 
a  general  strike.  The  Hitchman  Coal  Co.  of  West  Vir- 
ginia was  a  union  mine.  It  had  a  contract  with  the  B.  &  O. 
Railroad  to  supply  the  latter  with  fuel.  In  the  event  of  a 
strike  at  the  Hitchman  mine,  the  latter  agreed  to  load  such 
coal  from  its  chutes  as  the  railroad  secured  elsewhere  and 
hauled  to  the  Hitchman  property.     When  the  strike  was 

1  Cornado,  Brief  of  Defendants,  p.41.     Italics  mine. 

2  Coronado,  Brief  of  Defendants,  p.  51. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  46. 


I2o  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [I20 

called  the  Hitchman  mine  agreed  to  pay  its  men  the  wage 
they  had  been  receiving  with  a  retroactive  adjustment  only 
in  case  the  wage  was  raised.  The  company  further  agreed 
to  mine  only  engine  coal.  The  union  refused  to  accept 
these  terms,  but  allowed  an  Ohio  company  offering  identical 
conditions  to  mine  this  coal.1  Such  evidence,  although  the 
union  claims  reason  for  its  refusal,  is  damaging.  But  it  is 
almost  unique. 

If  further  evidence  is  needed  to  convince  the  reader  that 
the  union  fields  merely  desire  to  equalize  conditions  in  non- 
union and  union  fields,  let  him  listen  to  the  change  of  voice 
undergone  by  any  operator  who  accepts  the  union  scale. 
He  who  was  before  the  accused,  becomes  the  accuser.  He 
cries  out  for  justice  in  the  same  words  that  were  used  by 
others.  The  historic  example  of  Illinois  in  1887  has  been 
mentioned.  Non-union  at  this  time,  it  was  decried  in  bit- 
terest terms  by  miners  and  operators  of  Ohio  and  Penn- 
sylvania. Operators  pledged  themselves  to  boycott  the  non- 
union operators  by  refusing  to  fill  orders  should  the  union 
take  Illinois  out  on  strike  and  leave  the  operators  of  that 
district  with  unfilled  contracts.2  Chris  Evans,  secretary  of 
the  miners'  union,  urges  all  miners  receiving  the  scale  wage 
to  contribute  with  "  hearty  support  "  to  aid  those  receiving 
less  in  Illinois  to  wage  a  successful  strike.3  And  in  191 2 
Mr.  Taylor  of  Illinois  pleads  4  for  a  "  substantial  reduction  " 
of  wages  because  "  our  tonnage  will  be  still  further  reduced 
and  our  markets  still  further  absorbed  by  these  non-union 
fields  ". 

1  Petition  and  Motion  of  Hitchman  Coal  and  Coke  Co.,  a  Corporation, 
for  a  writ  of  certiorari  to  the  U.  S.  Ct.  of  Appeals  for  the  Fourth 
Circuit.     Sp.  Ct.  of  U.  S.,  October  Term,  1914,  pp.  33-34. 

2  Supra,  p.  108. 

3  Evans,  vol.  i,  p.  188. 

4  Coronado,  Brief  of  Defendants,  pp.  62-63. 


121]  CONSPIRACY  I2i 

Here  is  West  Virginia  itself,  the  Kanawha  field,  organ- 
ized in  1902  and  in  large  part  non-union  from  1905  to  191 2. 
This  was  part  of  the  state  which  was  talked  about  in  1898. 
And  in  19 14  Mr.  Evans,  then  the  secretary  of  the  opera- 
tors' association,  says : 

We  have  never,  by  word  or  deed  or  thought,  done  anything  to 
prevent  their  going  into  these  other  districts  and  lining  them 
up,  bringing  them  up  to  a  point  where  we  could  compete  with 
them,  or,  the  other  alternative,  putting  us  down  to  a  point 
where  we  could  produce  our  coal  and  sell  it  at  at  least  a  reas- 
onable price.1 

He  charges  that  there  never  has  been  "  any  real  effort  to 
organize  the  Guyon  fields,  the  eastern  Indiana  fields,  and 
the  Fairmont  fields  ".2 

Richard  Bryden  of  Piedmont  made  a  similar  complaint 
to  me  in  1921.  Strictly  speaking,  the  Upper  Potomac  oper- 
ators never  admitted  that  they  were  organized ;  but  for  our 
purposes  we  may  regard  them  as  having  had  joint  relations 
with  the  union  since  191 8.  The  wage  scale  was  fixed  in 
1920  for  two  years.  This  man,  non-union  operator  most 
of  his  life  and  still  claiming  through  his  association  to  be 
one,  complained  of  the  competition  of  non-union  coal  in 
Pennsylvania. 

It  is  not  the  competitive  adjustment  between  union  fields 
of  which  these  men  complain  most.  It  is  the  relation  of 
union  and  non-union.  Listen  specifically  to  Mr.  Evans 
again.  This  time  he  is  speaking  in  the  joint  district  con- 
vention of  1906. 

It  is  impossible  for  you  to  set  foot  out  of  your  own  state 
without  stepping  into  another  great  coal  producer,  and  these 

''■Proceedings  of  the  Board  of  Conciliation   (for  Di$t.   17),   1914,  vol. 
ii,  pp.  23-24. 
'Ibid.,  p.  24. 


122  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [I22 

same  great  coal  producers  are  the  market  for  our  coal.  ...  I 
think  that  in  the  demonstration  of  a  matter  of  this  kind  that 
we  should  not  go  out  to  Ohio,  Indiana,  Pennsylvania  and 
Illinois  to  seek  conditions  by  which  to  govern  ourselves,  but 
we  should  take  conditions  nearer  home  in  the  State  of  West 
Virginia.  .  .  .  Let  us  take  the  Pocahontas  field,  the  New 
River  field  and  the  Fairmont  field,  all  operating  non-union 
mines,  producing  non-union  coal  and  competing  with  us  in 
these  same  markets.1 

This  general  aim  to  level  conditions  by  bringing  non- 
union fields  up  to  union  would  be  held  by  the  miners  not  to 
constitute  a  conspiracy  in  restraint  of  trade,  but  to  be  an 
attempt  to  establish  fair  competition.  The  terms  "  un- 
just competitor  "  and  "  unfair  competition  "  abound  2  in 
the  speeches  of  the  miners.  Unfairness  to  them  means  that 
an  operator  gains  an  advantage  in  competition  by  under- 
cutting conditions  as  established  by  the  union.  It  is  as  well 
understood  a  phrase  as  unfair  competition  in  our  national 
legislation  in  reference  to  local  price-cutting  and  other  unfair 
tactics  by  trusts. 

The  operators  themselves,  even  non-union  operators,  hold 
analogous  views.  The  coal  industry,  as  has  been  pointed 
out,  is  highly  competitive.  Operators  have  constantly  sought 
to  impose  differential  costs  in  their  own  favor  or  to  abol- 
ish those  that  operate  to  their  disadvantage.  Freight  rates 
are  not,  strictly  speaking,  a  production  cost,  but  to  the  con- 
sumer they  represent  as  much  a  cost  of  coal  as  the  loaders* 
wages.  Public  policy,  as  interpreted  by  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission,  has  held  that  so  far  as  possible  freight 
rates  should  minimize  rather  than  increase  differentials. 
"  Differentials  between  competing  coal  mines  to  various 
markets  of  consumption  can  not  be  safely  established  upon 

1  Joint  Conference,  1906,  Dist.  17,  p.  33. 

2  Cf.  Coronado,  Brief  of  Defendants,  pp.  46,  47,  51,  62. 


I23]  CONSPIRACY  I23 

distance  alone."  1  As  an  extreme  example  we  have  the  case 
of  Georges  Creek  Basin  Coal  Co.  v.  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
R.  R.2  In  Georges  Creek  they  mined  coal  from  a  thick  and 
thin  vein.  The  big  vein  coal  sold  in  preference  to  thin  vein 
at  tide-water.  But  rates  had  previously  been  cut  on  coal 
moving  from  Pennsylvania  and  West  Virginia,  coal  mined 
under  similar  conditions  to  thin  vein  Georges  Creek  Coal. 
This  cut  had  been  sufficient  to  allow  this  coal  moving  from 
several  hundred  miles  farther  west  to  compete  with  the  big 
vein  coal.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  attempted 
to  solve  the  difficulty  by  establishing  two  rates  on  coal  from 
the  same  tipple  to  the  same  market.  The  rate  established 
was  to  place  thin  vein  Georges  Creek  coal  on  a  parity  first 
with  the  big  vein,  and  second  with  the  West  Virginia  and 
Pittsburgh  coals. 

If  there  can  still  be  any  doubt  not  only  as  to  the  purpose 
of  the  organization  of  the  non-union  fields  and  the  general 
acceptance  of  this  line  of  thought  in  the  coal  industry,  we 
must  deal  in  personalities.  The  men  who  are  leading  the 
struggle  in  West  Virginia  are  West  Virginia  miners.  For 
them  the  operation  of  the  mines  of  the  Mountain  State 
means  bread  and  butter.  To  close  the  mines  would  make 
the  rank  and  file  jobless  and  homeless.  Thomas  Cairns, 
president  of  District  17,  in  1914  said:  "What  we  want  to 
do  all  the  time  and  hope  to  do  is  to  protect  the  coal-mining 
industry  in  West  Virginia,  in  the  Kanawha  district."  3 
The  operators  allege  4  that  the  International  organization  is 
supreme,  that  the  miners'  president  has  dictatorial  powers 
and  uses  them   for  the  benefit  of  his   four  "  pet  "   states. 

1  Andy's  Coal  Ridge  Co.  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  R.  407. 
■  14  I.  C.  C.  R.  127. 

3  Board  of  Conciliation,  Dist.  17,  1914,  vol.  i,  p.  33a. 

4  Coronado,  Brief  of  Defendants,  pp.  14  et  seq. 


j  24  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [I24 

The  district  officers  are  supposed  to  be  mere  tools  of  the 
International  president  in  his  schemes. 

There  are  two  assumptions :  first,  that  the  international 
executive  is  absolutely  supreme;  second,  that  the  district 
officer  is  weak  enough  to  dance  as  he  is  ordered.  The  first 
of  these  is  capable  of  partial  verification  in  the  various  con- 
stitutions, national,  district  and  local.  The  miners  contend 
that  the  union  resembles  the  government  of  the  United 
States.  The  International  is  the  federation,  the  District  is 
the  State.  The  analogy  is  only  partially  correct,  for  the  dis- 
trict is  not  sovereign.  Relatively  far  more  power  is  con- 
centrated in  the  International  than  in  the  federal  govern- 
ment. But  the  president  holds  a  political  office  that  dictates 
from  expediency,  at  least,  a  large  measure  of  autonomy  to 
district  organizations. 

It  is  on  the  second  point,  however,  that  we  find  it  most 
difficult  to  accept  the  operators'  statements.  Here  we  meet 
the  personality  of  Frank  Keeney  in  West  Virginia,  Far- 
rington  in  Illinois,  Howatt  in  Kansas,  I  am  acquainted 
personally  only  with  Mr.  Keeney  —  and  after  a  very  few 
conversations  I  was  satisfied  that  he  was  not  trying  to  put 
West  Virginia  out  of  business.  He  was  born  a  West  Vir- 
ginian and  has  been  in  the  mines  of  that  state  since  he  was 
nine  years  old,  except  for  two  years  in  Arkansas.  He  helped 
organize  Cabin  Creek  in  191 2,  was  one  of  a  small  group 
who  forced  the  strike  on  over-cautious  district  officers.  He 
was  sufficiently  independent  to  lead  a  revolt  in  191 5  against 
alleged  corruption  and  weakness  among  the  officials  of  Dis- 
trict 17  at  that  time.  To  carry  his  revolt  he  organized  an 
independent  union  of  West  Virginia  miners.  He  came 
back  into  line  with  all  his  followers  after  he  had  forced  the 
International  office  to  accept  the  wishes  of  his  men. 

To  a  man  who  has  seen  Keeney  and  talked  with  him 
privately,  the  charge  that  he  is  a  docile  tool  or  an  ignorant 


I2$]  CONSPIRACY  I25 

dupe  is  a  source  of  considerable  amusement.  His  formal 
education  is  not  great,  but  his  mind  is  as  keen  as  that  of  any 
man  I  met  in  West  Virginia.  He  is  aggressive,  a  fighter, 
according  to  Winthrop  Lane  a  "  tiger  ".  His  heart  and 
soul  are  with  the  miners.  He  faces  their  problems  as 
national  in  scope,  but  if  there  is  to  be  an  individual  advan- 
tage he  is  a  West  Virginian.  To  use  his  own  words,  he  "  is 
not  going  to  sit  on  the  end  of  a  log  and  be  shoved  off  ". 

Here,  then,  is  the  conspiracy.  A  national  union  nego- 
tiates wage  scales.  It  is  faced  at  every  move  with  the  fact 
that  non-union  fields  competing  on  more  favorable  terms 
make  an  advance  in  union  fields  impossible.  The  complaint 
of  this  competition  has  come  most  loudly  from  the  Central 
Competitive  Field,  but  only  because  this  is  the  oldest  and 
most  solidly  organized  district.  It  is  taken  up  by  the  newer 
union  fields.  The  union  banner  is  being  carried  in  West 
Virginia  by  men  who  see  clearly  the  extent  to  which  the 
interests  of  operator  and  miner  are  identical.  They  are  all 
West  Virginians,  and  prosper  as  the  industry  of  their  state 
prospers.  They  stand  ready  to  wipe  out  a  differential  that 
favors  non-union  fields.  There  is  nothing  in  the  evidence 
to  warrant  the  assumption  that  they  plan  to  impose  a  differ- 
ential that  will  close  down  the  coal  mines  of  their  own 
district. 


CHAPTER  X 
The  Closed  Shop  in  the  Coal  Industry 

Philip  Murray,  a  vice-president  of  the  United  Mine 
Workers,  has  said  that  he  would  recognize  a  true  "  open 
shop  ".  One  of  the  conditions  which  he  specifies  for  peace- 
ful industrial  conditions  in  West  Virginia  is  "  the  protec- 
tion of  unorganized  workers  against  intimidation  or  coer- 
cion by  members  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America 
or  any  other  labor  organization  ".*  The  organization  will 
sign  an  agreement  embodying  this  clause  "  and  abide  faith- 
fully by  its  terms  ".2 

Mr.  Murray  believes  what  he  says  and  probably  thinks 
that  it  is  practicable.  Unfortunately  there  is  very  little  in 
past  history  to  bear  out  his  statement.  The  United  Mine 
Workers  is  essentially  a  closed  shop  organization.  Where 
"  open  shop  "  agreements  have  been  signed,  the  union  has 
used  methods  of  coercion.  Mr.  Dawson,  an  operator  in  the 
Kanawha  district,  said  that  he  had  employed  an  old  Eng- 
lishman, seventy  years  of  age,  as  a  trapper.  The  man  re- 
fused to  join  the  union.  The  union  men  "  ran  him  out  of 
where  the  band  men  practiced  and  jostled  him  out  of  the 
picture  show  .  .  .  and  jostled  him  around  until  I  thought 
he  would  have  to  run  off  the  creek  to  save  his  life  ".3  Dele- 
gate Oakes  says  that  on  Cabin  Creek  the  union  is  optional, 

1  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  p.  608;  Cf.  ibid.,  pp.  988-989,  Frank 
Walsh;  pp.  1047  et  seq.,  Jett  Lauck. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  609. 

s  Board  of  Conciliation,  Dist.  17,  1914,  vol.  i,  pp.  46-47. 

126  [126 


12y]     THE  CLOSED  SHOP  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY       i2y 

but  "  make  those  fellows  pay  their  dues.  If  they  don't  pay 
their  dues,  make  them  get  out  of  the  hill.  You  know  how 
to  make  them  get  out  of  the  hill,  don't  you?  If  you  don't, 
we  can  show  you."  x  And  Delegate  Carter  of  Local  Union 
760  on  Cabin  Creek  says :  "  At  my  place  we  have  a  bunch 
of  fellows  who  come  along  occasionally,  but  don't  want  to 
join,  but  it  is  a  cinch,  if  he  don't  join,  down  the  road  he 
goes ;  he  don't  work  there  unless  he  does,"  2 

There  is  evidence  available  to  prove  that  the  open  shop 
may  exist.  Mr.  Gilday,  an  executive  board  member  of  the 
union  from  Pennsylvania,  says  that  in  his  town  there  are 
600  employees,  102  of  whom  are  not  members  of  the  union. 
He  sees  them  "  going  to  church,  and  going  to  the  shows, 
and  going  to  saloons  and  associating  with  everybody,  and 
.  .  .  .  never  knew  one  of  them  .to  be  insulted  ".3  Mr. 
Dawson  has  15  or  20  men  "that  get  along  some  way" 
without  joining  the  union,  but  he  has  had  50  or  100  men 
driven  away  in  the  five  or  six  years  just  preceding  his 
statement.'4 

Mr.  Dawson  presents  well  the  influence  of  a  small  union 
organization  when  he  says:  "Of  course,  fifteen  or  twenty 
men  cannot  handle  three  or  four  hundred,  but  fifteen  men 
who  are  strong  union  men,  paying  their  dues,  can  handle 
five  hundred  men  when  the  fifteen  take  one  of  the  five  hun- 
dred at  a  time,  until  they  go  all  around  and  get  entire 
organization."  5 

The  operators  object  to  such  a  condition  and  stress  the 

1  Proceedings  of  the  Third  Biennial  Convention  of  District  17,  United 
Mine  Workers  of  America,  p.  114. 
"JMtf.,  p.  186. 

8  Board  of  Conciliation,  Dist.  17,  1914,  vol.  ii,  p.  83. 
4  Ibid.,  p.  83. 
6  Ibid.,  p.  42. 


I28  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [128 

involuntary  aspect  of  union  membership.1  The  union  dues 
are  characteristically  collected  by  what  is  known  as  the 
check-off  system.  By  this  is  meant  that  the  operator  holds 
back  a  certain  amount  of  a  man's  wages  and  pays  this  money 
directly  to  the  financial  secretary  of  the  local  union.  The 
details  of  this  system  vary  slightly  under  the  various  dis- 
trict contracts  but  the  provisions  of  the  Northern  West  Vir- 
ginia contract  may  be  accepted  as  typicail 2  The  operators 
agree  "  to  check  off  each  employee,  not  exempted  from  dues 
by  scale  contract,3  such  initiation  fees.,  dues,  assessments 
and  fines  as  are  submitted  to  the  Company  ".  The  company 
further  agrees  to  aid  the  local  secretaries  in  making  up  the 
check-off  list,  "  to  the  end  that  all  liable  under  the  contract 
are  properly  listed  ".  These  collections  shall  follow  deduc- 
tions for  checkweighman,  rent,  smithing  and  doctor.  The 
amount  shall  not  exceed  $5.00  in  any  one  calendar  month. 

There  are  several  points  in  connection  with  the  check-off 
that  the  operators  overlook.  Collections  directly  through 
the  company  are  as  old  as  the  mining  industry.  The  com- 
pany store  system,  particularly  where  the  store  is  run  by  an 

1  Cf.  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  p.  989.  Mr.  Wiley:  "It  is 
not  the  cry  of  'scab'  as  applied  to  himself.  He  can  stand  that  without 
any  trouble;  but  when  his  wife  comes  in  and  says,  'I  can  not  live  here. 
They  call  me  scab  wife.'  And  his  children  come  in  crying  and  saying, 
'  I  am  miserable  because  the  other  fellows  will  not  play  with  me. 
They  call  me  scab.'  It  is  more  than  a  man  can  be  expected  to  stand,  and 
he  takes  the  easiest  way  and  gives  up  his  principles  and  does  what  he/ 
is  told  to  do." 

*  Agreement  between  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  Dist.  17, 
and  the  Northern  West  Virginia  Coal  Operators'  Assn.,  April,  1920- 
March  31,  1922,  section  9. 

■  This  usually  refers  to  certain  men  who  are  agents  of  the  management 
as  "the  weighman,  mine  boss,  electrician"  etc.  (see  Kanawha  Agree- 
ment, 1917,  sec.  33).  This  agreement  specifies  only  labor  "employed 
specifically  for  construction  work,  plant  improvement,  or  extensive 
repairs,  unless  these  men'  are  regularly  employed  at  the  plant."  (Sec. 
6,  Northern  West  Virginia  agreement.) 


12g]     THE  CLOSED  SHOP  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY       i2g 

independent  merchant  with  the  privilege  of  redeeming 
scrip  at  the  company  offices,  is  analogous.  Charges  for 
smithing — usually  a  fixed  charge  of  about  twenty-five  cents 
a  month — for  coal  and  light  are  made  at  a  fixed  rate  with- 
out regard  to  the  individual  services  rendered.  Similarly 
doctor  and  hospital  assessments  are  collected  by  the  com- 
pany. Rent  is  of  a  slightly  different  nature.  It  is  a  lia- 
bility incurred  by  the  miner  with  the  coal  company  itself 
and  the  charge  varies  with  respect  to  the  extent  of  the  ser- 
vice; i.  e.,  the  charge  is  usually  so  much  per  room.  This 
payment  is  also  stopped  at  the  source. 

The  reasons  for  the  development  of  such  a  system  are 
obvious.  Were  the  mines  to  be  run  cooperatively,  it  would 
still  seem  advisable  to  make  certain  of  these  collections 
directly  over  the  pay-roll.  The  element  of  risk  is  very 
largely  done  away  with.  If  there  were  no  risk  involved,  the 
rent  item  would  still  require  the  employment  of  a  collector. 
The  charge  for  doctor  and  hospital  is  in  the  nature  of  social 
insurance.1  But  the  point  is  that  the  operators  themselves 
introduced  an  involuntary  check-off. 

Even  more  distinct  from  liability  to  the  company  itself 
are  examples  brought  out  in  the  Colorado  investigation. 
James  Cameron  was  superintendent  of  mines  at  Hastings 
and  also  mayor  of  the  little  company-owned  town.  Reve- 
nues amounted  to  $2000  or  $3000  a  year  and  were  collected 
by  "  the  saloon  and  poll-tax,  license  fees,  fines,  etc."  There 
was  no  property  tax.2  On  one  occasion  the  poll-tax  of  $2 
a  head  was  checked  out  of  the  pay  of  the  miners  and  paid 
over  to  the  city  treasurer.3  Mayor  Snodgrass  of  Delagua 
says  this  is  the  normal  method  of  collecting  the  poll-tax  in 
his  town.4 

1  There  is  opposition  to  this  charge  by  the  miners,  but  I  am  assuming 
here  that  it  is  beneficial  to  the  workers. 

2  Conditions  in  Colorado  Coal  Mines,  H.  R.  387,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1529-30. 
■  Ibid.,  p.  1532. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.   1213-14. 


j  3o  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [130 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  operator's  objection — so 
far  as  it  involves  protection  of  his  men — is  not  against  the 
check-off  system,  but  rather  against  the  check-off  of  union 
dues.     In  other  words,  he  is  objecting  to  the  closed  shop. 

The  check-off  is  regarded  to-day  as  one  of  the  funda- 
mental features  of  the  organization.  A  national  board 
member  says  that  the  check-off  cannot  be  arbitrated.  ".  .  . 
It  its  our  existence,  and  we  cannot  arbitrate  our  existence."  % 

It  has  not  always  been  regarded  as  so  vital.  In  1906  it 
was  sold  2  by  John  Nugent,  president  of  district  1 7,  against 
the  orders  of  the  national  executive  board.3  Before  this 
date  the  operators  "  simply  took  every  man's  name  on  the 
pay-roll  and  remitted  for  him  ".A  In  1906  the  miners  were 
asking  for  an  advance.  The  operators  refused  until  Nugent 
said :  "  As  far  as  the  check-off  is  concerned,  I  want  to  say 
that  that  is  the  only  weak  spot  in  our  organization,  and 
twenty  years  ago  ....  I  stood  in  Hocking  Valley  against 
the  check-off.  I  have  never  been  in  favor  of  it  and  never 
will  be  in  favor  of  it." 

Mr.  Winder,  an  operator,  answered :  "  We  will  consent 
to  the  advanced  scale  if  you  will  give  us  the  check-off." 

"We  will  agree.  By  jiminy,  I  will,"  said  Nugent;  and 
the  deed  was  done.  Two  weeks  later  the  report  came  out 
of  the  second  sub-scale  committee  with  an  advanced  wage 
and  no  check-off.5 

In  1887  an  agreement  was  entered  into  between  the  Na- 
tional Federation  of  Miners  and  National  District  Assembly 
135,  K.  of  L.,  regarding  the  division  of  dues  checked  off  at 

1  Board  of  Conciliation,  Dist.  17,  1914,  vol.  ii,  p.  39,  Thorn.  Haggerty; 
cf.  ibid.,  vol.  v,  p.  20. 

7  Ibid.,  vol.  iv,  pp.  31-32. 

8  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  41. 
iIbid.,  p.  52. 

•  Joint  Convention  1906,  Dist.  17,  p.  218. 


I3i]     THE  CLOSED  SHOP  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY       i$T 

a  mine  where  both  organizations  had  members.  Evans 
comments  that  N.  D.  A.  135  "  was  strongly  opposed  to  the 
check-off  system  of  collecting  dues  ....  and  in  some  in- 
stances the  money  collected  from  the  miners  belonging  to 
N.  D.  A.  135,  K.  of  L.,  was  returned  to  them  after  the 
check-offs  had  been  made  "-1 

The  check-off,  apart  from  the  closed  shop  feature,  has 
certain  evident  advantages  to  the  union.  Just  as  the  store 
prefers  to  collect  over  the  pay-roll  to  insure  regular  pay- 
ment, so  the  miners'  organization  prefers  this  method  of 
dues  collection.  Thomas  Cairns,  president  of  district  17  in 
1914,  says:  "  Many  of  them  who  are  desirous  and  anxious 
to  be  members  of  our  organization,  when  possibly  they  get 
the  money  in  their  pockets  they  go  somewhere  else  and 
spend  it.  They  are  perfectly  willing,  however,  that  it  will 
be  deducted  from  their  earnings  and  given  to  the  credit  of 
the  United  Mine  Workers."  2 

The  man  may  be  more  easily  controlled  under  the  check- 
off system,  even  though  it  be  voluntary.  On  Cabin  Creek, 
Delegate  Haptonstall  reports,  "  we  called  a  joint  meeting  of 
all  five  locals  at  Boomer,  and  I  offered  a  motion  that  the 
first  gentleman  that  went  to  the  office  and  revoked  his  slip 
would  be  fined  ten  dollars,  and  that  motion  carried  unani- 
mously. From  that  day  on  at  Boomer  we  have  had  no 
trouble  with  the  voluntary  check-off."  3 

The  operators  protested  against  the  closed  shop  because 
it  drove  men  away  from  the  field.  Mr.  Dawson  said :  "  I 
should  be  very  glad  if  every  man  at  our  place  were  volun- 
tarily a  member  of  the  union,  but  I  do  not  want  him  forced 
in   unless  he   wants  to  be."'*     The  majority  of   his   men 

1  Evans,  vol.  i,  p.  386. 

*  Board  of  Conciliation,  Dist.  17,  1914,  vol.  i,  pp.  31-32. 

•  District  17  Convention,  1918,  p.  112. 

4  Board  of  Conciliation,  Dist.  17,  1914,  vol.  ii,  p.  80. 


1 32  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [132 

prefer  to  pay  dues  voluntarily  and  do  so,  about  85  or  90  per 
cent  of  his  500  men  being  members  of  the  union.1  But  in 
1906  the  operators  felt  able  to  give  an  advance  in  wages  in 
return  for  the  check-off  because  it  would  bring  men  back 
who  had  left  the  field  rather  than  pay  dues.2 

There  are  two  reasons  for  urging  the  closed  shop  in  the 
mining  industry.  The  first  of  these  is  the  argument  for 
the  universality  of  taxation.  Those  who  benefit  from  the 
organization  within  which  they  function  and  from  which 
they  receive  protection  should  aid  in  its  support.3  In  19 14 
this  question  came  up  in  the  Kanawha  joint  conference  of 
miners  and  operators.  We  can  find  virtually  all  of  the 
arguments  that  are  advanced  to-day.  Although  the  discus- 
sion centered  around  the  check-off,  it  was  regarded  as 
synonymous  with  the  closed  shop. 

Cairns  said :  "  In  the  Kanawha  field  we  make  contracts 

lIbid.,  pp.  80-81. 

2  Joint  Convention,  1906,  Dist.  17,  p.  2>Z7- 

3  It  must  be  admitted  that  if  we  consider  dues  in  the  nature  of  taxation, 
the  union  has  an  imperfect  system,  generally  using  the  poll  instead  of 
ability  to  pay  as  a  basis  for  taxation.  But  political  taxation  has  been 
evolving  in  both  theory  and  practice  for  several  hundred  years  and  we 
may  hardly  condemn  a  new  organization  for  still  lacking  perfection  in 
the  application  of  its  general  principles. 

Notice  the  argument  reported  in  Dist.  17  Convention,  1918,  pp.  148-149. 

Delegate  Van  Camp :  "...  If  I  make  two  hundred  dollars  in  thirty 
days  I  will  pay  two  dollars  a  month  into  this  defense  fund.  This  man 
sitting  here,  maybe  he  will  work  day  work,  or  maybe  he  will  load  enough 
to  make  fifty  dollars  a  month,  and  he  will  pay  fifty  cents  into  the  defense 
fund  while  I  pay  two  dollars.  I  will  pay  four  times  as  much  as  he  will, 
but  he  will  reap  just  as  much  benefit  out  of  this  as  a  man  that  pays  two 
dollars.  I  believe  myself  that  if  there  is  going  to  be  a  tax  put  on  the 
district  it  ought  to  be  the  same  for  all.  .  .     .  " 

Frank  Keeney :  "...  I  desire  to  see  our  organization  extended  and 
grow  stronger  and  to  do  that  it  takes  money.  .  .  .  There  has  been  a 
statement  made  that  some  would  have  to  pay  more  than  others.  This 
is  true,  for  some  of  our  members  have  physical  infirmities  which  they 
cannot  overcome  and  that  makes  the  earning  power  of  some  of  our 
(members)  less  than  others." 


133]     THE  CL0SED  SH0P  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY       133 

for  possibly  10,000  or  12,000  men,  more  or  less.  ...  A 
certain  number  of  men  pay  their  dues.  The  rest  of  the  fel- 
lows are  enjoying  the  benefit  of  the  contract  which  we  make 
and  pay  nothing.  Our  men  insist  that  all  those  men  who 
enjoy  the  benefit  of  the  contract  should  be  paying  some- 
thing toward  the  support  of  the  organization  that  gets  it."  1 
According  to  Haggerty,  national  executive  board  member 
for  District  17,  fully  14,000  men  were  working  under  the 
contract  in  1912  and  only  1376  were  paying  dues.2  This 
would  indicate  a  difficulty  of  collection  far  greater  than 
even  Cairns  admitted,  who  said  that  there  was  little  diffi- 
culty in  collecting  from  miners:  i.  e.,  those  men  engaged  in 
cutting  and  loading  coal,  but  that  one-third  of  the  men 
were  on  day  rates  and  that  this  group  were  difficult  to 
reach.3 

It  is  of  interest  to  note  that  the  union  at  one  time  offered 
to  make  a  contract  applying  only  to  union  members.  The 
operators  refused  to  allow  this,  realizing  that  such  a  con- 
tract would  force  all  men  into  the  union  ranks.4 

This  fact  gives  added  weight  to  Cairns'  answer  in  regard 
to  the  nature  of  the  miners'  organization.  It  is  a  favorite 
argument  of  mine  operators  that  the  check-off  and  the 
closed  shop  are  similar  to  farcing  every  man  to  join  the  Elks 
or  the  Congregational  Church.  Nothing  can  convince  them 
that  the  analogy  between  state  and  industry  is  closer. 

We  know  that  every  secret  society,  every  fraternal  society,  no 
man  can  get  in  there  unless  he  is  balloted  for  and  accepted. 
We  realized  that,  and  in  the  opinion  of  those  men  already  in 
they  insist  he  must  be  a  good,  decent  citizen  or  else  he  can't 
get  in,  and  he  knows  that  if  he  doesn't  pay  his  dues  that  he  is 

1  Board  of  Conciliation,  Dist.  17,  1914,  vol.  i,  p.  33a. 

1  Ibid.,  p.  42. 

1  Ibid.,  vol.  iii,  p.  23. 

*  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  34.     Cairns  makes  this  statement. 


I34  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [I34 

debarred  from  all  their  sick  benefits  or  death  benefits  or  any- 
thing else  that  may  accrue.  That  is  not  true  of  the  miners, 
because  our  industry  is  such  that  we  have  to  take  in  every 
creed,  color  and  nationality  on  the  face  of  God's  earth.  .  .  .1 

The  closed  shop  will  involve  the  surrender  of  some  mani- 
festations of  personal  liberty.  It  is  characteristic  of  the 
miners'  organization  that  the  general  good  is  regarded  as 
higher  than  the  individual,  and  even  that  the  miners'  union 
can  better  interpret  ultimate  individual  good  than  the  indi- 
vidual who  discounts  future  gains  too  heavily. 

In  the  first  place,  as  we  have  seen,  men  are  brought  into 
the  union  in  some  few  instances  probably  against  their 
active  wishes.  Certainly  in  many  cases  the  union  over- 
comes the  passive  resistance  of  the  "  I-don't-care  "  attitude. 
Many  of  this  class  never  do  care.  They  come  in  because  it 
is  inevitable.     They  stay  in  for  the  same  reason. 

Such  a  man  was  C.  E.  Lively.  In  the  recent  trouble  in 
Mingo  County,  Lively  gained  notoriety  as  a  spy  in  the  em- 
ploy of  the  Baldwin  Felts  Detective  Agency.  If  one  may 
judge  by  his  testimony,  he  is  a  man  of  rather  colorless  char- 
acter without  the  slightest  sense  of  obligation  to  those  men 
with  whom  he  treats.  His  recent  employment  is  rather  re- 
pulsive to  most  persons.  His  testimony  is  shocking  to 
many.2  But  barring  only  hi's  extreme  lack  of  social  con- 
science, he  is  a  very  ordinary  fellow.3  In  1902  he  joined 
the  United  Mine  Workers. 

1  Board  of  Conciliation,  Dist.  17,  I9T4-      Cairns,  pp.  32"33- 
2Cf.  Senate  Investigation,   1921,   vol.   i,   pp.  359"36i.     Sen.   McKellar 
says :  "  I  will  say  that  it  violated  every  idea  of  right  that  I  ever  had. 
I  never  would  have  believed  that  a  thing  like  this  would  happen." 

3  This  is  still  further  emphasized  by  his  insistence  on  his  honesty  in 
the  matter  of  petty  cash  disbursements.  While  employed  by  the  agency 
his  work  involved  acting  as  a  union  official.  He  never  allowed  both 
organizations  to  pay  the  same  expense.  Humorous  morality,  in  view 
of  his  great  default  by  violating  trust,  but  nevertheless  quite  human. 


I35]     THE  CLOSED  SHOP  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY       j^ 

I  went  in  so  I  could  have  the  privilege  to  work  and  make  a; 
living.  ...  I  expect  I  would  not  have  given  my  money  to 
get  in  but  I  had  to  or  not  have  the  privilege  of  working.  I 
had  no  choice  about  it  only  to  quit  and  leave.1 

We  may  also  find  testimony  as  to  the  attitude  of  the 
union  toward  individual  members  who  short-sightedly 
worked  against  the  interests  of  the  whole.  Such  a  case 
occurred  in  1896  when  the  union  was  waging  war  on  the 
company  store.  President  P.  H.  Penna,  addressing  the 
convention,  said: 

Our  worst  opponents  in  our  efforts  to  rid  ourselves  of  this 
system  are  our  craftsmen,  who,  in  many  instances,  persist  in 
petitioning  their  employers  to  reopen  their  stores  and  return 
to  their  old  system  of  issuing  orders  thereon.  ...  I  advise 
that  you,  by  resolution,  protest  against  this  conduct  of  miners, 
and  request  employers,  annoyed  by  such  petitions,  to  dis- 
charge the  petitioners  and  pledge  him  the  support  of  our 
organization  in  ridding  himself  of  their  presence.2 

The  attitude  of  benefit  to  all  at  the  cost  of  a  few  is  still 
further  emphasized  by  the  attitude  of  the  union  towards  a 
bonus  or  super-scale  rate  for  any  worker.  The  non-union 
operator  says  that  he  reserves  to  himself  the  right  to  pay 
an  individual  worker  according  to  his  special  ability.  The 
union  establishes  a  flat  rate  and  insists  that  it  be  maintained. 
Here,  certainly,  appears  to  be  a  case  of  individual  hardship, 
the  discouragement  of  individual  initiative. 

It  is  of  interest  to  note  that  both  Mr.  Keeney,  the  presi- 
dent of  District  17,  and  Mr.  Kennedy,  the  secretary  of  the 
Kanawha  Operators'  Association,  agree  on  the  present 
union  ruling.  Mr.  Kennedy  says  that  the  bonus  was  an  in- 
dustrial evil,  that  the  operators  offered  bonuses  not  for  any 

1  Transcript  of  Record  in  Matcwan  Trial,  p.  2590.     Cf.  pp.  2592-3. 
*  Evans,  vol.  ii,  p.  412. 


I36  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [I36 

particular  superiority  of  the  individual  but  because  they 
wanted  to  increase  their  labor  force  temporarily  at  the  ex- 
pense of  their  neighbors.  It  meant,  in  good  times,  a  piling 
up  of  wage  costs  and  an  irregular  supply  of  labor,  for  the 
man  who  lost  his  miners  went  to  the  same  miners  and 
bought  them  back. 

He  tells  of  one  case  within  his  experience.  Two  mines 
were  located  within  a  mile  of  each  other.  The  foreman 
at  mine  No.  I  needed  men.  He  went  to  one  of  the  workers 
at  No.  2  on  Saturday  and  asked  him  what  he  was  getting. 
He  then  offered  him  a  small  bonus  and  all  costs  of  moving. 
The  foreman  sent  over  a  team  and  wagon,  moved  the  miner 
on  Saturday  night  and  thought  all  was  well.  On  Monday 
the  man  went  to  work  at  No.  2  in  his  old  place,  for  the 
foreman  of  this  mine  had  offered  him  an  additional  bonus 
and  his  team.     The  man  had  moved  back  on  Sunday. 

But  the  union  position,  which  is  not  unreasonable  in  the 
interests  of  stability  even  if  interpreted  as  rigorously  as  it  is 
by  non-union  operators,  is  not  as  drastic  as  they  claim. 
Keeney  interpreted  it  to  the  district  convention  of  miners 
in  1918: 

If  the  company  was  paying  a  man  a  premium  over  the  scale 
price,  that  does  not  set  the  price  for  the  job,  but  it  sets  the 
price  on  that  particular  man.  We  will  say  that  $2.98  for  a 
machine  man  is  the  rate  and  the  company  turns  around  and 
gives  that  machine  man  another  dollar  and  makes  it  $3.98, 
the  company  is  paying  that  man  for  what  they  consider  ef- 
ficiency and  it  sets  the  price  on  the  man,  and  not  on  the  job, 
because  here  is  the  contract  price  for  the  job.1 

This  premium  cannot  be  cut  of!  at  will,  for  at  one  mine 
"  five  or  six  men  had  a  premium  and  they  had  it  cut  off. 
When  we  got  through  up  there,  he  (the  operator)  ordered 
the  book-keeper  to  pay  it."  2 

1  District  17  Convention,  1918,  p.  171. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  172. 


I37]     THE  CLOSED  SHOP  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY       137 

But  although  the  union  does  not  aim  at  absolute  uniform- 
ity, the  bonus  or  premium  must  represent  an  actual  differ-  *JL 
ential  in  service  rendered.  In  one  instance  that  Mr.  Keeney 
described  to  me  the  men  were  doing  machine  loading  at  78 
cents.  This  was  the  pick-mining  rate,  a  premium  for  ma- 
chine loaders  of  18  cents.  It  was  being  paid  to  about  half 
the  men.  Keeney  went  out  and  saw  Mr.  Nugent,  the  man- 
ager of  this  particular  Consolidation  property  on  Cabin 
Creek.  Nugent  stated  that  he  was  giving  this  rate  because 
of  "  special  conditions  ",  but  he  admitted  that  the  mining 
conditions  were  uniform  throughout  the  mine.  Keeney  de- 
manded that  all  men  be  brought  to  the  same  level.  The 
manager  could  not  accede.  The  mine  was  then  threatened 
with  a  strike  of  all  the  Consolidation  properties.  The  com- 
pany gave  in,  but  closed  the  mine.  However,  when  it  re- 
opened, it  did  so  at  the  uniform  premium  rate. 

These  two  rulings  taken  together  place  a  very  heavy 
penalty  on  premiums.  The  addition  is  permanent 1  so  long 
as  the  man  is  employed.  The  operator  is  unable  to  dis- 
charge him  in  order  to  get  back  to  scale  with  new  workers. 
And,  furthermore,  he  may  be  called  upon  to  show  cause 
why  others  should  not  get  the  same  rate. 

While  we  are  discussing  individual  freedom  it  is  perhaps 
interesting  to  note  the  attitude  of  the  West  Virginia  law  in 
one  instance.  The  reader  will  recall 2  that  a  checkweighman 
need  not  be  employed  except  in  the  event  that  "  either  of 

1  The  Cleveland  and  Morgantown  Mining  Co.  operates  in  the  Fair- 
mont field.  It  did  not  employ  union  miners,  and  to  weaken  the  latter's 
attack  added  7]/2  cents  per  ton.  It  finally  was  forced  in,  but  paying  the 
old  rate.  When  the  1920  contract  was  written,  bonuses  were  con- 
demned and  were  allowed  to  be  dropped.  Cleveland  still  held  theirs. 
Then  came  depression  and  in  Aug.,  1921,  they  wrote  to  Keeney  asking 
permission  to  drop  the  bonus  as  they  could  buy  coal  more  cheaply 
than  mine  with  this  differential.  Keeney  refused  to  let  them  lower  this 
until  the  next  convention,  1922. 

2  Supra,  p.  31. 


I38  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [138 

the  parties  " — i.  e.,  operator  or  a  majority  of  the  miners — 
object  to  the  weighman.  In  case  of  such  an  objection  the 
operator  shall  dismiss  the  weighman  on  ten  days'  notice  or 
the  miners,  again  only  a  majority,  may  elect  a  checkweigh- 
man.1  And  "  the  company  shall  furnish  him  a  number  and 
shall  pay  him  for  all  coal  credited  to  his  number  at  the  rate 
in  force  for  miners  ".2  In  other  words,  the  check  weighman 
shall  credit  himself  with  a  certain  amount  of  coal  from  all 
the  miners,  although  he  may  represent  only  a  majority. 

We  may  also  well  consider  the  fact  that  even  under  a 
system  of  individual  liberty  to  bargain,  the  man  loses  certain 
rights,  or,  if  joining  the  union  be  not  a  right,  at  least  a 
certain  manifestation  of  freedom.  This  the  non-union 
operators  will  strongly  protest.  Numerous  quotations  might 
be  made,  but  a  few  will  suffice  to  give  the  operators'  posi- 
tion. Mr.  Stofflet,  superintendent  of  the  Empire  Coal  and 
Coke  Co.,  is  being  cross-examined  by  Mr.  Houston,  attor- 
ney for  the  United  Mine  Workers  :  3  1 

Mr.  Stofflet,  you  and  your  company  recognize  the  right  of  the 
workmen  to  join  a  labor  union  if  they  want  to,  do  you  not? 

We  do.  ...  If  they  believe  in  collective  bargaining  there 
are  plenty  of  operators  for  them  to  exercise  that,  but  with 
us  we  would  like  to  deal  with  men  direct  instead  of  representa- 
tives. 

Some  of  the  operators  feel  that  they  are  being  extremely 
liberal  when  they  employ  men  who  have  at  some  time  be- 
longed to  the  United  Mine  Workers.  To  quote  further 
testimony  from  this  petition  for  an  injunction:* 

They  (S.  J.  Patterson  Pocahontas  Co.)   operate  a  non-union 

iHogg,  sec.  517,  Acts  1901,  ch.  20,  §  4. 
2  Ibid.,  sec.  515,  Acts  1901,  ch.  20,  §  2. 

*  Deposition  of  Stofflet,  pp.  101-103. 

*  Deposition  of  W.  A.  Craven,  pp.  44-45. 


139]     THE  CLOSED  SHOP  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY       T39 

mine.  .  .  .  We  mean  by  that  that  we  employ  only  non-union 
labor.  .  .  .  Some  of  our  employees  have  belonged  to  the 
United  Mine  Workers  of  America.  .  .  .  (They  are  employed 
on  condition)  that  they  renounce  their  allegiance  to  the  United 
Mine  Workers  of  America  or  any  other  organization  to  which 
they  might  belong.  .  .  .  They  (the  workers)  understand  that 
if  they  join  the  United  Mine  Workers  or  any  other  similar 
organization  that  their  employment  ceases  at  once. 

There  is  a  change  of  fashion  to  be  seen  in  these  state- 
ments. This  would  constitute  individual  liberty:  the  right 
to  belong  to  the  union  or  not,  the  right  to  employ  union  or 
non-union  men.  At  best,  and  this  is  often  the  case,  it  is 
rationalized  opposition  to  the  union.  At  worst,  it  is  the 
merest  cant  and  cavil.  It  used  to  be  good  form  to  be  an 
outspoken  antagonist  of  unionism.  In  1844  Lord  London- 
derry stated  that  men  on  strike  would  be  "  marked  by  his 
agents  and  overmen,  and  will  never  be  employed  in  his 
collieries  again  ".a  Rev.  John  Burdon,  speaking  of  the 
wickedness  of  Trade  Unionism,  said  to  the  miners :  "  You 
are  resisting  not  the  oppression  of  your  employers  but  the 
Will  of  your  Maker."  2  The  law  has  come  to  frown  on 
blacklisting,  and  social  conscience  will  only  occasionally 
tolerate  such  prostituted  religion.  Fashions  change,  and 
now  men  think  and  speak  in  terms  of  individual  liberty. 

But  let  us  examine  the  manner  in  which  a  man  may  be- 
come a  member  of  the  union.  He  cannot  join  at  the  mine 
where  the  operator  says,  "  I  also  shall  be  free  to  employ 
only  non-union  labor."  He  goes  to  the  next  mine  and  finds 
a  similarly-minded  operator.     And  the  next;  and  the  next.8 

1  Webb,  History  of  the  DurJiam  Miners,  p.  45. 

7  Ibid.,  p.  46. 

*  In  Pocahontas  field  the  "  yellow  dog  contract,"  the  agreement  of 
the  men  not  to  join  the  union  while  in  the  employ  of  the  company,  was 
sent  out  by  the  secretary  of  the  operators'  association. 


1 40  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [I40 

The  same  condition  exists  throughout  the  field.  The  opera- 
tors have  their  association.  Probably  it  is  agreed  that  none 
will  employ  union  men.1  Certainly  it  is  understood.  The 
man  must  pack  all  his  possessions  and  leave  his  home  to  go 
to  a  union  field  —  a  neither  cheap  nor  pleasant  manner  of 
exercising  this  right  to  join  the  union. 

Let  us  take  the  single  case  of  Frank  Ingham,  a  colored 
miner.2  He  had  been  employed  by  the  Howard  Collieries 
in  Williamson  Co.  On  joining  the  union  he  was  discharged. 
He  crossed  the  river  and  went  to  work  for  the  Pond  Creek 
Coal  Co.  About  two  weeks  later  the  manager  said  that  he 
had  had  a  telephone  call  stating  that  Ingham  was  a  union 
man  and  that  he  had  been  "  advised  to  get  rid  of  "  Ingham, 
who  then  went  to  Alfex,  where  he  was  discharged  for  the 
same  reason  five  days  later. 

But  the  question  of  the  closed  shop  may  be  viewed  in  a 
second  light :  its  bearing  on  the  enforcement  of  the  joint 
agreement.  These  contracts  between  operators'  associa- 
tions and  union  districts  or  sub-districts  differ  in  detail,  but 
they  all  contain  two  fundamental  sets  of  provisions.  The 
first  of  these  specifies  a  wage  scale  and  lays  down  certain 
rules  as  to  hours,  working  conditions,  payment  of  wages 
and  jurisdiction  of  the  operator  and  mine  committee.  The 
"'second  provides  machinery  for  the  interpretation  and  en- 
forcement of  these  working  rules.  The  process  of  adjudi- 
cation is  a  graded  scale  of  conference,  starting  with  the 
mine-committee  and  foreman  and  ending  with  a  district 
board  or  an  arbitrator. 

The  important  provision  for  our  immediate  considera- 
tion is  that  pending  settlement  of  the  dispute  there  shall  be 

JThe  secretary  of  one  association,  now  dealing  with  the  union,  told 
me  that  the  original  reason  for  organizing  the  operators  was  that  they 
might  better  fight  the  union. 

8  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  i,  pp.  26-27. 


I4I]     THE  CLOSED  SHOP  IN  THE  COAL  INDUSTRY       I4I 

neither  strike  nor  lock-out.  A  money  penalty  is  attached 
to  violation :  usually  full  wages  for  the  men  in  case  of  a 
lock-out  and  a  dollar  a  day  fine  for  each  striker. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  district  union  is  re- 
sponsible for  the  enforcement  of  the  no-strike  provision. 
It  is  the  men  of  the  local  union  who  strike.  To  keep  these 
men  in  line  the  district  officer  holds  just  one  club.  With  the 
sanction  of  the  international  office  he  may  suspend  or  expel 
individuals  or  local  unions.  In  some  cases  this  is  an  ex- 
tremely powerful  weapon,  for  it  absolutely  prohibits  a  man 
earning  a  livelihood  until  he  meets  the  demands  of  the  dis- 
trict office.  In  West  Virginia  it  is  probably  as  powerful 
as  the  non-union  operator's  weapon  to  maintain  "  freedom 
of  contract  ",  for  within  the  union  areas  no  such  expelled 
man  could  find  employment.  The  power  in  both  cases  de- 
pends on  the  degree  of  immobility  of  labor.  In  the  case 
under  consideration  it  depends  on  the  proximity  of  the 
non-union  fields.  The  problem  of  discipline  is  a  difficult 
one,  and  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  union  can  be  solved 
only  by  complete  organization.  Particularly  if  we  concede 
the  operators'  demand  ?  that  the  union  be  held  financially 
responsible  for  loss  occasioned  by  illegal  strikes,  this  argu- 
ment becomes  a  potent  one. 

To  condense  what  has  been  said  thus  far :  The  closed 
shop  is  characteristic  of  the  union  mining  field.  It  is  main- 
tained in  large  part  with  the  aid  of  the  check-off.  This 
system  is  found  in  many  instances  throughout  the  coal  in- 
dustry, being  a  recognized  practice  with  operators  and  even 
in  the  statute  law.  The  opposition  to  the  check-off  can 
therefore  be  passed  over  as  being  only  one  manifestation 
of  the  operators'  opposition  to  the  closed  shop.  The  indi- 
vidual liberty  argument  against  the  closed  shop  may  well  be 
met  by  that  of  social  responsibility  and  universal  taxation.  As 

1  Considered  in  the  following  chapter. 


i 


I42  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [j42 

we  shall  see  further  in  the  next  chapter,  one  may  indeed 
doubt  that  the  liberty  or  rights  surrendered  are  greater  than 
those  gained.  At  all  events  we  may  definitely  say  that 
liberty  is  a  comparative  term,  a  matter  of  degree,  that  there 
is  no  absolute  liberty  under  either  system.  And,  finally,  if 
we  are  to  increase  the  responsibilities  of  the  union,  it  can 
only  be  done  with  justice  by  increasing  the  disciplinary 
power  of  the  collective  body  of  miners  over  the  recalcitrant 
individual. 


CHAPTER  XI 
The  Case  of  Management  against  the  Union 

Harry  Olmsted,  chairman  of  the  Labor  Committee  of 
the  Williamson  Operators'  Association,  has  presented  in 
condensed  form  the  reasons  for  the  non-union  operator's 
opposition  to  the  organization  of  his  field.1  As  he  pictures 
himself,  the  non-union  operator  is  the  guardian  of  three 
interests :  those  of  his  worker,  those  of  the  public,  and  his 
own. 

We  have  examined  his  claims  as  they  relate  to  his  workers 
in  earlier  chapters  and  will  consider  the  public  interest  in 
the  following.  As  regards  the  former,  a  quantitative  eval- 
uation is  difficult.  The  employer  is  not  so  closely  in  touch 
with  his  workers  as  he  imagines.  The  union  will  mean 
certain  gains  and  certain  losses  to  the  worker.  The  net 
result  is  what  should  be  determined.  This  will  differ  if  we 
regard  the  industry  socially  or  individualistically.  The  re- 
sulting evaluation  is  partly  a  matter  of  opinion.  Those 
who  conceive  the  interests  of  worker  and  operator  to  be 
somewhat  antagonistic  will  view  the  latter's  claims  with 
great  skepticism. 

But  if  we  are  somewhat  contemptuous  of  his  claims  as 
guardian  of  interests  other  than  his  own,  we  must  concede 
that  he  is  well  within  his  rights  to  defend  himself.  Some  of 
the  points  which  he  makes  in  this  connection  are  weak  or 
even  antagonistic  to  his  purpose.     A  few  are  well  taken. 

1  Statement  of  Harry  Olmsted  to  the  Senate  Investigating  Committee, 
1921,  pp.  39-48. 

M3]  143 


I44  THE  UXITED  MINE  WORKERS  [144 

In  analyzing  these  arguments,  the  order  of  their  presen- 
tation is  changed  from  the  arrangement  which  Olmsted 
makes,  in  order  to  avoid  the  confusion  of  saying  first  "with 
this  I  agree  ",  then  "  this  is  untrue  ",  and  then  "  in  a  quali- 
fied sense  I  can  agree  here  ".  The  only  reason  for  insert- 
ing the  unfavorable  points  is  that  the  operator  has  himself 
brought  them  forward.  The  stronger  arguments  are  pre- 
sented here  last  because  it  is  desired  to  leave  the  impression 
that  the  mine  workers'  union  does  not  deserve  unqualified 
public  approval. 

Adopting  this  changed  order,1  the  points  are  as  follows: 
( i )  The  union  conspires  to  put  the  non-union  fields  out  of 
business.  (2)  There  is  a  fundamental  antagonism  between 
the  aims  of  the  union  and  the  West  Virginia  operators. 
(3)  The  miners  show  a  contempt  for  government  that  makes 
them  unworthy  of  public  respect.  (4)  The  miners  do  not 
respect  the  contracts  which  they  make  with  the  operators, 
who  therefore  should  not  be  asked  to  do  business  with  such 
an  irresponsible  organization.  (5)  The  miners  desire  to 
participate  in  the  management  of  the  mines.  (6)  The 
union  results  in  inefficiency  and  increased  mining  costs. 

CONSPIRACY 

"  The  mine  owners  of  the  field  oppose  the  United  Mine 
Workers  because  of  the  conspiracy  ....  wherein  it  is 
proposed  that  the  output  from  this  State  should  not  be  per- 
mitted to  grow  but  should  be  suppressed."  *  On  this  point 
we  can  add  nothing  to  the  chapter  above.  The  market  of 
the  present  non-union  fields  would  be  curtailed  under  union- 
ization in  times  of  depression  when  wage  cuts  giving  these 
fields  a  preferential  condition  would  be  impossible.     This 

1  The  writer  has  been  careful  not  to  break  any  logical  sequence  on 
which  Mr.  Olmsted's  argument  depended.  The  reader  can  verify  this 
by  consulting  the  record  cited. 

'Olmsted,  p.  42. 


I45]     CASE  OF  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       145 

cannot  be  denied.  But  there  is  a  large  element  of  justice 
in  the  union  operator's  plea  that  conditions  be  equalized, 
that  he  be  not  penalized  for  maintaining  working  stand- 
ards. Socially  this  "  conspiracy  "  is  one  of  the  most  con- 
clusive demonstrations  of  the  need  of  extending  the  union. 
We  may  concede  that  the  present  non-union  operator  will 
not  benefit,  that  for  his  individual  interest  the  present  slid- 
ing and  easily  adjusted  scale  is  an  advantage,  without  at 
the  same  time  giving  him  the  social  sympathy  that  is  ac- 
corded to  victims  of  "  conspiracies  in  restraint  of  trade  ". 

AIMS  OF  THE  UNION 

The  next  point  is  the  fundamental  antagonism  of  the 
aims  of  the  union  and  the  operator.  The  latter  quotes  the 
demands  of  the  miners'  Cleveland  convention  in  1919. 
These  fall  into  two  groups :  the  immediate  demands,  and 
the  forecast  of  policy  under  the  desired  government  control. 
Unfortunately  the  miners'  immediate  demands  were  grossly 
misrepresented.  It  is  this  mistaken  construction  which  the 
operators  accept,  (a)  The  six-hour  day  and  five-day  week 
are  not  the  demands  of  a  radical  or  lazy  group  of  men. 
Even  the  most  cursory  examination  of  the  miners'  brief  * 
will  show  that  it  is  an  attempt  to  stabilize  the  working  year, 
to  spread  the  present  amount  of  work  over  308  working 
days  instead  of  lumping  it  on  214.  (b)  "A  substantial  in- 
crease in  wages  "  which  the  Williamson  operators  oppose, 
was  granted  by  the  Bituminous  Coal  Commission  in  1920 
although  the  award  was  27  per  cent  instead  of  60  per  cent. 
The  miners  made  a  case  that  must  have  thoroughly  con- 
vinced themselves,  but  it  is  not  at  all  rare  for  the  demands 

1  Case  for  Bituminous  Coal  Miners,  pp.  45-50;  cf.  Frank  Kecney  in 
Testimony  before  Bituminous  Coal  Commission,  vol.  xii,  p.  574;  also 
U.  S.  G.  S.  Weekly  Bulletin  on  Coal  Trade,  no.  121.  From  the  armistice 
to  Oct.  25,  1919  (50  weeks)  the  average  number  of  hours  per  week 
was  30.0  out  of  a  possible  48.0.    The  maximum  was  397  hours  per  week. 


I46  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [I46 

made  by  both  parties  to  take  the  form  of  minimum  conces- 
sions. From  these  bargaining  proceeds  until  a  compromise 
is  reached.  But  this  is  almost  universally  assumed  to  be 
the  condition,  (c)  Cooperation  instead  of  competition  in 
the  coal  trade  is  opposed,  but  many  persons  other  than 
miners  are  convinced  that  it  must  come.1  Some  will  dis- 
agree. The  public  at  large  still  seems  to  cling  to  the  gen- 
eral applicability  of  competition  to  industry.  But  just  as 
we  have  moved  away  from  the  idea  of  free  competition  in 
the  case  of  railroads,  public  utilities,  and  farmers'  sell- 
ing organizations,  so  we  must  ultimately  realize  its  limita- 
tions in  coal  mining,  (d)  The  right  to  unionize  under 
government  control  has  already  been  conceded  by  law  to 
the  postal  clerks  and  to  the  railroad  workers  during  the  war. 
(e)  The  right  to  bargain  with  the  government  may  be  vari- 
ously interpreted.  But  even  carrying  it  to  its  greatest 
length,  the  strike  against  the  government  is  not  unreason- 
able from  the  workers  point  of  view.  It  is  also  quite  pos- 
sible that  even  without  government  operation  of  the  mines 
the  public  must  control  this  free  right  to  strike.  In  the 
moderate  sense  of  bargain,  the  joint  agreement  of  manage- 
ment and  the  collective  body  of  workers,  a  strong  argument 
might  be  presented  that  this  is  the  simplest  method  of  deal- 
ing with  the  workers,  (f)  On  the  question  of  nationaliza- 
tion itself,  the  operators  of  course  disagree.  But  the  miners 
are  not  the  only  ones  to  urge  such  action  to  safeguard  the 
public  and  to  stabilize  the  coal  industry. 

These  demands,  then,  are  not  the  radical  and  "  bolshe- 
vik "  demands  that  the  operators  contend.  They  may  be 
based  on  insufficient  data,  on  misinformation,  on  a  narrow 
point  of  view.     The  logic  may  be  faulty.     The  conclusions 

1  Frank  Walsh,  chairman  of  Industrial  Relations  Commission,  1912, 
(vol.  i,  p.  303)  thinks  that  only  by  government  taking  over  all  coal 
lands  and  leasing  them  on  terms  to  permit  cooperative  operation  can 
the  problem  be  solved. 


I47]     CASE  OF  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       I47 

may  be  mistaken.  But  it  is  not  unnatural  for  the  workers 
to  adhere  to  them,  if  we  may  judge  by  the  number  of 
thoughtful  citizens,  non-miners,  who  share  the  views.  They 
do  not  constitute  a  valid  excuse  to  refuse  to  deal  with  the 
union. 

CONTEMPT  OF  GOVERNMENT 

The  operators  are  further  opposed  to  an  organization 
that  shows  "  persistent  opposition  to  the  institutions  of  our 
government  and  contempt  for  constituted  authority  ".*  To 
dwell  at  length  on  this  subject  is  extremely  distasteful  to 
the  author.  The  subject-matter  is  controversial.  When  we 
have  sufficiently  discounted  the  operators'  statements,  there 
remains  a  residual  that  gives  a  weak  basis  for  argument. 
Let  it  be  clearly  borne  in  mind  that  the  writer  concedes  that 
the  miners  have  committed  many  acts  of  lawlessness,  to 
mention  but  one,  the  armed  march  from  Kanawha  County 
in  September,  1921. 

This  problem  is  important  not  because  it  is  an  argument 
against  unionism.  It  is  not.  It  is  extremely  important 
when  we  consider  the  likelihood  of  successful  compulsory 
arbitration.  With  this  we  deal  in  the  next  chapter.  The 
reason  for  treating  it  here  is  that  the  operators  seriously 
consider  it  a  strong  point  in  their  favor. 

The  miners  have  expressed  dissatisfaction  with  the  police 
protection,  with  the  courts,  and  to  some  extent  with  the 
statute  law.  In  fairness  to  the  operator  let  us  put  his  case 
briefly.  The  statement  of  fact  opens  with  a  description  of 
the  normal  police  protection  which  seems  meager.  For  ex- 
ample, the  Freetown  mine  is  locatted  in  a  magisterial  district 
in  Kentucky  with  an  area  of  about  750  square  miles.  There 
is  one  constable.  The  sheriff  stays  at  the  county  seat  about 
35  miles  away  and  requires  fourteen  hours  to  get  to  Free- 
burn  either  by  train  or  horseback.     Before  the  strike  this 

1  (  Hoisted,  p.  45. 


I48  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [I48 

mine  had  one  deputy  sheriff.  When  the  trouble  began,  four 
or  five  were  sworn  in.1  It  is  particularly  in  times  of  indus- 
trial dispute  that  this  protection  is  needed.  There  are  in- 
stances of  tipple-burning.  There  is  shooting.  There  is 
bombing.  Against  all  such  outrages  the  operator  and  such 
employees  as  elect  to  work  for  him  are  entitled  to  protec- 
tion. The  deputy  sheriff  is  employed  not  to  commit  acts  of 
violence  upon  the  persons  of  union  organizers.  His  duty  is 
impartially  .to  administer  "  law  and  order  ". 

With  regard  to  the  use  that  the  operator  makes  of  the 
courts,  he  makes  only  the  same  use  of  the  law  that  is  open 
to  all.  The  primary  fact  is  his  opposition  to  the  union.  To 
keep  the  union  out  he  makes  such  use  of  the  letter  and  tradi- 
tional prejudices  of  the  law  as  are  possible.  In  so  doing  he 
is  fully  within  his  rights.2 

The  attitude  which  the  miners  took  toward  these  deputy 
sheriffs  may  be  fairly  seen  in  the  fact  that  they  induced  the 
sheriff  of  Williamson  County  to  deputize  two  of  their 
number  in  July  or  August,  1920.  One  of  these  men,  Blair, 
was  dismissed  after  about  three  months'  service  because  he 
was  strictly  one-sided.  His  only  official  acts  seem  to  have 
been  "  beating  up  "  five  or  six  Baldwin  Felts  men  (private 

1  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  i,  pp.  285-6,  291-3. 

2  For  example,  the  Logan  operators  attempted  to  pass  what  was 
known  as  the  "  No  Strike  Bill "  in  1918.  It  was  introduced  in  the 
West  Virginia  legislature  as  House  Bill  3  and  Senate  Bill  5.  The 
Governor  had  favored  it,  but  yielded  to  a  special  convention  of  District 
17  and  promised  to  veto  it.  The  bill  was  defeated  in  the  House  and 
never  reported  out  of  the  Senate.  Proceedings  of  the  Annual  Con- 
vention of  the  West  Virginia  Federation  of  Labor,  1918,  pp.  7,  14. 

In  1917  a  vagrancy  act  was  passed  aimed  at  the  professional  idler. 
Two  coal  companies  had  striking  employees  arrested  under  the  law. 
In  both  cases  they  were  unable  to  obtain  convictions.  Proceedings  of 
Biennial  Convention  of  Dist.  17,  1918,  pp.  51-53. 

These  are  two  extreme  examples.  The  operators  may  have  been 
striving  for  socially  undesirable  results  but  the  method  they  pursued  was 
legal  and  there  existed  legal  means  of  defeating  the  aims  of  the  operators. 


149]     CASE  0F  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       149 

detectives)  and  some  "  scabs  ".*  James  Kirkpatrick  was 
paid  by  the  county  2  and  received  additional  money  from 
the  union  with  orders  from  Keeney  to  nip  any  violence  be- 
fore it  started,  as  violence  only  reacted  to  discredit  the 
union.  Kirkpatrick  has  arrested  five  or  six  union  men.3 
But  it  is  perfectly  evident  that  to  the  miners — and  I  believe 
to  the  operators — the  administration  of  justice  is  still  con- 
ceived in  a  feudal  sense.  Each  interested  party  sets  up  his 
own  private  machinery.4 

Before  proceeding,  let  us  first  feel  the  atmosphere  in 
which  the  struggle  is  taking  place.  Mingo  County,  like 
most  sections  of  West  Virginia,  is  built  on  coal.  Coal  is 
the  raison  d'etre  of  the  large  majority  of  the  population. 
One  side  is  bitterly  opposed  to  unionism.  The  other  side 
has  placed  its  entire  fortune  on  the  chance  of  organization. 
Between  the  two  there  is  no  link  of  understanding  and  ap- 
preciation. There  exist  between  them  nothing  but  distrust 
and  hatred.5  Over  the  whole  struggle,  and  obscuring  any 
change  of  tactics,  there  is  a  smoke-cloud,  the  traditions  of 
past  struggles  when  armed  guards  maintained  by  the  opera- 
tors without  any  legal  veneer  beat  off  unionism.6     There  is 

1  Personal  conversation  with  Frank  Keeney,  8/1/21. 

3  Record  of  Testimony  in  Matewan  trial,  pp.  3343,  2275. 

8  Conversation  with  Keeney,  8/1/21. 

*  It  is  not  to  be  imagined  that  privately  paid  deputies  are  found  only 
in  non-union  fields.  As  though  he  were  describing  nothing  unusual,  a 
union  operator  (Wiley)  tells  the  Senate  Committee  that  he  employs  them 
and  carries  them  on  his  pay  roll.  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii, 
pp.  067,  978. 

bCf.  Harold  E.  Weston,  Survey,  April  5,  1913,  vol.  xxx.  p.  37.  "  The 
men  of  both  sides  are  pretty  good  fellows  away  from  the  mines  and 
the  subject  of  mining;  on  the  matter  of  mining,  they  show  the  obstinacy 
of  men  who  look  at  a  proposition  from  but  one  point  of  view,  who 
no  justification  of  the  position  of  those  who  oppose  them  and  who 
seem  to  have  lost  absolutely  the  sense  of  proportion." 

6  See  the  Charleston  Daily  Mail  for  3/17/02  and  6/9/02.     Also  Judge 


1 5o  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [150 

a  universal  anticipation  of  trouble.     "What  next?     How 

long  will  be  allowed  to  live?"     It  is  in  the  air.     It  is 

contagious. 

There  is  also  a  feeling  of  repression.  Our  train  was 
stalled  just  outside  of  Williamson  by  a  wreck.  I  left  the 
train  in  company  with  a  doctor  from  Huntington  and  a 
trainman  who  was  off  duty.  Several  of  the  State  Police 
were  nearby.  The  uniform,  the  large  and  conspicuous  re- 
volver seemed  ostentatious  and  ominous.  We  talked  of  the 
strike  and  unionism.  The  railroad  man  said :  "  Not  so 
loud.  Be  careful  what  you  say  with  those  guards  around." 
Wre  lowered  our  voices.  Was  it  necessary?  What  differ- 
ence did  that  make  ?  The  railroad  man  was  convinced  of  it. 
The  doctor  and  I  felt  that  it  might  be.  Three  peaceful 
citizens,  a  doctor,  a  railroader,  a  student,  felt  as  though 
they  were  conspiring.  Of  course  tihait  was  idiotic.  But  it 
explains  why  miners  can  be  so  easily  convinced  of  their  op- 
pression; why  leaders  honestly  believe  that  authority  and  the 
institutions  of  government  are  stacked  against  them. 

Positing  such  an  atmosphere,  irrational,  surcharged  with 
hatred  and  suspicion,  let  us  see  what  conditions  lead  the 
miners  to  a  "  contempt  for  constituted  authority  ".  The 
courts  are  supposed  to  be  "  owned  by  the  operators  ".  The 
chief  grievance  against  the  courts  is  found  in  the  sweeping 
injunctions  issued  by  district  courts  and  based  very  largely 

Ben  Lindsey,  Report  of  Commission  on  Industrial  Relations,  vol.  vii, 
pp.  6401-2:  "...  They  have  owned  judges  on  the  bench  as  they  have 
owned  their  office  boys  :  .  .  .  that  they  have  controlled  district  attorneys ; 
that  they  have  controlled  governors ;  that  they  have  been  in  the  most 
perfidious  deals  to  control  the  agencies  and  officers  of  the  law  time  and 
time  again,  so  that  they  may  not  only  make  the  law  to  suit  their  own 
wishes  .  .  .  ;  but  when  occasionally,  as  happens  after  a  long  struggle 
against  every  step  of  the  way — for  there  is  terrific  opposition  to  get  a 
law  through  for  the  protection  of  human  rights — they  control  through 
the  bipartisan  machine  in  Colorado  the  agencies  of  the  law  and  prevent 
the  enforcement  of  those  laws." 


I  5 1  ]     C4.S£  OF  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       1 5 1 

on  the  Hitchman  Coal  Co.  case.  These  maintain  the  valid- 
ity of  the  "  yellow  dog  "  contract,  a  promise  by  the  worker 
not  to  join  the  union  while  in  the  employ  of  the  coal  com- 
pany. The  courts  may  not  be  owned  by  the  operators.  It 
is  quite  possible  that  any  justice  would  feel  he  must  follow 
the  highest  judicial  precedent.  Yet  four  justices  dissented 
in  the  Hitchman  case.  Many  non-partisans  are  bitterly  op- 
posed to  the  decision.  The  miners  who  are  actually  con- 
cerned know  that  in  Pocahontas  all  the  operators  presented 
such  a  form,  that  the  operators'  association  decided  on  the 
use  of  it.  They  know  that  "  freedom  of  contract  "  is  mere 
legal  verbiage ;  or,  as  one  miner  told  me  more  picturesquely, 
"  a  damned  insult  ".  The  courts  hold  against  them.  The 
courts  are  against  them!  The  courts  are  owned  by  the 
coal  operators ! !  Perhaps  the  miners  are  wrong,  but  it  is 
easy  to  follow  their  reasoning.  It  also  explains  why  they 
are  not  desirous  of  having  many  dealings  with  the  courts. 

The  antagonism  and  mistrust  of  sheriffs  and  deputy  sher- 
iffs is  even  more  readily  understood.  Let  us  entirely  pass  over 
overt  acts  by  these  men.  The  operators  will  contend  that  no 
unprovoked  attacks  have  been  made.  Is  there  any  justifica- 
tion for  the  preconception  that  these  men  administer  the  law 
for  the  operators?  In  Logan  County  the  treasurer  of  the 
Guyon  Coal  Operators'  Association  testified  that  he  paid 
the  sheriff  $32,700  a  year  to  cover  the  salaries  of  25  depu- 
ties to  protect  mine  property.1     R.  M.  Dial  received  $120 

1  Digest  of  Evidence,  Logan,  1919,  pp.  9-10. 

In  1920  this  amounted  to  $46,630  and  the  first  nine  months  of  1921 
to  $61,517.  The  amount  is  collected  by  the  operators'  association  from 
each  mine  by  an  assessment  per  ton  mined.  In  1920  this  amounted  to 
$.00491  and  in  1921  to  $.00810  per  ton.  The  explanation  given  for  this 
increased  cost  of  policing  was  the  alleged  necessity  of  suppressing  illicit 
liquor  distillation.     Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  p.  1020. 

It  is  not  quite  clear  to  the  author  why  the  appointment  of  deputies 


1 52  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  ^52 

from  the  sheriff  and  in  addition  $50  a  month  from  the 
Logan  Mining  Company.  ".  .  .  .  In  return  for  this  pay- 
ment he  goes  over  two  of  their  camps  every  two  or  three 
days."  1  The  Patterson  Pocahontas  Coal  Co.  employs  "  no 
mine  guards  "  but  has  three  deputy  sheriffs  on  the  property : 
"myself  [W.  A.  Craven,  supt.],  the  bookkeeper,  and  an- 
other man.  Only  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  our  pay- 
roll." 2  These  men  were  not  paid  for  their  services.  "  They 
are  subject  to  the  call  of  the  sheriff  for  anything  that  he 
wants  ",  but  the  services  so  far  have  been  simply  guarding 
the  pay-roll  of  the  company  and  also  policing  the  property 
of  the  company.3 

The  State  constabulary  was  increased  in  May,  1921,  by 
about  600  volunteers  for  special  emergencies.  Of  these, 
207  came  from  Williamson  City.  It  is  impossible  to  ascer- 
tain how  many  of  these  men  were  directly  interested  eco- 
nomically not  merely  in  the  maintenance  of  order  but  in  the 
defeat  of  the  union.  Assuming  the  4  contractors,  19  pro- 
fessional engineers  and  18  mine  officials  to  be  the  only 
directly  interested  parties,  only  41  were  badly  prejudiced.4 
The  estimate  is  low,  however,  when  one  considers  the  man- 
ner in  which  volunteers  were  enrolled.  Capt.  J.  R.  Brockus, 
in  charge  of  the  State  Police  in  Williamson  Co.,  was  Un- 
as in  the  Patterson  Pocahontas  case  is  not  unlawful.  Hogg,  sec.  226, 
acts  1863,  pp.  16,  156,  etc.  to  acts  1913,  ch.  29. 

"  It  shall  not  be  lawful  for  any  of  the  aforesaid  officers  [sheriffs 
included]  of  this  state  to  appoint  any  deputy  or  deputies  to  act  as,  or 
perform  any  duties  in  the  capacity  of  guards  or  watchmen  for  any 
(private  individual,  firm  or  corporation,  nor  shall  the  above  named 
officers  be  authorized  to  appoint  any  person  or  persons  as  deputy  or 
deputies  to  act  for  or  to  represent,  in  any  capacity,  as  officers  of  the  law, 
any  individual,  person,  firm,  or  corporation." 

1  Digest  of  Evidence,  Logan,  1919,  pp.  16-17. 

2 Deposition  of  W.  A.  Craven,  p.  59. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  81-82. 

4  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  i,  pp.  230-236. 


1 53]     CASE  0F  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       1  53 

acquainted  in  this  district.  He  therefore  accepted  "  a  com- 
mittee of  citizens  of  long  residence  in  Williamson,  who 
knew  everybody  in  town,  a  committee  of  seven,  to  pass  on 
the  names  submitted  and  to  cross  off"  those  they  were  not 
absolutely  sure  of;  that  is,  that  they  could  be  relied  upon  to 
be  issued  a  rifle  and  ammunition  and  go  out  in  the  interest 
of  law  and  order  ",1  This  committee,  as  brought  out  in 
cross-examination,  was  largely  composed  of  men  whose 
interests  were  closely  identified  with  those  of  the  coal 
operators.2  In  the  outlying  districts  there  is  absolutely  no 
question  of  the  partisanship.  "  In  the  outlying  districts  we 
had  to  rely  solely  on  the  recommendations  of  the  officials  of 
these  mining  companies.  We  had  no  other  way  of  deter- 
mining who  was  responsible,  but  to  take  the  recommenda- 
tion of  the  mine  superintendents  or  some  official  there  that 
knew  the  men  working  around  the  mines."  3 

Even  the  regular  State  Police  seem  to  have  lost  sight  of 
the  nature  of  the  controversy.  They  were  charged  with 
the  duty  of  maintaining  law  and  order,  but  they  regarded 
the  miners  as  the  enemy  and  drew  no  nice  distinctions. 
The  young  clerk  of  the  force  told  me :  "  The  big  advantage 
of  this  martial  law  is  that  if  there's  an  agitator  around  you 
can  just  stick  him  in  jail  and  keep  him  there. " 

To  cite  the  most  drastic  act  of  the  State  Police,  let  me 
recall  the  raid  on  the  Lick  Creek  tent  colony.  There  had 
been  occasional  shots  fired  from  the  woods  near  this  colony 
of  striking  miners.'4  The  state  police  legitimately  went  out 
to  search  for  concealed  weapons.  They  found  a  few.  When 
they   left   the  colony,   tents   were   slashed,5    furniture   was 

1  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  i,  p.  339. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  343-344- 

3  Ibid.,  p.  339.     Quoting  Brockus. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  332-334- 

5  I  saw  the  condition  of  the  tents  and  furniture  for  mystlf,  but  photo- 
graphs can  be  found  in  United  Mine  Workers  Journal,  8/1/21. 


1 54  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [154 

broken,  and  the  miners  charge  small  articles  were  stolen. 
Only  the  words  of  Radius  in  R.  U.  R.  can  describe  this: 
"  You  do  such  unnecessary  things." 

This,  then,  is  the  atmosphere  in  which  the  miners  feel 
and  show  contempt  for  authority  and  the  institutions  of 
government.  The  rights  that  they  see  defended  are  those 
of  property.  The  rights  of  persons  are  forgotten.1  They 
do  not  see  the  whole  truth,  but  who  can  blame  them?  "Con- 
stituted authority  "  paid  by  one  party  to  the  struggle!  The 
operators'  point  is  absolutely  valueless.  Perhaps  the  quick- 
est manner  to  re-educate  the  miner  to  confidence  in  the  gov- 
ernment is  to  permit  unionization  of  the  mines  or  at  least 
for  the  courts  to  refrain  from  issuing  decisions  which  the 
miner  can  only  interpret  as  hostile  to  unionism.  But  the 
distrust  of  government  is  real  and  will  be  a  difficult  condi- 
tion to  meet  when  we  attempt  to  curtail  the  right  to  strike. 

STRIKES  IN  VIOLATION  OF  CONTRACT 

It  is  charged  by  the  operators  that  the  miners'  union 
"  does  not  maintain  and  protect  its  contracts  when  made  ".2 
This  means  that  the  provisions  of  the  joint  agreement  for 
continuation  of  work  pending  negotiations  are  not  carried 
out  by  the  workers. 

In  a  sense  the  union  officials  attempt  to  sell  the  operator 

1  Cf.  Henry  Seager,  Industrial  Relations  Commission,  1912,  vol.  i, 
pp.  52-53:  "...  Our  judges  have  shown  a  decided  bias  in  favor  of  the 
employers.  I  would  not  be  inclined  to  ascribe  this  so  much  to  a  class 
bias,  although  I  think  that  is  a  factor,  as  to  the  antecedent  training 
of  judges.  Under  our  legal  system  the  principal  task  of  the  lawyer  is 
to  protect  property  rights,  and  the  property  rights  have  come  to  be 
concentrated  more  and  more  in  the  hands  of  corporations,  so  that  the 
successful  lawyer  of  to-day,  in  a  great  majority  of  cases,  is  the  cor- 
poration lawyer.  His  business  is  to  protect  the  rights  of  employers 
and  corporations.  It  is  from  the  ranks  of  successful  lawyers  for 
the  most  part,  that  our  judges  are  selected,  and  from  that  results 
inevitably  a  certain  angle  on  the  part  of  a  majority  of  our  judges." 

2  Olmsted,  p.  39. 


1SS]     CASE  OF  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       155 

to  the  idea  of  unionization  by  showing  him  the  benefits  that 
accrue  to  peaceful  negotiation  and  continuous  production. 
Coal  is  mined  very  largely  on  contract.  The  operator  wants 
to  know  for  the  period  of  the  contract  what  his  mining 
costs  are  to  be.  It  is  desirable  therefore  that  he  negotiate 
a  long-time  fixed  wage  scale.  The  buyer  wants  assurance 
of  a  steady  supply  of  coal.  This  means  that  the  field  enjoy- 
ing a  minimum  of  stoppages  of  work  secures  an  advantage, 
other  things  being  equal.  These  two  conditions  are  em- 
bodied in  the  joint  contract.  A  wage  scale  is  fixed  for  a 
year  or  two  years.  The  union  and  the  operator  guarantee 
no  stoppages  due  to  strikes  or  lock-outs  pending  negotiation 
of  disputes  arising  under  the  contract. 

Unfortunately  the  theory  is  better  than  the  practice. 
Olmsted  brings  out  the  fact  that  in  Kansas  from  19 16  to 
1919  there  were  705  strikes,  15%  a  month.1  These  strikes 
averaged  a  little  over  10  days.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that 
the  Kansas  operators  do  not  conclude  to  abolish  the  union. 
They  ask  that  you  "  determine  the  question  for  yourself,  as 
to  which  is  the  best  plan — peaceful  negotiation  under  the 
contract  with  equitable  results,  or  strikes  through  force  and 
certain  loss  ".2 

In  the  light  of  our  more  detailed  knowledge  of  West 
Virginia  strikes,  it  seems  probable  that  many  of  these 
strikes  are  not  violations  of  contract.  For  example,  in  Sep- 
tember, 1916,  48  strikes  occurred  pending  negotiations  for 
a  new  contract;  23  in  October  and  November,  1917,  for  the 
same  reason.  In  the  general  strike  of  1919,  54  mines  were 
struck.  We  may  also  reasonably  doubt  that  all  the  other 
strikes  were  flagrant  violations  of  the  contract,  as  the  causes 

1  Ibid.,  p.  39.  Cf.  The  Strike  History  of  District  14  from  April  I, 
1916  to  December  31,  1919,  a  pamphlet  published  by  the  Kansas  oper- 
ators.    The  subsequent  figures  for  Kansas  are  taken  from  this  booklet. 

a  Strike  History,  p.  2. 


is6 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS 


[156 


of  the  strike  were  set  down  by  the  operator  who  was  party 
to  the  controversy. 

Some  of  the  strikes  were  probably  technical  violations, 
Many  of  these  further  emphasize  the  miner's  attitude 
toward  a  holiday.1  To  illustrate:  in  July,  1919,  "  No  beer, 
no  work  ",  tied  up  one  mine  of  the  Central  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  for  three-quarters  of  a  day.  In  September,  19 19,  the 
Clemens  Coal  Co.  had  three  one-day  strikes  (stoppages) 
because  of  "  Home  Coming  Day  at  Frontenac  ".  In  April, 
1918  the  Clemens  Coal  Co.  had  eight  one-day  stoppages  to 
"  celebrate  buying  Liberty  Bonds  ".  In  November,  1918, 
ten  mines  of  this  company  celebrated  the  end  of  the  war. 
The  recurrence  of  the  name  of  this  company  suggests  some- 
thing unusual.  These  were  not  strikes  but  stoppages — mass 
holidays.  It  seems  quite  likely  from  the  fact  that  the 
Clemens  Co.  is  the  only  one  reporting  the  celebration  of  the 
armistice  that  every  mine  celebrated  and  only  the  Clemens 
Co.  stuck  to  the  letter  of  the  contract  and  reported  a  strike. 

But  there  remains  a  large  balance  of  strikes,  pure  viola- 
tions of  the  contract.  A  few  of  these  with  the  cause  are 
listed  below. 


Dec. 

1916 

Wear  Coal  Co. 

1  day 

Cold  Wash  House 

a 

(i 

Western  C.  &  M.  Co. 

<< 

2     " 

T           " 

«                  U                     U 

u             u               (i 

Feb. 

1917 

<« 

1 

2       " 

Wash  House  Dark 

May 

" 

(4  mines) 

IO      " 

Wage  Advance 

June 

" 

Jackson  Walker 

I       " 

Price  of  dynamite 

July 

u 

0.  S.  Hubert  Coal  Co. 

29      " 

Sympathetic  strike 

And  so  it  goes.     In  the  first  year,  for  example,  of  about  190 
stoppages,  at  least  51  must  be  regarded  as  violations. 

Come  now  to  West  Virginia  and  view  the  question  only 
briefly  in  statistical  form.     In  1920  in  the  Kanawha  district 

1  Cf.  supra,  p.  25. 


IS7]     CASE  OF  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       157 

there  were  63  strikes,  totalling  292  days.1  Of  these,  eight 
or  nine  were  not  violations  of  contract.  They  arose  either 
because  an  unexpected  delay  had  prevented  the  payment  of 
wages  on  time,  or  because  the  scales  were  supposed  to  be 
out  of  order  and  no  agreement  could  be  reached  to  continue 
operations  pending  the  arrival  of  the  sealer.2  On  the  prin- 
ciples involved  and  the  underlying  cause  of  the  balance,  both 
Keeney  and  Kennedy  are  in  agreement :  "  There  would  be 
no  trouble  if  either  the  men  or  the  foreman  did  not  assume 
the  arrogant  position  of  absolute  right." 

To  illustrate  the  difficulty  of  assigning  complete  blame  to 
the  workers  let  us  take  a  mine  on  Elk  River  in  the  No.  5 
Coalburg  seam.  The  company  paid,  on  a  64-cent  basis,  70]/^ 
cents  with  19^4  cents  per  ton  for  dead  work.  It  arbitrarily 
cut  the  rate  to  65  cents  with  no  dead  work  pay.  Mr.  Ken- 
nedy agreed  that  the  rate  must  go  back  until  the  next  scale 
convention,  that  the  operator  was  wrong  in  cutting  his  rate 
without  first  securing  the  agreement  of  his  workers.  Yet 
the  men  who  struck  misunderstood  their  rights.  A  just 
grievance  does  not  entitle  them  to  an  illegal  remedy,  but 
only  to  expect  a  favorable  decision  from  the  joint  board 
when  the  case  is  presented.  In  the  meantime  the  men  must 
remain  at  work. 

The  operators  place  very  little  blame  on  the  district  offi- 
cers. The  latter  are  honest  in  their  efforts  to  live  up  to  the 
contract.  One  operator  in  Fairmont  told  me  that  he  would 
"  leave  any  question  up  to  old  Charley  Batley  ",  the  union 
representative  in  Northern  West  Virginia.  The  district 
office  had  secured  the  suspension  of  fourteen  locals  in  at- 
tempting to  enforce  the  contract  from  1918  to  1921.     Most 

1  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  i,  pp.  250-252.     In  1021  Mr.  Kennedy 
informs  me  there  were  75  strikes  totalling  348  days. 

2  D.    C.    Kennedy,   sec.   of   the   operators   assn.,   and   Frank   Keeney, 
district  president,  agreed  on  this  point. 


I58  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [^g 

of  these  had  occurred  in  the  bad  strike  year,  1920.  It  is 
individuals  who  are  to  blame  and  the  responsible  heads 
have  only  two  weapons,  education  and  expulsion. 

The  difficulty  of  tracing  the  blame  to  individuals  can 
be  appreciated  from  the  following  instance.  A  local  union 
was  attempting  to  secure  some  concession.  The  men  knew 
the  strike  to  be  illegal  and  that  the  district  office  would 
order  them  back  to  work.  Some  individual  with  a  predilec- 
tion for  legal  technicality  conceived  the  idea  of  trying  sabot- 
age instead.  Therefore,  it  is  supposed,  the  local  resolved 
that  no  man  should  load  more  than  two  cars  of  coal  a  day. 
At  all  events  only  two  cars  came  from  each  man.  The  com- 
pany complained.  Keeney  sent  down  a  representative.  He 
ordered  the  men  to  do  a  decent  day's  work,  whrch  they  pro- 
ceeded to  do.  But  he  was  altogether  unable  to  find  the  indi- 
vidual trouble-maker  whom  the  men  shielded. 

In  view  of  this  situation  and  the  extreme  difficulty  of  col- 
lecting fines  from  the  workers,  it  would  not  seem  unduly 
stringent  to  make  the  union  itself  responsible  for  these 
losses.  But  we  must  face  the  facts.  The  union,  as  regards 
the  enforcing  of  the  contract,  holds  a  hand  weakened  by 
several  factors,  —  the  deliberately  provoked  strike  brought 
on  by  the  operator  to  discredit  the  union;  the  disgruntled 
worker  who  takes  up  cudgels  against  the  union  and  is 
shielded  by  the  men;  the  training  of  the  worker  himself  to 
strike  first  and  then  talk.1  All  of  these  the  union  can  meet 
only  with  education  and,  as  punishment  for  failure  to  learn, 

1  Cf.  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  p.  949.  The  individual  trouble- 
maker need  not  always  be  disgruntled.  He  is  often  merely  a  man  desir- 
ing leadership  who  through  ignorance  or  selfishness  causes  trouble. 
Wiley  points  out  (it  is  a  very  common  story)  that  the  man  advances 
through  agitation.  He  becomes  a  professional  trouble-hunter,  excites 
the  workers,  makes  a  demand  and  urges  the  men  to  insist  upon  its  ac- 
ceptance. If  he  allowed  conditions  to  appear  tranquil,  his  own  im- 
portance would  suffer. 


t  59 j     CASE  OF  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       1 59 

expulsion  or  fine.  The  strength  of  this  latter  depends  on 
the  complete  closing  of  the  coal  industry  to  non-members 
of  the  union. 

Yet  it  is  on  this  very  point  of  responsibility  that  the 
strongest  and  most  universal  attack  is  made  on  the  union.1' 
J.  A.  Clark  of  Fairmont  finds  in  this  his  chief  ground  of 
complaint.  Were  the  union  financially  responsible  for  such 
breaches  of  contract  as  are  their  fault,  he  told  me,  he  would 
prefer  dealing  with  organized  rather  than  unorganized  men. 

We  must  not  over-emphasize  these  strikes,  however.  The 
non-union  operator  with  a  no-strike  record  sees  only  the 
number  of  violations  of  agreement  in  the  union  field.  He 
does  not  appreciate  the  fact  that  with  organized  workers 
and  no  agreement  the  petty  strike  is  an  even  more  frequent 
occurrence.  In  order  to  stop  just  such  bickerings,  the  joint 
scales  of  1886  and  1898  were  adopted.  In  large  measure 
the  bickerings  did  stop.  During  the  years  1918  and  1919 
there  was  only  one  irregular  strike  in  the  Kanawha  field 
that  had  63  in   1920.     Disturbed  conditions  following  the 

1  It  is  pointed  out  that  the  operator  is  a  responsible  person  whose 
potential  fines  are  secured  by  tangible  property.  The  miner  becomes 
financially  responsible  only  through  his  union  and  the  operator  wishes 
his  claim  to  be  against  the  district  or  local  union  instead  of  against 
individuals.  He  contends  that  he  is  often  unable  to  collect  the  fine  of 
$1  a  day  per  man  on  strike  because  it  is  not  politic  to  do  so.  So  for 
example  when  the  Kanawha  mines  were  tied  up  by  the  armed  march 
in  the  fall  of  1921,  John  L.  Lewis  advised  that  the  fine  was  technically 
due  the  operators  but  that  it  would  be  best  to  forgive  it.  (Sen.  Invest., 
1921,  vol.  ii,  p.  850.)  I  do  not  know  the  man-days  lost  in  1921  in 
Kanawha.  There  were  10,469  men  affected  by  strikes  and  $11,070  was 
collected  in  fines.  From  these  figures  it  is  evident  that  the  operators 
did  not  collect  all  that  was  actually  due  them.  It  is  difficult  to  see  why 
the  operator  should  be  forced  to  consider  expediency  of  collecting 
that  which  the  contract  promises.  So  far  as  there  is  disapproval  of  the 
contract  by  the  workers,  it  seems  that  the  union  should  bear  this  and 
not  the  individual  operator.  In  other  words  it  would  suggest  itself 
that  the  district  pay  the  fine  and  itself  force  the  men  to  pay  by  a  special 
local  assessment  against  the  individuals  involved. 


^O  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [160 

war  may  account  for  many  of  these  local  disturbances.    The 
contract  usually  seems  to  improve  with  age.1 

INDUSTRIAL   DEMOCRACY 

The  operators  oppose  the  United  Mine  Workers  "  be- 
cause of  the  general  attitude  of  the  officers  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers  to  the  effect  that  the  workers,  through  their 
organization,  shall  direct  the  policy  of  the  mines  and  shall 
have  full  partnership  in  their  operation  ".2  Let  us  distin- 
guish at  the  outset  two  possible  effects  that  such  a  "  part- 
nership "  may  have.  One  effect  is  a  curtailment  of  the  abso- 
lute rights  of  management.  The  second  is  an  increased 
inefficiency  due  to  the  interference  with,  or  division  of 
authority.  The  second  is  considered  by  the  operators  later 
as  a  separate  argument  against  the  union.  Therefore  we 
may  assume  that  this  partnership  is  opposed  only  because  it 
infringes  the  hitherto  undisputed  authority  of  the  operator. 
This  involves  the  entire  field  of  what  is  now  commonly 
called  "  industrial  democracy  ".  So  much  has  been  written 
on  this  subject  in  recent  years  that  it  is  hardly  within  the 
scope  of  this  work  to  expand  the  idea  at  length.  But  a  few 
instances  may  be  cited  from  the  coal  industry  to  show  the 
specific  nature  of  the  complaint. 

The  distinction  cannot  be  finely  drawn  between  those 
activities  and  demands  which  involve  only  a  loss  of  prestige 
and  those  which  result  in  pecuniary  loss.  The  seemingly 
private  life  of  the  employee  may  find  its  analogue  in  the 
employer's  profits.3  But  we  shall  try  ito  distinguish  roughly, 
using  as  criteria  the  magnitude  and  directness  of  the  rela- 
tionship to  profit. 

As  a  first  proposition  we  may  quote  the  position  of  joint 

1  Cf.  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  p.  949. 

'Olmsted,  p.  43. 

*  Somewhat  like  the  theory  of  Robert  Owen,  or  perhaps  Henry  Ford. 


!6i  ]     CASE  OF  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       i£v 

boards  on  the  question  of  the  employer  in  the  purely  private 
life  of  his  employees. 

The  employer  is  not  the  judge  of  a  man's  character,  morals, 
or  religion,  and  cannot  discriminate  against  him  by  reason 
thereof;  that  the  employer  is  interested  in  such  things  only 
as  they  affect  the  service  rendered  by  the  employee,  or  as  they 
affect  the  service  rendered  by  other  employees. 1 

This  position  of  the  union  came  before  William  M.  Wiley, 
a  union  operator  at  Sharpless,  W.  Va.,  in  very  extreme 
form.2  The  wife  of  the  president  of  the  local  union  com- 
plained that  a  miner  was  conducting  a  disorderly  house. 
Wiley  felt  unable  to  discharge  the  man,  although  the  con- 
dition of  the  camp  was  becoming  "  so  disreputable  and 
offensive  that  the  decent  women  of  the  camp  would  have  to 
move  out  ".  The  man  was  later  arrested  and  sentenced  for 
making  and  selling  moonshine. 

Although  the  case  is  extreme  and  it  is  conceivable  that 
union  officials  might  have  consented  to  his  discharge,  the 
difference  in  attitude  is  clearly  brought  out  in  the  exam- 
ination. 

Mr.  Wiley:  [As  he  understands  the  union  attitude]  "If  any 
of  these  men  break  the  law,  take  the  law  on  them;  that  you 
shall  not  discharge  them.".  .  .  . 

Mr.  Vinson  [Attorney  for  the  operators]  :  "  And  in  the  pre- 
sence of  a  character  of  a  man  like  that  fellow  in  your  employ, 
you  are  powerless  and  helpless  to  protect  the  women  and 
children." 

Mr.  Wiley:  "Yes,  sir." 

Mr.  Walsh  [Attorney  for  the  miners]  :  "  That  is,  by  putting 

1  King  v.  Manor  Coal  Co.,  Maryland  Basic  Agreement,  Case  37. 
*  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  pp.  986-987. 


l62  ?HE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [162 

them  out  of  the  house.  You  could  have  gone  and  sworn  out 
a  warrant  or  anything  like  that,  like  any  other  citizen.'' 

Mr.  Wiley:  "  Oh,  yes." 

Mr.  Vinson :  "  You  could  not  discharge  him,  as  I  understand 

it.- 

Mr.  Wiley :  "  No,  sir ;  I  could  not  discharge  him." 

Here  are  the  three  points  of  view.  Mr.  Wiley  was  a  little 
mystified  by  his  lack  of  power.  He  took  the  attitude  one 
would  expect  the  public  at  large  to  take.  Why  should  not 
so  gross  an  evil  be  remedied  as  quickly  and  easily  as  pos- 
sible? Mr.  Vinson,  being  retained  by  non-union  operators, 
was  utterly  incapable  of  seeing  two  sides  to  the  question. 
The  only  right  course  was  to  discharge  the  man.  It  was 
immoral  to  think  otherwise.  The  union  feels  that  the 
operator's  interest  in  the  miner  extends  only  to  the  indus- 
trial relationship.  In  private  life  both  men  are  citizens  with 
equal  rights  at  law.  In  the  abolition  of  any  public  nuisance 
committed  by  either  party  recourse  should  be  had  to  gov- 
ernment authority. 

Another  example  1  of  joint  determination  of  conditions 
is  given  by  Ernest  M.  Merrill,  an  operator  who  has  mines 
in  both  union  and  non-union  territory.  He  operates  at  the 
Mordue  Collieries,  a  plant  that  is  at  one  end  of  a  long  and 
narrow  hollow.  Because  of  this  condition,  houses  are  strung 
in  a  single  row  along  the  railroad  track  for  three  and  a  half 
miles.  To  get  the  men  to  work  a  bus  2  is  operated  by  the 
company.  For  about  eight  months  the  bus  had  stopped 
"  almost  anywhere  ....  to  pick  up  men  in  groups  ".  But 
with  the  coming  of  winter  it  was  thought  desirable  to  sys- 
tematize the  schedule.     Frequent   stops  required  a  greater 

1Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  842-3,  860-1. 

2  Merely  for  accuracy :  I  cannot  determine  from  the  text  whether  this 
is  an  automobile  or  work-train.    The  point  is  immaterial. 


^3]     CASE  OF  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       163 

period  of  time  and  men  from  the  far  end  of  the  hollow  were 
exposed  unnecessarily.  Furthermore,  the  poor  condition  of 
the  winter  road  made  it  difficult  to  start  in  certain  spots. 
The  company  ordered  that  a  stop  be  cut  out  where  it  had 
been  customary  to  pick  up  four  or  five  men.  The  men 
could  reach  the  bus  320  yards  further  ahead.  The  men 
struck  on  the  second  day  and  stayed  out  five  days.  In  the 
joint  board  it  was  held  that  the  company  had  established  a 
condition  during  the  eight  months  which  could  not  be 
changed  without  mutual  agreement.  The  change  had  been 
arbitrary. 

Mr.  Walsh :  "  But  if  that  had  been  a  non-union  mine,  although 
all  those  men  wanted  that  convenience,  did  not  want  to  walk 
that  three  blocks  in  winter-time  on  the  railroad  track  .... 
up  to  the  bridge,  you  would  have  fired  them,  would  you  not, 
on  the  ground  of  efficiency  and  because  you  had  the  power?  " 
Mr.  Merrill :  "  I  think  so." 

In  Maryland  a  miner  was  ordered  by  a  new  foreman  to 
run  a  motor.  He  refused,  because  he  couldn't  run  a  motor. 
The  refusal  was  not  couched  in  terms  to  induce  reasonable- 
ness on  the  part  of  the  foreman.  "  I  can't  run  a  motor. 
Damned  if  I'd  blackleg  and  take  another  man's  job."  He 
was  discharged,  but  was  ordered  reinstated.1  In  another 
instance  a  motorman  had  been  told  by  the  superintendent  to 
settle  with  another  man  which  one  should  serve  a  certain 
heading.  Blocher  was  ordered  to  the  heading  by  a  sub- 
ordinate official  whom  he  did  not  know.  He  refused  and 
was  discharged.     Blocher  also  was  reinstated.2 

A  more  interesting  and  far-reaching  case  is  that  of  an 
appeal  by  the  miners  against  a  reduction  of  wages  made  by 

1  Harry  Rcnn  v.  Emmons  Coal  Mining  Co.,  Maryland  Basic  Agree- 
ment, Case  31. 

1  Blocher  v.  Emmons  Coal   Mining  Co.,   Maryland  Basic  Agreement, 
Case  23. 


^4.  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [164 

the  Wolf  Den  Coal  Co.  of  Maryland.1  The  men  had  been 
employed  as  pick-miners  at  the  scale  rate  of  $1.01  a  ton.  In 
September,  19 18,  the  mine  introduced  cutting-machines. 
With  only  four  days'  notice  the  management  cut  the  rate  to 
$0,773  a  ton-  Two  questions  were  involved :  Did  the  opera- 
tors have  the  right  to  make  an  arbitrary  change  in  the  wage 
rate  ?  Did  they  have  the  right  to  reach  a  mutual  agreement 
with  the  men  or  appeal  to  an  umpire  to  reduce  the  rate  be- 
cause of  the  recognized  differential  for  machine-mining? 
On  the  first  point  the  umpire  held — as  is  always  held — that 
no  reduction  could  be  made  arbitrarily  and  that  the  rate 
should  be  retroactively  $1.01  and  should  remain  such  until 
the  matter  was  taken  up  jointly  by  miners  and  management. 

On  the  second  point  Mr.  Hollander  held  that  the  right  of 
the  employer  to  introduce  the  machine  was  unquestionable; 
that  the  company  is  entitled  to  be  reimbursed  for  the  addi- 
tional capital  expenditure ;  that  they  may  not  reduce  the  rate 
so  far  that  men  earn  less  at  the  new  rate  than  at  the  old. 
The  question  of  the  justification  of  the  $0,773  rate  i|S  "  en~ 
tirely  an  issue  of  fact  ".  "  This  is  a  matter  as  to  which  in 
the  first  instance,  adjustment  should  be  sought  by  confer- 
ence between  the  Local  Mine  Committee  and  the  Company, 
either  directly  or  acting  through  their  representatives.  .  .  . 
If  after  serious  effort  no  agreement  is  reached  and  the  Com- 
plainants still  feel  themselves  aggrieved,  the  umpire  will  of 
necessity  be  obliged  to  take  further  cognizance  of  this 
appeal." 

This  "  partnership  "  that  is  supposed  to  be  achieved  in 
union  mines  and  to  which  the  non-union  operators  take  ex- 
ception does  not  mean  that  the  operator  loses  all  his  rights. 
Much  of  his  absolute  power  is  gone.    He  is  limited  by  other 

1  Appeal  of  August  Dreggs  and  Thomas  Boyce  for  Adjustment  of 
Disagreement  with  the  Wolf  Den  Coal  Co.  (Decision  rendered  Dec. 
26,  1918,  by  Jacob  H.  Hollander.     Maryland  Agreement.) 


265]     CASE  OF  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       ^ 

considerations  than  personal  choice.  But  in  the  case  just 
cited  we  see  that  he  has  a  legitimate  method  of  bringing 
about  change.  The  Consolidation  Coal  Company  refused  to 
recognize  a  particular  checkweighman.1  The  contract  pro- 
vided that  at  a  plant  men  might  elect  any  representative 
from  their  own  ranks  they  saw  fit.  If,  however,  they  chose 
an  outsider,  he  must  be  mutually  agreeable  to  miners  and 
operator.  This  checkweighman,  an  outsider,  was  not  agree- 
able to  the  Consolidation  and  the  umpire  held  clearly  for 
the  company. 

These  cases  are  sufficient  to  show  what  partnership  means 
under  the  joint  contract.  The  non-union  method  of  settling 
a  dispute  is  discharge,  rather  of  the  nature  of  the  Alice-in- 
Wonderland  Queen's  "  Off  with  his  head  ",  or,  "  No.  No! 
Sentence  first — verdict  afterwards ".  The  method  em- 
ployed under  the  joint  contract  more  closely  approximates 
judicial  procedure.  Like  many  laws,  it  adds  rigidity  to  the 
process,  as  when  the  man  who  operated  a  disorderly  house 
could  not  be  quickly  disposed  of.  Often  the  union  miner 
may  be  at  fault  in  inviting  the  break,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
man  who  was  "  damned  if  he'd  blackleg  ",  instead  of  end- 
ing with  the  statement  that  he  was  unable  to  run  a  motor. 
But  by  and  large  the  specific  instances  cited  before  the 
Senate  Committee  and  such  other  decisions  as  I  have  seen, 
do  not  seem  to  constitute  a  severe  menace  to  the  operator. 
On  the  other  hand  they  mark  an  elevation  of  the  miner.  He 
is  vested  with  the  dignity  of  certain  rights.  He  ceases  to  be 
a  Jack  of  Hearts  and  becomes  a  citizen  of  industry. 

INEFFICIENCY  DUE  TO   UNIONIZATION 

The  complaint  of  the  relative  inefficiency  of  union  mines 
usually  starts  with  the  statement  that  it   is  impossible   in 

1  Appeal  of  Thomas  J.  Leake  for  Adjustment  of  Disagreement  with 
the  Consolidation  Coal  Co.  (Decision  June  16,  1919,  by  Jacob  Hollander. 
Maryland  Agreement.) 


j66  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [iSS 

union  mines  to  discharge  a  man  who  is  a  poor  workman. 
In  non-union  mines  by  a  weeding-out  process  a  force  of 
good  workers  can  be  built  up.1 

This  condition  arises  out  of  the  joint  contract.  In  all 
contracts  it  is  provided  that  the  right  to  hire  and  discharge 
workers  is  vested  in  the  management.  Nothing  in  the  con- 
tract shall  be  construed  to  abridge  the  rights  of  the  employer 
in  this  respect.2  It  is,  however,  provided  that  an  employee 
may  obtain  a  hearing  against  unjust  discharge.3  Further- 
more it  is  implicitly  agreed  that  no  man  shall  be  discharged 
for  union  activities.  Until  this  became  a  thoroughly  under- 
stood rule,  it  was  often  explicitly  stated.4  The  operators 
contend  that  this  last  article  of  agreement  enables  the  union 
to  abrogate  the  right  of  discharge  "  by  twisting  every  time 
....  to  the  position  that  he  is  being  discharged  for  union 
activities  ".5 

Mr.  Wiley  complains  that  he  can  secure  efficiency  neither 
by  discharge  of  the  less  efficient,  nor  by  rewards  for  addi- 
tional efficiency.  The  specific  instance  that  he  cites  has  to 
do  with  the  care  of  the  motors.6  Through  careless  driving 
of  the  electric  mine  locomotives  not  only  is  the  cost  increased 
by  additional  repairs,  but  the  temporary  disablement  of  the 
motor  dislocates  the  transportation  system.  It  would  pay 
well  to  give  a  bonus  based  on  the  number  of  miles  the  loco- 
motive was  run  without  a  breakdown.  Under  the  inelastic 
wage  scale  he  claims  to  be  unable  to  do  this. 

It  is  not  correct  to  leave  the  impression  that  many  of 
these  operators  do,  that  all  premiums  are  forbidden.    It  will 

1  Cf.  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  pp.  844,  852,  962. 
2Cf.  Kanawha  Agreement,  1920-22,  sec.  II. 

3  Cf.  Maryland  Agreement,  1920-22,  sec.  8. 

4  Kanawha  Agreement,  1912-14,  sec.  2. 

5  Senate  Investigation,  IQ21,  vol.  2,  p.  962. 

6  Ibid.,  pp.  963-964. 


j67]     CASE  OF  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       167 

be  recalled  that  a  differential  may  be  paid  a  good  workman.1 
But  it  is  not  strictly  speaking  a  bonus.  The  premium  be- 
comes permanent  so  far  as  the  individual  is  concerned.  In 
the  particular  type  of  case  Mr.  Wiley  cites  there  may  be  no 
possibility  of  granting  the  additional  incentive. 

Particular  individuals  have  at  times  created  inefficiency 
and  yet  been  protected  from  discharge.  At  one  of  Wiley's 
mines  there  were  two  men  who  maintained  a  constant  agi- 
tation 2  (the  merits  of  the  case  he  does  not  discuss  and  they 
are  not  pertinent  to  our  discussion)  with  a  consequent  lower- 
ing of  efficiency  to  about  50  per  cent  of  that  of  has  other 
plants.  In  September,  1921,  the  men  left  and  operation  at 
once  returned  to  normal.  Yet  their  activities  were  of  such 
a  nature  that  he  must  have  admitted,  had  he  attempted  to  get 
rid  of  them,  that  their  discharge  was  brought  about  because 
of  "  union  activities  ". 

Ernest  Merrill  brings  forward  the  familiar  case  of  in- 
creased personnel  required  by  the  union.3  His  specific 
grievance  turns  on  an  instance  in  which  he  ordered  a  motor 
crew  to  take  in  a  bucket  and  bail  out  a  heading,  a  matter 
of  only  10  or  20  minutes  daily.  The  men  refused,  saying 
that  he  must  employ  a  water-bailer.  Again  the  men  in- 
sisted that  he  must  hire  a  special  man  as  sub-station  tender 
to  do  a  job  that  could  have  been  equally  well  performed  by 
another  man  who  had  very  light  duties. 

There  are  two  points  of  view  presented  by  the  cross- 
examination.4  The  operator  feels  that  he  pays  the  men  for 
their  time.  Having  purchased  this,  he  may  dispose  of  it  as 
he  sees  fit.  (It  was  not  brought  out  that  he  attempted  to 
make  a  man  do  work  of  a  higher  grade  than  that  for  which 

1  Supra,  p.  136. 

7  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  p.  964. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  843. 

*Ibid.,  pp.  861-862. 


X(38  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [T68 

the  man  was  paid.)  The  union  attorney  points  out  that  the 
men  were  engaged  for  specific  work  and  intimates  that  it 
was  as  illogical  to  expect  them  to  bail  out  this  place  as  for 
the  manager  or  foreman  to  do  so. 

The  organized  worker's  reaction  on  this  subject  is  com- 
plicated. I  am  not  sure  that  I  ever  fully  understood  it.  It 
is  nowhere  set  forth  by  the  miners,  but  from  conversations 
with  the  workers  I  judge  that  there  are  several  different 
reasons  for  the  attitude.  The  first  is  that  brought  out  by 
the  attorney,  Mr.  Walsh.  The  worker  is  hired  for  a  spe- 
cific job.  He  feels  somewhat  the  same  pride  in  that  par- 
ticular job  as  the  engineer  who  would  refuse  to  do  certain 
other  types  of  work.  But  equally  important  is  the  attitude, 
by  no  means  confined  to  miners,  that  by  doing  two  jobs  he 
keeps  another  man  out  of  work.  This  is  shown  above  by 
the  man  who  was  "  damned  if  he'd  black-leg  ".  The  coal 
industry  is  particularly  conducive  to  this  attitude  because 
the  worker's  year  is  so  extremely  insecure.  Historically,  I 
believe,  there  is  also  a  reason  for  the  tradition  that  a  man 
is  liable  to  exploitation  if  he  makes  himself  an  "  easy  mark  ". 
These  three  thoughts — mixed,  the  operator  says,  with  just 
plain  "  cussedness  "  —  interact  and  result  in  a  policy  that 
must  seem  to  the  operators  and  to  many  laymen  unjustified. 

Another  example  of  inefficiency  is  introduced  by  Mr. 
Merrill.1  The  contract  provides  that  men  be  allowed  thirty 
minutes  for  lunch.  The  hour  shall  be  selected  by  the  men. 
The  tipple  crew  chose  12  to  12.30.  The  main-line  motor 
crew  chose  12.30  to  1.  The  former  is  dependent  on  the 
latter  for  a  supply  of  cars  to  keep  them  busy.  When  at 
12.30  there  happens  to  be  half  an  hour's  work  for  the  tipple 
crew,  all  is  well.  But  if  the  motor-crew  takes  time  out  just 
as  they  emerge  from  the  drift  mouth  and  the  tipple  crew 
have  no  cars,  the  latter  are  forced  to  idle  for  half  an  hour. 

1  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  p.  843. 


jSg]     CASE  OF  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       ify 

The  men  refused  to  rearrange  their  lunch  hours.  Mr. 
Walsh,  on  the  cross-examination,  says,  "  The  30-minutes- 
for-dinner  matter  I  will  let  go.  I  do  not  understand  it  well 
enough  ".*  Perhaps  it  was  well  not  to  pursue  the  subject, 
for  one  cannot  help  suspecting  that  the  tipple  crew  were  not 
disappointed  in  the  occasional  extra  half-hour. 

The  facts  as  to  the  actual  differential  in  efficiency  of 
union  and  non-union  mines  are  not  available.  Mr.  Merrill 
maintains  that  his  mines  are  forced  to  carry  about  25  per 
cent  greater  equipment  in  union  than  in  non-union  fields  2 
because  the  production  per  man  per  year  is  smaller  in  the 
union  district.3  He  mentions  some  difficulty  about  installing 
an  improved  type  of  mining  machine,  but  other  than  that 
the  difficulties  he  cites  are  those  given  above :  the  bus  trouble 
that  represented  no  money  loss,  the  lunch  hour,  the  special 
men  to  carry  on  small  jobs,  and  the  resulting  loss  of  time 
and  money  in  petty  strikes  to  settle  the  questions. 

But  although  we  can  get  no  statistical  information,  al- 
though there  may  be  compensating  gains  in  efficiency  due  to 
the  organization  of  the  men,  these  instances  are  adequate  to 
show  that  efficiency  is  not  as  great  as  is  possible.  It  consti- 
tutes a  valid  ground  for  complaint.  It  is  a  weakness  that 
the  union  must  admit. 

As  Mr.  Wiley  sees  the  problem,4  a  man  sells  the  "  cheap- 
est thing  he  has  got  ....  his  time  and  labor  ";  his  loyalty 
and  interest  have  to  be  earned  by  the  management.  He 
confesses  himself  unable  to  secure  these  because  he  cannot 
give  either  reward  or  punishment.     Not  all  operators  have 

1  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  ii,  p.  861. 

7  Ibid.,  pp.  841-842. 

%Ibid.,  pp.  856-858.  He  promised  to  introduce  statistical  exhibits. 
They  were  not  printed  in  the  report  and  I  have  been  unable  to  find  out 
from  Washington  whether  or  not  they  were  presented. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  963. 


I jO  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [ijo 

this  difficulty.  He  says  that  some  men  who  have  worked 
with  the  union  for  a  long  time  feel  that  they  would  not 
know  how  to  get  along  without  it.1  Richard  Bryden,  an 
operator  of  Piedmont,  who  has  the  reputation  of  getting 
on  well  with  his  men,  told  me  that  he  had  not  found  much 
difficulty.  His  method  consisted  largely  in  suggesting  to 
the  older  and  more  responsible  miners  that  they  serve  on  the 
mine  committee  instead  of  the  more  radical  and  hot-headed 
youngsters.  The  miners  had  so  long  been  discriminated 
against  for  union  activities  that  the  older  men,  those  whose 
judgment  was  best,  refused  to  serve  unless  they  were  given 
specific  assurance  of  their  safety. 

Thus  out  of  the  mass  of  charges  against  the  union,  many 
of  which  arise  from  and  cater  to  prejudice,  there  remain 
several  strong  points.  The  first  of  these  is  the  guarantee 
of  contractual  engagements.  The  second  is  petty  interfer- 
ences with  management  that  result  in  inefficiency.  Both  are 
closely  allied.  The  conditions  appear  to  improve  with  the 
length  of  time  2  that  miners  and  operators  meet  contrac- 
tually, rather  than  with  absolute  powers  on  one  side.3  In 
justice  to  the  operator  it  would  seem  that  the  union,  with 
proper  safeguards  against  provocative  acts  by  the  employ- 
ers, should  be  financially  liable  for  the  petty  stoppages  of 

1  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  vol.  ii,  p.  965. 

2  Cf.  Senate  Investigation,  ig2i,  vol.  ii,  p.  949.  Louis  Bloch  has 
collected  considerable  information  on  the  working  of  the  joint  agree- 
ment in  the  Central  Competitive  field.  He  reaches  the  same  conclusion 
from  a  much  more  detailed  study.  The  results  of  his  investigation 
should  soon  be  available. 

3  This  "  previous  condition  of  servitude "  may  have  considerable 
psychological  importance  in  the  imperfect  functioning  of  the  joint 
agreement.  It  seems  not  at  all  unlikely  that  the  reaction  from  industrial 
autocracy  in  the  first  freedom  would  be  extreme,  that  the  workers  who 
had  previously  had  no  powers  should  now  feel  all-powerful.  It  is  this 
condition  that  education  must  correct,  and  does  in  large  measure.  But 
it  is  not  a  condition  for  which  the  worker  is  responsible. 


I7i]     CASE  OF  MANAGEMENT  AGAINST  THE  UNION       171 

work.     As  to  the  latter  feature,  inefficiency,  there  seems  to 
be  no  specific  remedy  except  the  drastic  one  of  no  union. 

The  author  feels  that  these  weaknesses  are  not  great 
enough  to  overbalance  the  arguments  for  the  union.  They 
are  conditions  which  may  be  remedied  either  by  time  or  by 
changes  in  the  detail  of  the  contract,  if  necessary  union  re- 
sponsibility may  be  fixed  by  state  law.  The  operator  who 
faces  the  problem  in  West  Virginia  will  think  that  is  the 
opinion  of  an  ignorant  optimist  or  will  say  with  Mr.  Wiley: 
"  I  have  often  wished  that  [he]  could  be  where  I  am  and 
try  to  meet  the  conditions  that  I  have  to  meet  and  see  how 
[he]  would  feel  about  it." 


CHAPTER  XII 
The  Public  Interest  in  Coal 

The  fundamental  importance  of  coal  in  our  economic 
organization  is  so  obvious  as  to  warrant  little  more  than 
mention.  The  average  citizen  first  conceives  the  fuel  prob- 
lem as  one  of  personal  bodily  comfort.  His  house  is  warm 
or  cold.  The  air  he  breathes  is  thick  with  the  fumes  of  soft 
coal  or  is  pleasant  and  fresh.  But  though  this  is  his  most 
intimate  contact  with  coal,  he  realizes  with  a  moment's 
thought  the  more  serious  and  fundamental  problem. 

The  importance  of  coal  is  not  primarily  that  it  heats  an 
apartment  when  the  temperature  is  hovering  around  zero. 
Coal  touches  us  at  every  turn.  It  is  the  gas  we  burn  as  we 
cook  breakfast.  It  is  the  subway  ride  to  business.  It  is 
transportation,  and  as  such  is  the  food  we  eat,  the  clothes 
we  wear.  It  is  our  means  of  livelihood,  for  ultimately  even 
a  "  white  collar  "  job  becomes  precarious  when  business  is 
upset.  If  we  are  one  of  the  millions  of  factory  workers,  no 
power  tomorrow  means  no  work  tomorrow.  Coal  is  not  all, 
but  without  coal  the  present  economic  system  cannot  con- 
tinue.1 

There  are  at  least  two  reasons  for  desiring  a  steady  supply 
of  coal.  The  first  of  these  is  technical;  the  second,  finan- 
cial. Coal  can  be  stored  with  proper  safeguards.  But 
bituminous  coal  suffers  deterioration  after  it  is  mined  and 

1  The  latest  figures  for  the  incidence  of  the  bituminous  coal  supply 
problem  are  given  in  the  Preliminary  Report  of  the  U.  S.  Coal  Com- 
mission, Jan.  15,  1923,  p.  3:  Railroads,  28  per  cent;  Industrials,  25; 
Coking,  15;  Domestic,  10;  Iron  and  Steel,  7;  Export,  4;  Mines,  2; 
Bunkers,  2.  The  percentages  refer  to  the  proportion  of  the  total  output 
going  into  various  uses. 

172  [172 


I73]  THE  PUBLIC  INTEREST  IN  COAL  173 

with  faulty  storage  is  extremely  liable  to  spontaneous  com- 
bustion. It  is  desirable,  therefore,  that  a  minimum  amount 
be  stored.  There  must,  of  course,  be  certain  reserves  against 
emergencies  such  as  are  brought  on  by  a  railroad  or  coal 
strike,  but  more  particularly  against  the  unavoidable  delays 
arisiing  out  of  traffic  congestion.1     Financially  it  is  of  course 

1  The  history  of  coal  storage  is  shown  by  the  U.  S.  G.  S.  bulletin  on 
Commercial  Stocks  of  Coal,  Jan.  1,  1923: 

Estimated  Total  Commercial  Stocks  of  Bituminous  Coal  in  the 

United  States  a 

(net  tons) 

October  1,  1916 27,000,000      April  1,  1921  39,500,000 

October  1,  1917 28,100,000      August  1,  1921 41,100,000 

July  15,  1918 39,700,000      November  1,  1921  .. .     48,500,000 

October  1,  1918 59,000,000      January  1,  1922 48,ooo,ooob 

Day  of  the  Armistice  .     63,000,000      March  1,  1922 52,5oo,ooob 

January  1,  1919 57,900,000      April  1,  1922  At  least    63,ooo,ooobc 

April  1,  1919 40,400,000      September  1,  1922  .. .     22,ooo,ooob 

March  1,  1920 24,000,000      October  1,  1922 26,ooo,ooob<1 

June  1,  1920 20,000,000      November  1,  1922...     32,ooo,ooob 

January  1,  1921 45,800,000      January  1,  1923 36,ooo,ooob 

During  the  war  the  stocks  were  held  because  of  the  possibility  of 
emergency  congestion  of  traffic.  The  figures  do  not  show  the  storage 
of  coal  in  anticipation  of  the  1919  strike.  The  threatened  railroad 
strike  in  the  fall  of  1921  shows  how  stocks  piled  up.  The  U.  S.  G.  S. 
weekly  bulletins  on  coal  production  show  the  increase  in  demand  and 
its  sudden  slump  when  the  crisis  was  passed. 

Week  ending  Sept.     3  production  1.3  million  tons  per  day 
Oct.     15  "  1.6  -      "      » 

Oct.     29  "  1.8  »       m       n 

Nov.     5  "  1.6  9      •      n 

Dec.      3  "  1.2        "  "       "       " 

On  Jan.  28,  1922  (Bui.  237)  the  U.  S.  G.  S.  reports  that  coal  is  beginning 
to  go  into  storage  in  anticipation  of  the  strike. 

(a)  The  figures  for  1918  in  this  table  are  based  upon  an  actual  count. 
Beginning  April  1,  1919,  the  figures  are  estimates  based  upon  reports 
from  a  selected  list  of  5,000  consumers  whose  stocks  in  1918  bore  a 
known   relation  to  the  known   total   stocks,     (b)    Subject   to  revision. 

(c)  No  canvass  of  consumers  was  made  on  this  date.  The  total  stock 
was  estimated  from  the  stock  on  March  I,  ascertained  by  questionnaire. 

(d)  Revised  from  last  report. 


1/4 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS 


[174 


undesirable  to  keep  large  amounts  of  capital  tied  up  in  raw 
material  stocks.  Banks  are  now  educated  to  the  point  where 
they  will  loan  money  against  coal  reserves,  but  they  demand 
that  it  be  stored  near  the  point  of  consumption.  There  is  in- 
deed no  reason  for  storing  coal  near  the  mines  except  in  an- 
ticipation of  a  coal  strike,  because  the  mines  of  the  country 
can  always  produce  more  per  day  than  the  railroads  can 
handle.  This  means  costly  storage  space.  Besides  this 
there  is  the  cost  of  physical  rehandling. 

The  non-union  operators  point  to  this  need  of  the  public 
and  say  that  their  mines  guarantee  a  certain  minimum 
supply.  Harry  Olmsted  tells  the  Senate  Committee  that 
the  non-union  fields  of  Kentucky  and  West  Virginia  have 
an  annual  capacity  of  67,005,882  tons.1  Except  for  these 
non-union  fields  the  union  can  absolutely  throttle  production. 

This  contention  is  undoubtedly  true.  The  United  Mine 
Workers  can,  and  have  stopped  the  production  of  coal  in 
certain  districts.  Take  the  figures  for  coal  production  in 
1 91 9.     (Table  16.)     The  history  of  the  strike  is  written  in 


TABLE  16 

Production  of  Bituminous  Coal  in  1919  2 


Week  ending 

Average 
net  tons  per 
working  day 

Week  ending 

Average 
net  tons  per 
working  day 

Sept.  27 

1,934,000 
1,921,000 
1,980,000 
1,972,000 
2,189,000 
2,016,000 
592,000 

Nov.  15 

Nov.  22 

671,000 
896,000 
953,000 
877,000 
967,000 
1,750,000 
1,712,000 

Oct  4 

Oct   11 

Oct   18 

Dec.  6 

Oct  25 

i  Dec.  11 

Dec.  20 

Nov  8 

|Dec.  27 

1  Senate  Investigation,  1921,  vol.  i,  p.  256. 

1  U.  S.  G.  S.,  Weekly  Reports  on  the  Production  of  Bituminous  Coal. 


Revised  figures  used  except  for  December  6. 


I75]  THE  PUBLIC  INTEREST  IN  COAL  ^5 

those  figures.  The  threatened  strike  spurred  on  production. 
All  parties  to  production,  operators,  miners,  and  railroads, 
worked  faithfully.1  To  the  day  of  the  strike  there  was 
almost  no  labor  disturbance.2  On  November  1  the  strike 
was  called.  The  Central  Competitive  Field  was  closed 
down  almost  100  per  cent  except  for  a  few  wagon  mines, 
stripping  pits  and  cooperative  mines.  West  Virginia  and 
Kentucky  were  the  only  states  normally  supplying  the  upper 
Mississippi  basin  that  remained  active.  From  Iowa  to 
Oklahoma  about  99  per  cent  of  the  tonnage  was  closed 
down.  Texas  managed  to  maintain  an  output  of  33  per 
cent.3  The  strike  order  was  nominally  rescinded  at  Presi- 
dent Wilson's  demand  on  November  II.  A  few  mines 
opened  and  production  moved  up  slightly,  but  the  strong 
union  districts  remained  closed.  The  Interstate  Wage  Con- 
ference on  November  14  induced  many  miners  of  eastera 
and  southern  Pennsylvania,  Maryland  and  West  Virginia 
to  return  to  work.  The  conference  broke  up  too  late 
(Thanksgiving  Day)  to  stop  this  partial  movement.4  In 
the  sixth  week  of  the  strike  (Dec.  7-13)  President  Wilson 
submitted  a  satisfactory  basis  for  settlement.  It  required 
about  five  days  to  get  the  miners  back  to  work  and  produc- 
tion for  this  week  was  hardly  better  than  during  strike  weeks. 
Then  comes  the  swing  back  to  work.  December  20  looks 
normal.5  The  following  week  local  strikes  accounted  for  a 
loss  of  only  0.8  per  cent  of  productive  capacity.6 

During  this  period  the  non-union  fields  worked  almost  to 
capacity.     Car  shortage  and,  more  particularly,  rail  conges- 

1  Op.  cit.,  Bui.  1 18-120,  Oct.  11-25,  1919. 

2  Ibid.,  Bui.  120-121,  Oct.  25;  Nov.  1,  1919. 

8  Ibid.,  Bui.  123,  Nov.  15,  1919. 
4  Ibid.,  Bui.  124-126. 

9  Ibid.,  Bui.  128-129. 
'Ibid.,  Bui.  130. 


176 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS 


[176 


tion  kept  them  from  full  operation.  For  the  worst  of  the 
strike  weeks,  for  example,  the  following  table  (Table  17) 
shows  production. 

TABLE  17 

Per  cent  of  Capacity  Production  Mined  in  Certain  Non-union 

Fields  1 


Field 


Connellsville  (Pa.) 

Winding  Gulf  (W.  Va.)  . . 

Pocahontas  ( W.  Va.) 

Logan  (W.  Va.)    

Kenova-Thacker  (W.  Va.) 
Hazard  (Ky.)    


Per  cent  capacity  operated,  week  ending 


Nov.  8 


86.3 
91.1 

92-5 
84.2 
78.5 
76.0 


Nov.  15 


87.3 
92.9 
84.8 

87.3 
80.8 

79.3 


Nov.  22 


89.6 

95-° 
89.0 
85.2 
79.8 
(working) 


The  strike  of  1922  shows  a  similar  power  for  the  union. 
In  the  week  ending  Jan.  7,  1922,  the  market  turned  and 
with  only  minor  fluctuations  production  increased  until 
March  2$.2  Then  came  the  strike.  The  following  table 
(Table  18)  shows  the  course  of  production.  It  dropped  at 
once  to  about  one-third  of  the  peak.  After  the  third  week 
of  the  strike  the  output  begins  to  increase  and  rises  with 
fair  regularity  for  ten  weeks.  But  it  is  important  to  note 
that  this  is  not  due  to  a  resumption  of  work  at  struck  mines. 
For  April  22  the  U.  S.  G.  S.  reports  many  non-union  opera- 
tions working  part  time  because  the  demand  was  light.3  By 
May  13  there  had  been  an  increase  from  596,000  tons  per 

1  Op.  cit.,  Bulletins  covering  this  period. 

'This  change  is  seen  in  weekly  and  daily  tonnage,  Buls.  236,  247. 
The  daily  figure  increased  from  1,435,000  to  1,910,000;  the  weekly,  from 
7,450,000  to  11,458,000. 

8  Ibid.,  Bui.  249. 


177] 


THE  PUBLIC  INTEREST  IN  COAL 


177 


TABLE  18 
Production  of  Bituminous  Coal  in  1922  1 


Week  ending 

Average 
net  tons  per 
working  day 

Week  ending 

Average 
net  tons  per 
working  day 

1,964,000 
639,000 
609,000 
596,000 
696,000 
694,000 
739,000 
747,000 
815,000 
769,000 
856,000 
835,000 

894,000 
871,000 
736,000 
687,000 
615,000 
659,000 
719,000 
768,000 
768,000 
1,123,000 
1,524,000 

April  8 

A.pril  15 

Tulv  8 

Juv    'D  

'■*"&•  D 

Aug.  19   

Sept  2  

Tune  17 

day  to  739,000  tons.  The  increase  was  primarily  a  response 
to  quickened  demand.2  On  June  10  the  further  increase  to 
856,000  tons  was  made  possible  by  a  resumption  of  work 
in  some  mines  of  Connellsville,  Eastern  Kentucky,  Tennessee 
and  the  New  River  district :  3  all  regions  that  are  at  best 
only  weakly  organized.  No  further  increase  could  be  ex- 
pected without  a  break  in  the  union  ranks/  No  such  break 
had  occurred  and  there  seemed  little  reason  to  expect  one. 

At  this  point  the  conditions  of  the  railroads  became  im- 
portant. Early  in  June  the  weekly  bulletin  reports  signs  of 
congestion.  But  the  strike  of  the  shop-men  on  July  1  defi- 
nitely and  progressively  caused  trouble.5  In  three  weeks 
daily  tonnage  dropped  from  871,000  to  615,000  tons.  And 
still  no  new  fields  came  forward  to  relieve  congestion. 

1  U.  S.  G.  S.,  Weekly  Reports.     Revised  figures  used. 

2  Ibid.,  Bui.  252. 
'Ibid.,  Bui.  256. 
4  Ibid.,  Bui.  259. 
>Ibid.,  Bui.  261. 


1 78 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS 


[I78 


The  return  to  work  was  almost  as  rapid  as  the  stoppage. 
The  Cleveland  Agreement  was  signed  on  August  15,  Tues- 
day of  the  twentieth  week  of  the  strike.  As  fast  as  opera- 
tors signed,  men  returned  to  work.     (Table  19.)    The  strike 

TABLE  19 
Cars  of  Coal  Shipped  in  1922  1 


Day 


Monday  . . 
Tuesday  . . 
Wednesday 
Thursday  . 
Friday .... 
Saturday . . 


20th  week 
of  strike 


I5»703 
i3>°32 
12,531 
I3.52I 
I3.7I8 
13.524 


2 1  st  week 
of  strike 


18,601 
17,801 
18,524 
19,388 
22,882 
23,070 


22nd  week 
of  strike 


30,662 

28,197 
28,641 
28,687 
27,040 
25.5 1 7 


was  over.  The  Illinois  and  Ohio  miners  that  had  been  re- 
porting 100  per  cent  production  lost  due  to  strikes,  substi- 
tuted trifling  percentages,  if  any,  and  shifted  the  balance  of 
production  lost  to  "  car  shortage  "  and  "  no  market  ". 

Such  control  gives  the  mine  workers  great  power  over 
the  public.  The  miners  are  themselves  part  of  the  public.2 
As  such  they  suffer.  But  we  are  no  longer  dealing  with  a 
financially  weak  group  of  men.  The  United  Mine  Workers 
is  a  powerful  financial  organization,  as  can  be  seen  from 
Table  20.  Receipts  for  1921  were  over  $4,000,000;  ex- 
penditures were  nearly  $5,000,000.  For  four  years  the 
international  organization  has  carried  a  balance  of  over 
$1,000,000.  Besides  these  sums  the  various  districts  and 
locals  have  reserve  funds.  In  1921,  D.  C.  Kennedy  writes 
me,  the  operators  collected  $378,684.63  in  Kanawha  and 

1  Op.  cit.,  Bui.  269. 

2  Cf.,  Samuel  Untermyer  (Sen.  Invest.,  1921,  p.  715). 


179] 


THE  PUBLIC  INTEREST  IN  COAL 


179 


$661,29876  in  Fairmont,  making  a  total  for  District  17  of 
$I>°39>983-39  collected  as  union  dues  by  the  check-off. 

TABLE  20 
Growth  of  Resources  of  United  Mine  Workers,1  1899-1921 


Year 


i899; 

1900 

1901 

1902 

1903 ; 

1904 

1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1 9 1 1 
1912 

>9i3 
1914 

1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
I9i9; 
1920 
1921 


Average 

Curt 

Balance 

paid-up 

Expenses 

at  end  of 

membership 

year 

61,887 

$88,775 

$72,287 

#39,378 

"5.521 

333,945 

245,516 

127,807 

198,024 

299,283 

330,143 

97,047 

I75»367 

3,010,877 

2,080,805 

1,027,120 

247,240 

652,671 

573,593 

1,106,196 

251,006 

852,772 

i,355>OI9 

603,952 

264,850 

810,264 

1,024,670 

389,546 

230,667 

1,081,408 

1,132,994 

337,96o 

260,740 

910,742 

1,383,812 

864,890 

252,018 

806,882 

1,076,033 

595,739 

265,274 

831,730 

956,649 

470,820 

231,392 

1,669,634 

1,974,661 

160,793 

256,256 

2,222,754 

2,186,331 

197,216 

289,269 

221,262 

377,682 

2,159,031 

2,102,261 

278,032 

333*333 

3,222,742 

3»389,835 

110,938 

311,786 

1,858,604 

1,776,984 

192,558 

322,911 

1,047,871 

823,411 

417,018 

367,381 

1,759,727 

1,966,998 

209,747 

409,844 

2,484,834 

1,659,271 

1,035,310 

391,339 

1,607,771 

904,175 

1,728,906 

376,447 

2,352,821 

2,307,148 

1,774,578 

442,057 

4,346,3" 

4,987,988 

1,132,901 

Some  further  idea  of  the  financial  power  of  the  union 
may  be  gathered  from  the  nature  of  its  expenditures. 
(Table  21.)     In  1901  for  the  first  time  a  large  proportion 

1  Compiled  from  Report  of  Secretary-Treasurer  to  Annual  and 
Biennial  Conventions  of  United  Mine  Workers. 

2  In  all  figures  the  cents  have  been  omitted. 

3  Fiscal  year  1899-1902  is  Jan.  1  to  Dec.  31 ;  1903-1918  the  fiscal  year 
ends  Nov.  30;  19 10-  the  fiscal  year  ends  July  31.  Thus  1903  figures 
cover  11  months  and  1919  cover  8  months. 


i8o 


THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS 


[180 


of  the  expenditure  is  paid  for  relief.     "  Salaries  and  ex- 
penses "  is  an  extremely  important  item.     This  represents 

TABLE  21 
Nature  of  United  Mine  Workers'  Expenditures  1 


Year 

O 

H 

■2  « 

c  <u 

.5  & 

3 

CO 

p 

CO 

<u 

(R 

G 
(U 

Cu 
W 
0 

$956 

35i 

1,588 

3,022 

3,173 
5,340 
3,490 
3,123 
3,327 
5,397 
5,J27 

5,595 
5,382 

CJ 

Id 
in 

s 

So 

V 

"3 
H 

w 

3 
O 
<u 

a 

a 
0 

.22 

"3 

c 

H 

O 

1899 

1900 

1901 

1902 

1903 

1904 

1905 

1906 

1907 

1908 

1909 

1910 

19" 

$72,287 
79,280 

330,143 
2,080,805 

573.593 
i,355»<»9 
1,024,670 

1,132,994 
383,812 

1,076,033 
956,649 

1,979,661 

2,186,331 
4 

$42,682 
21,258 
79,478 
109,017 
158,146 
199,725 
186,883 
179,279 
169,671 
2II,803 
224,365 
216,242 
215^53 

290,764 

$10,276 
4,057 

6,495 

n,o75 

1,721 

14,948 

14,517 

16,435 

14,112 

16,498 

3,127 

4,576 

3,997 

$2,909 
1,136 
3,505 
5,738 
5,641 
5,872 
5,856 
6,458 
5,672 
6,666 
5,904 
7,i35 
5,66i 

$15,461 
2,838 

26,847 

54,895 

72,806 

54,389 
53,647 

106,856 
74,200 

78,319 

89,450 

177,378 

158,226  s 

#49,638 
202,926 

1,890,201 
308,780 

1,067,300 
753,723 
813.945 
109,935 
749,937 
600,300 

1,532,040 

1,758,401 

$9,301 
6,845 
7,830 
7,442 

6,551 
6,894 
6,892 
7,4IO 
9,883 
13,947 
H,493 

:::::: 



$18,489 

22,745 
25,015 

1913 

2,102,261 

4,43i 

7,161 

5,307 

136,032 

1,621,942 

24,031 

12,589 

1915 

1,776,984 

266,607 

1,632 

6,458 

4,968 

150,687 

1,259,515 

80,503 

6,6n 

1917 

1,966,998 

377,662 

15,182 

9,469 

9,920 

836,788 

643,509 

66,OI4 

8,45 « 

19192 

904,175 

366,798 

12,908 

6,442 

6,387 

393,867 

11,201 

96,909 

9,659 

"  missionary  work  ".     It  continues  to  grow  steadily,  but 
becomes  relatively  less  important.    In  1917  and  1919  "  mis- 

1  Compiled  from  Secretary- Treasurer's  Report  as  printed  in  the 
Annual  or  Biennial  Convention  Proceedings.  Figures  for  even  years 
1912-1918  not  given  in  biennial  report  for  detail  of  expenditure. 

2  For  eight  months,  Dec.  1,  1918  to  Aug.  1,  1919. 

8  Includes  $100,160  reported  separately  as  "  loans  refunded  to  districts." 
4  The   detail   for   these  even   years   is  not   given  by  the   Secretary- 
Treasurer  to  the  biennial  conventions. 


igl]  THE  PUBLIC  INTEREST  IN  COAL  1S1 

cellaneous "  represents  very  largely  repayments  of  loans 
for  strike  purposes.1 

The  first  concern  of  the  public  is  a  stabilized  coal  supply. 
There  must  be  no  stoppage  of  work.  To  prevent  such 
occurrences  there  must  be  some  public  machinery.  Kansas 
tried  the  industrial  court.  It  has  not  been  a  success.  Much 
may  be  written  on  this  subject,  but  the  interest  of  the  author 
is  not  to  go  back  to  any  fundamental  rights  involved.  The 
union  says :  "As  Mine  Workers,  we  are  absolutely  opposed 
to  the  principle  sought  to  be  enacted  into  law  contained 
within  the  provisions  of  the  Kansas  law,  with  or  without 
the  penalty  clause,  for  the  reason  it  is  a  part  of  the  funda- 
mental law  of  our  land  that  labor  has  the  right  to  agree  to 
peaceably  cease  work  when  not  in  violation  of  its  contract, 
and  when  the  concerted  action  is  peaceably  taken  to  increase 
their  wages  or  improve  their  working  conditions."  ' 

The  latter  part  of  this  statement  is  of  only  passing  in- 
terest to  us  at  this  point.  The  "  fundamental  right  "  to 
strike  is  a  rather  recent  discovery.  It  had  its  origin  in  the 
economic   institutions   of    the    nineteenth   century.      These 

1  In  191 7  "Loans  Repaid  Districts"  account  for  the  expenditure  of 
$356,282  of  the  $693,143  entered  as  "  Miscellaneous."  In  1919  the  figures 
are  as  follows : 

War  Chest  Indianapolis  $20,000 

Payment  of  $100,000  loan  made  by  Dist.  12  to  Dist.  6 100,000 

Over  paid  dues  (and  to  a  small  extent  wholly  miscellaneous 

items)    78,024 

Lawyers'  fees  and  A.  F.  of  L 80,594 

Loans  made 87,000 

One  half  salaries  and  expenses  of  travelling  auditors 28,248 

$393,866 
The  discrepancy  of  this  total  and  that  given  in  Table  21  is  accounted 
for  by  dropping  the  cents. 

1  Official  Statement  by  International  Executive  Board,  U.  M.  IV.  of 
A.,  in  Regard  to  the  Kansas  Controversy,  Indianapolis,  1921,  p.  7. 


lg2  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [^a 

same  institutions  continue  in  most  industries  to-day.  In 
the  coal  industry,  however,  one  institution  has  changed. 
The  worker  who  thirty  years  ago  was  a  member  of  a  small 
union  negotiating  with  operators  who  controlled  a  small 
percentage  of  the  total  output,  dealing  with  separate  groups 
of  operators  in  Illinois,  in  Indiana,  in  Ohio,  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, is  to-day  doing  business  on  a  national  scale.  The 
public  can  feel  very  little  interest  in  a  strike  that  cuts  off 
the  supply  from  even  one  state.  But  the  public  is  vitally  in- 
terested in  a  strike  that  ties  up  the  entire  nation. 

As  institutions  change,  the  concept  of  "  rights  "  changes 
also.  We  know  that  the  "  inalienable  and  natural  rights  " 
of  even  fifty  years  ago  are  gradually  going  by  the  board. 
The  decision  in  State  v.  Buchanan  1  in  1902  in  Washing- 
ton is  apropos  here. 

In  the  early  history  of  the  law,  when  employments  were  few 
and  simple,  the  relative  conditions  of  the  citizen  and  the  state 
were  different,  and  many  employments  and  uses  which  were 
then  considered  inalienable  rights  have  since,  from  the  very 
necessity  of  changed  conditions,  been  subjected  to  legislative 
control,  restriction,  and  restraint. 

Considered  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  public,  the  in- 
alienable right  to  strike  is  almost  as  individualistic  as  the 
extreme  conceptions  of  freedom  of  contract. 

But  although  we  may  consider  the  right  to  strike  a  strictly 
qualified  one,  to  which  the  rights  of  the  public  are  para- 
mount, there  remains  the  question  of  expediency.  The 
miners  are  opposed  to  compulsory  arbitration.  As  we  have 
seen  above,  they  have  been  taught  by  the  courts  themselves 
to  feel  that  labor's  cause  can  never  be  won  in  the  courts. 
Before  we  can  expect  cooperation  from  the  miners  with  the 
government,  they  must  be  re-educated.     The  public  cause  is 

1 29  Wash.  602,  610. 


!83]  THE  PUBLIC  INTEREST  IN  COAL  183 

always  represented  by  some  agent  of  the  government,  and 
the  government  represents,  so  the  miner  feels,  not  the  con- 
suming public  but  the  producing  owner.  Through  our  own 
government  institutions  we  have  lost  the  worker's  confi- 
dence.    We  must  pay  the  price  and  regain  his  confidence. 

This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  public  is  power- 
less. There  are  several  intermediate  positions  between  the 
present  attitude  of  government  and  compulsory  arbitration. 
The  present  attitude  seems  to  be  largely  that  of  awaiting 
some  overt  act.  When  this  occurs,  a  temporary  fact-finding 
agency  is  established.  What  preliminary  overtures  of  con- 
ciliation are  made  are  almost  unofficial.  The  suggestions  of 
the  Secretary  of  Labor  or  Commerce  have  been  timorous. 
They  have  lacked  the  dignity  of  a  public  demand. 

As  an  absolute  minimum,  there  should  exist  a  permanent 
fact-finding  agency  with  the  full  power  and  dignity  of  the 
federal  government  behind  it.  It  should  be  the  duty  of 
this  commission  to  consolidate  all  existing  information  with 
reference  to  wages,  cost  of  living  in  coal  camps,  prices  of 
coal,  market  conditions  and  profits.  It  must  have  the 
power  to  compel  the  attendance  of  any  witness.  It  must 
function  with  a  view  to  reaching  a  decision  before  a  break 
occurs.  Its  findings  should  be  enforced  by  concerted  public 
opinion. 

There  is  not  even  included  the  clause  of  the  Canadian  In- 
dustrial Disputes  Act  that  specifies  that  an  award  be  made 
before  a  strike  or  lock-out  be  allowed  to  go  into  effect. 
The  purpose  of  the  proposed  body  is  that  it  eliminate  the 
necessity  of  such  a  clause  by  reaching  some  conclusion  be- 
fore the  date  originally  set  for  strike.  Strikes  in  the  coal 
industry  are  not  sudden  phenomena.  The  exact  day  when 
a  strike  may  occur  is  known  at  least  one  year  ahead  of  time. 
The  storm-clouds  gather  slowly  and  plainly.  There  is  a 
distant  rumbling  that  grows  clearer.     The  strike  of  1922 


N 


j%4  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [184 

was  clearly  predictable  in  1921.  Men  on  both  sides  were 
ready  for  it.  Many  operators  with  whom  I  talked  were 
anxious  for  it.  By  January,  1922,  the  coal-purchasing 
public  were  buying  in  anticipation  of  a  suspension.  There 
still  remained  three  months  for  settlement.  By  March  no 
doubt  of  the  strike  remained.  Our  commission  still  had 
one  month  in  which  to  analyze  the  information  that  had 
been  continuously  collected.  The  strike  was  called,  dragged 
on  for  five  months,  was  settled  in  no  more  scientific  manner 
than  strikes  in  the  coal  industry  have  been  settled  since 
Hocking  Valley  in  1884.  After  it  was  all  over,  the  con- 
suming public  established  a  temporary  agency  to  find  out 
what  is  wrong  with  the  coal  industry. 

If  a  commission,  such  as  is  here  suggested,  proves  too 
weak,  then  we  may  still  go  forward  to  compulsory  arbitra- 
tion. It  will  then  be  time  to  invoke  the  superior  rights  of 
the  public.  But  as  a  preliminary  step  it  would  seem  unwise 
to  antagonize  a  body  of  half  a  million  workers,  to  force 
them  before  an  economic  judiciary  in  whom  they  would 
lack  confidence. 

There  are  several  elements  of  no  small  importance  that 
must  be  mentioned  at  this  point.  A  strike  in  the  coal  in- 
dustry is  brought  about  by  the  fundamental  disagreement  of 
two  parties.  The  operator,  therefore,  frequently  shares  re- 
sponsibility for  the  suspension.  The  entire  industry  may 
be  so  inefficiently  organized  that  a  drastic  reorganization  is 
necessary  before  either  of  the  two  producing  parties  or  the 
public  faces  a  stabilized  condition. 

But  accepting  the  situation  as  it  is,  the  public  must  re- 
arrange certain  preconceptions  as  to  fair  profits  and  equal 
competitive  conditions.  The  writer  is  convinced  (and  many 
operators  agree)  that  the  difficulty  is  not  that  of  obtaining 
a  given  wage,  but  of  obtaining  such  a  wage  in  the  face  of 
a  lower  wage  paid  in  other  competing  fields.    The  probable 


^5]  THE  PUBLIC  INTEREST  IN  COAL  ^5 

outcome  of  government  intervention  in  April,  1922,  would 
have  been  a  material  wage  cut.  All  the  facts  were  with  the 
operators.  The  non-union  fields  had  the  trade.  But  by  a 
five  months'  strike  aided  by  industrial  revival  the  miners 
maintained  the  old  wage. 

The  solution  is  to  be  found  first  in  bringing  all  fields  to  a 
union  scale;  and  then  when  wage  cuts  are  to  be  made  only 
in  response  to  market  demands,  the  public  may  well  insist 
that  the  cut  be  taken  and  work  continued.  The  miners  will 
not,  and  ought  not  to  "  mortgage  the  future  for  a  tem- 
porary gain  "  by  reducing  wage  rates  to  meet  the  non-union, 
a  procedure  that  has  no  end,  as  the  non-union  again  cuts 
below  the  union.  The  operators  are  absolutely  correct  when 
they  say  that  in  times  of  depression  they  cannot  compete 
with  non-union  fields.  It  is  these  non-union  competing 
fields  in  West  Virginia,  in  Kentucky,  in  Pennsylvania  that 
bear  much  of  the  responsibility  for  chaos  in  the  coal  in- 
dustry.    As  a  preliminary  step  they  must  be  organized. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
Conclusion 

In  large  measure  any  conclusion  drawn  from  the  preced- 
ing chapters  must  be  opinion.  A  mathematically  accurate 
conclusion  as  to  some  of  the  individual  factors  is  impossible 
because  of  the  qualitative  nature  of  the  material.  The  net 
resultant  of  all  the  factors  is  still  more  inexact  because  the 
attempt  is  made  to  equate  incommensurable  quantities.  Ex- 
cept by  some  Benthamite  calculation  one  cannot  express  in 
common  terms,  efficiency  and  money  loss,  personal  liberty, 
advances  in  the  miners'  standard  of  life  and  public  welfare 
as  affected  by  the  coal  supply. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  condition  of  non-union  and  union 
fields  at  any  given  moment  does  not  present  a  picture  un- 
favorable to  the  non-union  districts.  With  the  exception 
of  the  method  of  measuring  coal,  conditions  seem  to  be 
about  the  same  in  the  two  types  of  field  during  periods  of 
prosperity. 

But  the  flexible  wage  scale  of  non-union  fields  allows 
them  to  compete  more  favorably  during  times  of  depression. 
The  union  fields  are  bound  to  a  wage  scale  for  two  years. 
The  differential  costs  force  them  to  remain  idle,  a  result  that 
would  not  necessarily  obtain  were  all  fields  non-union. 

This  distribution  of  the  market  is  constantly  undermining 
advances  made  by  the  miners  in  union  fields.  It  occasion- 
ally forces  them  down.     It  always  impedes  progress. 

Yet  in  the  face  of  this  condition  the  miners  have  ad- 
vanced from  the  frightful  chaos  of  the  middle  nineties  to 
such  a  position  that  the  need  for  any  further  immediate  in- 
186  [186 


igy]  CONCLUSION  187 

crease  is  at  least  debatable.  They  have  been  able  to  ad- 
vance only  through  the  strength  of  the  union. 

That  the  union  will  be  beneficial  to  men  who  are  now 
non-union  operators  is  doubtful.  The  loss  through  petty 
strikes  and  inefficiency  is  small  contrasted  with  the  probable 
loss  that  will  result  when  depression,  instead  of  concen- 
trating on  union  fields,  is  spread  over  the  entire  industry  by 
truly  competitive  conditions,  which  include  a  uniform  labor 
market.  This  loss  furnishes  ample  reason  for  the  non- 
union operators'  opposition  to  organization.  It  furnishes 
absolutely  no  reason  for  public  sympathy  with  his  cause. 

The  union  is  not  perfect  in  its  functioning.  But  the  flaws 
are  matters  of  detail  —  important,  it  is  true  —  that  may 
reasonably  be  expected  to  disappear  with  time.  The  point 
of  view  is  perhaps  narrow,  failing  to  recognize  properly  the 
public  interest.  But  we  may  well  ask  why  we  should  expect 
the  miners  to  trouble  themselves  with  the  public  interest 
when  their  own  needs  have  been  so  pressing.  They  knew 
that  the  competition  engendered  by  over-development  made 
improvement  in  their  lot  impossible.  They  proceeded  to 
stifle  competition  among  themselves  by  creating  a  labor 
monopoly  and  fixing  the  price  of  that  labor  so  as  to  stabilize 
their  employment.  The  public  has  an  interest  in  the  coal 
problem,  but  it  is  unjust  to  condemn  the  miner  for  not 
protecting  a  public  that  had  sufficient  powers  to  protect 
itself  and  yet  did  not  interest  itself  sufficiently  to  use  them. 

To  the  statement  of  William  Wiley  to  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Education  and  Labor  (vol.  2,  p.  975) 

I  believe  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America  started  a  union 
at  a  time  when  it  was  most  tremendously  needed,  at  a  time 
when  the  operators  were  doing  most  dreadful  things ;  and  that 
there  was  a  union  needed,  and  they  have  done  a  wonderful 
work,  but  as  the  power  has  grown  in  them  they  seem  to  have 
lost  a  sense  of  the  benefit  to  the  men,  the  conditions  that  they 


iSS  THE  UNITED  MINE  WORKERS  [t88 

wanted  to  remedy  when  there  were  no  more  conditions  to 
remedy  ....  [The  inference  being  that  the  union  is  un- 
necessary.] 

there  is  only  one  answer.  The  inference  is  not  true.  So 
long  as  the  industry  is  over-developed,  good  intentions  will 
not  maintain  scale  rates.  The  miners'  union  is  needed  to-day 
to  keep  conditions  from  reverting  to  those  that  existed 
when  operators  did  "  most  dreadful  things  ". 

That  the  United  Mine  Workers  should  be  extended  to  all 
coal  fields  in  the  country  may  be  argued  from  two  points  of 
view.  The  miners  can  advance  only  with  the  greatest  diffi- 
culty in  the  face  of  non-union  competition.  If  it  is  argued 
that  the  miners  should  advance  no  further  at  present,  it 
may  still  be  pointed  out  that  the  union  operator  is  being 
penalized  for  rendering  a  service  to  society,  that  he  has 
been  thus  penalized  for  twenty  years,  that  in  ordinary  jus- 
tice this  should  cease. 

The  non-union  fields  should  be  organized.  The  operator 
must  be  protected  in  certain  important  details — by  the  public 
if  necessary.  The  public  must  be  prepared  to  exercise  suffi- 
cient control  to  insure  a  "  good  trust  "  in  the  labor  market 
for  coal.  If  necessary,  there  must  be  public  intervention 
based  on  complete  information  and  backed  by  all  the  author- 
ity of  government. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Agreements  between  Kanawha  Coal  Operators  and  United  Mine  Workers 

of  America,  1903  to  date,  Charleston,  W.  Va. 
Agreement  of  Northern  West  Virginia  Operators'  Association  and  United 

Mine  Workers  of  America,  1920,  Fairmont,  W.  Va. 
Archbald,  Hugh,  The  Four  Hour  Day  in  Coal,  1921. 
Basic  Agreements  for  Maryland  and  Upper  Potomac  Coal  Fields,  1918 

and  1920,  Cumberland,  Md. 
Basic  Agreement   for   Maryland,   Decisions   rendered  under  agreement 

by  arbitrator.     (Mostly  unprinted.) 
Bald,  Robert,  A   General  View  of  the  Coal  Trade  of  Scotland,  Edin- 
burgh, 1812. 
Bloch,  Louis,   The  Coal  Miners'  Insecurity,   Russell   Sage  Foundation, 

New  York,  1922. 
The  Coal  Controversy,  Bui.  2,  Research  Department  of  Federal  Council 

of  Churches  of  Christ  in  America,  New  York,  1922. 
Constitution  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  1920,  Indianapolis. 
Edington,   Robert,  A    Treatise  on  the  Coal   Trade  with  Strictures  on 

its  Abuses,  London,  1813. 
Evans,    Chris,   History    of    United  Mine   Workers    (to   1900),   2   vols., 

Indianapolis. 
Evidence  taken  by   Commission  Appointed  by  the  Governor  of   West 

Virginia   in    Connection    with    the   Logan    County    Situation,    1919. 

Only  one  typewritten  copy  at  Huntington,  W.  Va.  is  in  existence. 
Facts  about  the  Armed  March,  Testimony  of  William  Wiley  before  U.  S. 

Senate  Investigating  Committee,   Kanawha  Operators'   Association, 

Charleston,  1922. 
Hard,   William,  Labor  in  a  Basic  Industry,  Chicago  Daily  News  Re- 
prints, 1920. 
Hearings  before  the  Committee  on  Education  and  Labor,  U.  S.  Senate, 

67th   Congress,    1st   Session,   pursuant   to   Sen.   Resolution   No.   80, 

Investigating  conditions  in  West  Virginia,  2  vols.,  Washington,  1922. 
Hearings  before  Committee  on  Labor  of  House  of  Representatives,  67th 

Congress,  2nd  Session,  pursuant  to  H.  R.  11022,  Labor  Conditions 

in  the  Coal  Industry,  Washington,  1922. 
Hogg,  Charles  Edgar,  ed.,  Hogg's  West  Virginia  Code,  3  vols.,  St.  Paul, 

Minn.,  West  Publishing  Co.,  19 14. 
189]  189 


190  BIBLIOGRAPHY  [190 

International  Geological  Congress  1913,  Coal  Resources  of  the  World, 

3  vols,  and  atlas. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  Reports,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Jevons,  H.  Stanley,  British  Coal  Trade,  London,  1915. 
Journal  of  House  of  Delegates,  West  Virginia  Legislature,  Charleston, 

W.  Va. 
Journal  of  Senate,  West  Virginia  Legislature,  Charleston,  W.  Va. 
Knowles,  Morris,  Industrial  Housing,  McGraw-Hill,  New  York,  1920. 
Lane,  Winthrop  D.,  Civil  War  in  West  Virginia,  B.  W.  Huebsch,  New 

York,  1921. 
Moore,   Martha,  Mendip  Annals,  2nd  edition,  ed.  by  Arthur  Roberts, 

London,  1859. 
Proceedings  of  Board  of  Conciliation    (for   Kanawha  District),    1914, 

5  vols.     Typewritten  copies  in  Charleston,  W.  Va. 
Proceedings  of  the  Joint  Scale  Committee  and  Joint  Scale  Convention 

of  Miners  and   Operators    (Kanawha   District),    1906,    Charleston, 

W.  Va.,  1906. 
Proceedings  of  the  Annual  Conventions  of  the  National  Coal  Association. 
Proceedings  of  the  Seventh  National  Conference  of  the  National  Tax 

Association,  191 3. 
Proceedings  of  the  Third  Biennial  Convention  of  District  17,  U.  M.  W. 

of  A.,  Charleston,  W.  Va.,  1918. 
Proceedings  of  the  Annual  and  Biennial  Conventions  of  the  United  Mine 

Workers  of  America. 
Proceedings   of  the  Annual  Conventions  of  the   West   Virginia   State 

Federation  of  Labor,  Charleston,  W.  Va. 

Reports 

Award   and   Recommendations   of    the   Bituminous    Coal    Commission, 

1920,  Washington,  1920. 
Annual  Reports  of  Bureau  of  Labor,  West  Virginia,  Charleston,  1893- 

1918. 
Federal  Trade  Commission,  Cost  Reports  on  Coal,  7  vols.,  Washington, 

1920. 
Final  Report  of  Commission  on  Industrial  Relations,  Washington,  1915. 
Final  Report   and   Testimony   Submitted   to   Congress   by   Commission 

on  Industrial  Relations,  12  vols.,  Washington,  1916. 
Report  on  the  Colorado  Strike,  by  George  P.  West,  U.  S.  Commission 

on  Industrial  Relations,  Washington,  1915. 
Report  of  Industrial  Commission,  1901,  15  vols.,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Report  and  Digest  of  Evidence  taken  by  Commission  appointed  by  Gov- 

ernor  of  West  Virginia  in  Connection  with  the  Logan  County  Situ- 
ation, 1919,  Charleston. 


I9I]  BIBLIOGRAPHY  191 

Report  of  Commission  appointed  by  Gov.  Glasscock  to  investigate  Paint 

Creek  Strike,  1913,  Charleston. 
Report  of  Senate  Committee  on  Education  and  Labor  on  Paint  and 

Cabin  Creek  Strike,  Washington,  191 4. 
Biennial  Reports   of   State   Superintendent   of  Free   Schools  in    West 

Virginia,  Charleston. 
Annual    Reports    of    State    Tax    Commissioner    of    West     Virginia, 

Charleston. 
Preliminary  Report:  U.  S.  Coal  Commission,  Washington,  Jan.,  1923. 
Final  Report  of  the  U.  S.  Fuel  Administration,  1917-1919,  Washington, 

1921. 
Annual  Report  of  the  U.  S.  Geological  Survey  on  Mineral  Resources, 

Washington,  1890-1918. 
Weekly  Reports   of   the   U.    S.    Geological  iSurvey   on   Production   of 

Bituminous  Coal,  Anthracite  and  Beehive  Coke,  Washington,  1917- 
Annual  Reports  of  West  Virginia  Department  of  Mines,  Charleston. 
Spivak,  John  L.,   Report  to  American  Civil  Liberties  Union  on  Con- 
ditions in  Mingo  County,  1920. 
Statement   of  Facts  and  Summary   of   Committee  appointed  by  Hon. 

John  F.  Hylan  to  Investigate  the  Labor  Conditions  at  the  Berwin- 

White  Co's.  Coal  Mines,  Dec,  1922. 
Statement  of  Harry  Olmsted,  Chairman  of  the  Labor  Committee  of  the 

Operators'  Association  of  the  Williamson  Field  to  the  Senate  In- 
vestigating Committee,  Washington,  1921. 
Statement  made  by  the  Operators'  Association  of  the  Williamson  Field 

before  the  Senate  Investigating  Committee,  1921. 
Statement    of    Wm.    Green,    International    Secretary-Treasurer    of   the 

United   Mine  Workers   of  America,  to  the   Senate  Committee  on 

Manufactures  during  Public  Hearings  on  the  Calder  Coal  Regula- 
tion Act,  Indianapolis,  1922. 
Stone,  Gilbert,  The  British  Coal  Industry,  J.  M.  Dent,  London,  1919. 
The  Strike  History  of  District   14   of  Kansas  from  April  J,   1916  to 

December    31,     1919,     Southwestern     Interstate     Coal     Operator's 

Association. 
Suffern,  Arthur  E.,  Conciliation  and  Arbitration  in  the  Coal  Industry 

of  America,  Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  New  York,  1915. 
Testimony  taken  before  Bituminous  Coal  Commission,  Washington,  1920. 
Testimony  taken  under  House  Resolution  387,  Conditions  in  the  Coal 

Mines  of  Colorado,  2  vols.,  Washington,  1914. 
The  1920  Soft  Coal  Shortage,  letter  by  George  Otis  Smith.     Reprinted 

by  National  Coal  Association,  Washington,  1921. 
Transportation,  the  Problem  of  Soft  Coal,  National  Coal  Association, 

Washington,  192 1. 


I92  BIBLIOGRAPHY  [ig2 

United  Mine  Workers  of  America,   The  Case  of  the  Bituminous  Coal 

Mine  Workers,  1920. 
U.  M.  W.  of  A.,  Government  of  Coal,  1922. 
U.  M.  W.  of  A.,  Official  Statement  by  the  International  Executive  Board 

in  Regard  to  the  Kansas  Controversy,  1921. 
U.  M.  W.  of  A.,  Why  the  Miners  Program,  1922. 
U.  S.  Bituminous  Coal  Commission,  Memorandum  Filed  by  Kanawha 

Operators'  Association,  1920. 
U.   S.   Bureau  of  the   Census,   Coal,   14th  Census  of  the  U.   S.   1919, 

Washington,  1922. 
U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics : 

Bui.  2/g,Hours  and  Earnings  in  Anthracite  and  Bituminous  Coal 
Mining  in  19 19,  Washington,  1921. 

Bui.  316,  Hours  and  Earnings  in  Anthracite  and  Bituminous  Coal 
Mining,  1921,  Washington,  1922. 

Bui.  263,  Housing  by  Employers  in  the  United  States,  Washington, 
1920. 
U.  S.  Bureau  of  Mines,  Bui.  87,  Housing  for  Mining  Towns,  Washing- 
ton, 1914. 
U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor,  Bui.  46,  Anthracite  Commission  Report,  Wash- 
ington, 1903. 
U.  S.  Commissioner  of  Labor,  Special  Report  12,  Comparative  Mining 

in  Europe,  Washington,  1905. 
U.  S.  Geological  Survey : 

Commercial  Stocks  of  Coal,  Jan.  1,  1923. 

Professional   Paper   123,  W.   S.   Murray,   Superpower  System  for 
Region  between  Boston  and  Washington,  Washington,  1921. 

Topographical  Maps. 
Warne,  Frank  J.,  The  Coal  Mine  Workers,  1905. 
Webb,   Sidney  and  Beatrice,   History  of  Trade   Unionism,  Longmans, 

Green  &  Co.,  London,  1902. 
Webb,    Sidney,    The  Story   of   the  Durham  Miners,    Fabian   Society, 

London,  192 1. 

Cases  Cited 

Atkins  v.  Grey  Eagle  Coal  Co.,  76  W.  Va.  27. 

Bowman  v.  Bradley,  151  Pa.  351. 

Erie  RR  Co.  v.  Williams,  233  U.  S.  685. 

Frorer  v.  People,  141  111.  171. 

Godcharles  v.  Wigeman,  6  Atl.  354. 

Graniteville  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Renew,  102  S.  E.  18. 

Hackett  v.  Marmet  Co.,  8  U.  S.  App.  149. 

Hancock  v.  Yaden,  121  Ind.  366. 

Hitchman  Coal  and  Coke  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  241  U.  S.  644. 


193]  BIBLIOGRAPHY  193 

Keskee  Consolidated  Coke  Co.  v.  Taylor,  234  U.  S.  224. 
Lane  v.  Au  Sable  Electric  Co.,  147  N.  W.  546. 
Leep  v.  St.  Louis,  58  Ark.  407. 

Mitchell  v.  Morris  Canal  and  Banking  Co.,  31  N.  J.  Law  99. 
Pond  Creek  Coal  Co.  V.  Riley  Lester  &  Bros.,  188  S.  W.  007. 
State  v.  Buchanan,  29  Wash.  602. 
State  v.  Fire  Creek  Coal  and  Coke  Co.,  33  W.  Va.  188. 
State  v.  Goodwill,  33  W.  Va.  179. 
State  v.  Peel  Splint  Coal  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  802. 

United  Mine  Workers  of  America  v.  Coronado  Coal  Co.,  U.  S.  Sp.  Ct., 
Oct.  Term  1921,  p.  643. 

Records,  etc.,  in  Legal  Cases 

Algonquin  Coal   Co.  v.  John   L.  Lewis,  Ct.  Ct.  of   Mercer  Co.,    1920. 
Copies  of  the  bill,  answer  and  injunction  published  by  the  Pocahontas 
Operators  Association. 
Deposition  of  Stofflet. 
Deposition  of  Craven. 
Hitchman  Coal  and  Coke  Co.  v.  John  Mitchell. 

Petition  and  Motion  of  Hitchman  Coal  and  Coke  Co.  for  a  writ  of 
certiorari  to  the  U.  S.  Ct.  Ct.  of  Appeals,  Sp.  Ct.  of  U.  S.,  Oct. 
term,  1914. 
Petition  and   Motion   for  Writ  of   Certiorari :    Supplemental   Brief 

for  Respondents. 
Transcript  of  Record,  Sp.  Ct.  of  U.  S.,  Oct.  term,  1915. 
Matewan  trial,  1920-1921.     Evidence  taken  in  the  Matewan  Trial,  Feb., 

1921. 
Pond  Creek  Coal  Co.  v.  John  L.  Lewis,  U.  S.  Dist.  Ct.,  iHuntington,  1920. 

Bill,  answer  and  injunction.     Not  printed. 
Red  Jacket  Coal  and  Coke  Co.  v.  John  L.  Lewis,  U.  S.  Dist.  Ct.,  Blue- 
field,  1920.     Bill,  answer  and  injunction. 
Red  Jacket,  Jr.,  Coal  Co.  v.  Cecil  Rudisille.     Bill  of  complaint  in  Mingo 

Ct.  Ct.  (1920  or  1921). 
U.  M.  W.  of  A.  v.  Coronado  Coal  Co.,  Oct.  term,  1920,  U.  S.  Sp.  Ct. 
Brief  and  Argument  for  Plaintiffs-in-Error. 
Brief  and  Argument  for  Defendants-in-Error. 
Wilhelmina  v.  Young.     Evidence  in  Ct.  Ct.  of  Mingo  County,  1921. 

Periodical  LzTESATUSB 

American    Economic    Review,    Sept.,    1921,    vol.    xi,    Paul    H.    Douglas, 

"  The  Movement  of  Real  Wages,  1890-1918." 
Charleston  Daily  Mail,  Charleston,  W.  Va. 
Coal  Age. 
Coal  Review.     Organ  of  the  National  Coal  Association. 


1^4  BIBLIOGRAPHY  [I94 

Monthly  Labor  Review,  April,  1922.    "Wages  in  Coal  Mines  and  Cost 

of  Living." 
North  American  Review,  vol.  198,  pp.  457-469,  Oct.,  1913. 
Political  Science  Quarterly,  vol.  29,  pp.  626-663,  Dec.,  1914.     Lawrence 

Lynch,  "  The  West  Virginia  Coal  Strike." 
Survey,    vol.    30,    pp.    37-50.    Harold    Weston,    "Civil    War    in    West 

Virginia  Coal  Mines." 
Survey  Graphic,  April,  1922. 

John  Brophy,  "  The  Miners'  Program." 

Powers  Hapgood,  "  Two  Days  from  a  Diary." 

Charles  P.  Steinmetz,  "  The  White  Revolution." 

F.  G.  Tryon,  "  The  Broken  Year  of  the  Bituminous  Miner." 

David  L.  Wing,  "  Economic  Aspects  of  the  Anthrac-ite  Industry." 
United  Mine  Workers  Journal.    Official  organ  of  miners. 


INDEX 


American  Miners'  Association,  104 

Bonuses:  an  industrial  evil,  135; 
allowed  under  certain  conditions, 
136;   operators  cannot  pay,   166, 

I/O 

Check-off:  description  of,  128; 
characteristic  of  industry,  128; 
not  always  favored  by  miners, 
130 

Checkweighman :  laws  relating  to, 
30;  men  afraid  to  demand,  15; 
need  for,  32,  35;  position  of,  33 

Closed  shop :  characteristic  of  U. 
M.  W.,  126;  drove  men  away, 
131;  analogy  to  taxation,  132; 
and  personal  liberty,  134;  and 
enforcement  of  joint  contract, 
140,  159 

Company  housing:  necessary,  54, 
59,  7°;  types  of,  55;  little  dif- 
ference between  union  and  non- 
union, 58;  low  returns  from,  60; 
control  over  worker,  63,  79;  law 
of  master  and  servant  and,  65 

Company  stores :  reasons  for,  36 ; 
prices  at,  38,  42;  method  of 
operating,  38;  compulsion  to 
trade  at,  39,  47;  legal  position 
of,  47 

Conspiracy  to  close  non-union 
mines:  "basis  of  charge,  1121; 
argument  by  miners,  116 

Days  operated:  and  wages,  89; 
chart,  93 

Deputy  sheriffs :  employed  by 
union,  148;  employed  by  opera- 
tors,  151 

Discharge  limited,  161,  167 

Eviction,  64 

Hours :  changes  due  to  union,  83 ; 
six-hour  day,   145 
195] 


Industrial  democracy,   160 
Inefficiency    due    to    unionization, 
165 

Joint  agreement:  105,  107,  no; 
applying  only  to  union  men, 
133;  rights  of  both  parties,  160 

Kansas  Court,  181 
Knights  of  Labor,  109 

Medical  treatment :  medical  in- 
spection in  schools,  72;  company 
doctor,  76 

Miners'  and  Laborers'  Benevolent 
Association,    105 

National     Federation     of     Miners 

and  Aline  Laborers,  106 
Xon-union    fields    supply    country 

during  strike,    176 

Operators  oppose  union:  reasons 
for,    144 

Overdevelopment,  93;  effect  on  in- 
dustry of,  101 

Pay-days.  40,  52 

Premiums,  see  Bonuses 

Production  :  since  1890,  92  ;  factors 
controlling,  94,  seasonal,  98; 
U.  M.  \V.   control,    174 

Public  interest  in  coal,  172;  tem- 
porary commissions,  181 ;  right 
to  compel  production,  182;  per- 
manent  commission  needed',    18$ 

Public  slow  to  improve  miners' 
condition,   84 

Scrip :  law  relating  to,  49 

Shopmen's  strike  of  1922  and  coal 
supply,   177 

Schools :  aid  from  companies,  71 ; 
medical  inspection,  72;  control 
over  school  system,  73;  low 
standing  of  schools  of  West 
Virginia,  74 

195 


196 


INDEX 


[196 


State  constabulary,  152;  raid  Lick 

Creek,  153 
Storage  of  coal,  173 
Strikes:    Hocking  Valley,   106;   in 

violation  of   contract,    154;   andl 

coal    supply,    174,    177;    brought 

on  by  both  parties,  184 

Unionization:  need  for,  118;  in- 
efficiency due  to,  165;  workers 
petition  against,    13. 

United  Mine  Workers:  increase 
seasonality,  100;  history,  104; 
organized,  no;  closed  shop 
union,  126;  control  coal  supply, 
174;  resources,  179;  oppose 
Kansas    Court,    181 ;    aims    of, 


145;  show  contempt  of  govern- 
ment, 147 

Violence:  not  a  reason  for  organ- 
izing, 10;  cause  of  private 
police,  148;  by  state  police,  153 

Wages :  fair  day's  wage,  18,  24 ; 
by  measurement  in  non-union, 
19;  wage  increases  follow  union 
fields,  21,  28;  large  earnings  in 
non-union,  24;  wage  increases 
since  1902,  87,  90;  short  work- 
ing year,  89 

Yellow  dog  contract,  140 


VITA 

The  author  was  born  in  Brooklyn  in  1899.  He  received 
the  A.B.  degree  after  work  at  Cornell  University  in  191 6- 18, 
1919-20,  and  at  Columbia  College  in  1920-21.  During  the 
years  1921-23  he  attended  Columbia  University  first  as 
William  Mitchell  Fellow  and  then  as  University  Fellow  in 
Economics.     He  received  the  M.A.  degree  in  1922. 

While  at  Columbia  he  attended  seminars  conducted  by 
Professors  E.  R.  A.  Seligman,  Henry  R.  Seager,  Henry  L. 
Moore,  Wesley  C.  Mitchell,  and  V.  G.  Simkhovitch. 

He  is  co-author  wiith  Donald  C.  Davenport  of  Part  III 
(Statistical  Section)  of  the  Report  of  the  Special  Joint 
Committee  on  Taxation  and  Retrenchment  (New  York 
State,  1923). 

197 


